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We are the children of a passionate truth and a truthful passion. We passionately
know that reality is not reduced to what exists and that most of what does not exist
could and deserves to exist.
– Boaventura de Sousa Santos, p.8 (2016)
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Abstract
Science diplomacy, the interlinkage between research and foreign affairs, is a recent
field of research, albeit being claimed to be an ancient practice in international
relations. Science diplomacy practices generally include the influence of scientific
advice during international negotiations, the bridging of communities (or even
conflicting nations) through joint research projects and the promotion of science by
diplomatic channels, just to name a few. Largely identified today by mainstream
intergovernmental policy-makers as a beneficial practice, science diplomacy is
promoted as being rooted in the universality and cooperative nature of science and
as a means for peaceful and uncontested international interactions. However,
research on the processes underlying the adoption of science diplomacy practices is
evaluating how the different imperatives of science and of diplomacy clash in values
and expected outcomes. Thus, this study is aimed at exploring and understanding
the importance of science diplomacy to ocean affairs, specifically looking at the
power play between science and diplomacy in the Atlantic Ocean, utilizing the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance as a case.
This study reflects a stepwise process in unveiling the importance of science
diplomacy in ocean governance. The first step was to review the current state-ofthe-art on science diplomacy, its practices and scholarship. Second, analyze how
science diplomacy is active in ocean affairs, departing from the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and related instruments. Finally, use the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance as a case in time to search for science diplomacy
practices. In this journey, the collection of perceptions from researchers and
government officials about science diplomacy informed me on the need to address
issues of power, capabilities and South-North relationships in the Atlantic.
My ultimate goal was to identify how and why the Atlantic community of practice
gives meaning to the use and practices of ocean science diplomacy. To this end, I
interviewed both researchers and government officials from the South and North
Atlantic involved in the negotiation and implementation of the Alliance. Through a
thematic analysis I identified the values perceived by scientists and government
officials with regard to ocean science diplomacy, in particular in the context of the
UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development.
My results indicate that most practitioners were and remain unfamiliar with the
available concepts of science diplomacy. There is, however, a common perception
of it being positive, relevant and influential to international ocean negotiations. This
benevolent perception of ocean science diplomacy in the Atlantic Ocean is further
contrasted with different expectations coming from the South and North Atlantic,
as well as different perspectives revealed by researchers and government officials.
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By applying the theoretical framework of postcolonialism and decolonial thought, I
discuss how different meanings of ocean science diplomacy between functional
roles (scientists and officials) and regions (South and North Atlantic) cause distinct
motivations in engagement. As a result, I advocate that ocean science diplomacy in
the Atlantic will only be a driver to unite communities around shared goals and
values if common interests are negotiated and achieved, recognizant of the colonial
past that shapes our understanding of ocean science diplomacy.
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1 Introduction

This work reports on a journey to understand the adherence of science diplomacy
to ocean affairs. It was motivated by my own experience in witnessing the
progressive use of the term “science diplomacy” in different negotiations among
States and communities of practice during my career as a government official at the
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation of Brazil. The meaning given to
science diplomacy in such contexts is usually positive, as a way to achieve greater
coordination and cooperation among countries (Skolnikoff, 1993). However, the
interaction between science and diplomacy can also be pernicious in the sense of
scientific evidence being bent to serve national interests (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010).
Science diplomacy departs from the assumption that science is solely a technical
procedure with no inherent political values when, in reality, science can be
prestigious and biased (Latour, 1993; Thorp, 2020a). Moreover, diplomacy can
promote scientific capabilities as a country’s soft form of power, attracting other
countries to attain their foreign policy goals (e.g., House of Lords, 2014). In order
to understand the driving forces behind this formulation of science diplomacy, this
transdisciplinary research navigates through theories and practices from a diversity
of areas, including science and technology studies, sociology, philosophy of
science, science-policy interface, and international relations, among others. The
work was conducted over the past three years and provides an overview of what I
chose to term “ocean science diplomacy”, both a social phenomenon as well as a
common practice in global ocean affairs. The following sections take the reader
through the line of reasoning behind this research. In doing so, we will explore the
two terms that compose the concept of science diplomacy: science and diplomacy.
More detail about the current academic debate around science diplomacy will be
presented and then related to some contemporary developments and pressing issues
in ocean affairs. Finally, the basic features and standard architecture of this study
are presented, including the choice of my case study, and the methodological and
theoretical approaches followed therein.
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1.1 Line of Reasoning
Our journey into science diplomacy needs to depart from its conceptualization,
which is done through the use of language. Language drives our comprehension of
reality. It is through the exercise of conceptualization that humanity is able to
classify reality and adopt a system by which reality makes sense (Calhoun, 2001, p.
92). Conceptualization goes beyond the categorization of concrete and visible
objects; it classifies abstractions, subjectivities, and hence values and beliefs. Thus,
through concepts, language builds meaning, constituting social identities,
relationships, and subjectives (Angermuller, 2014).
Language and concepts change over time and represent specific historical, cultural
and social contexts. For example, the conceptualization of science diplomacy within
academia has been debated over the past two decades. In this line of thought, which
is notably characterized by a predominance of European and American views,
science diplomacy is grounded in specific assumptions and values of both science
and diplomacy (Fedoroff, 2009; Gluckman et al., 2018; The Royal Society &
AAAS, 2010). These specific views tend to promote science as a universal language
through which international players are brought together around shared goals
(Skolnikoff, 1993). Similarly, diplomacy is promoted as a State-centered peaceful
exercise of negotiating compromised terms of action, to a certain extent influenced
by the universality of science (Berkman, 2019; Gluckman et al., 2018). This
perception of science diplomacy can be understood as a discourse that promotes
science as being universal and diplomacy as an active engagement in inter-State and
other relations for peace building.
Discourse, as a socially constructed phenomenon, is a debated concept amongst
scholars (e.g., Hesselmann, 2019; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Stoddart, 2007). In this
work, we assume discourse to be a system of signs that use language to express not
solely ideas, but also the cultural, historical and social determinants that form those
ideas (Paltridge, 2014). Poststructuralists claim that there are multiple simultaneous
discourses being disseminated in society, whereas individuals abide by those with
better adherence to their own values and beliefs (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Çalkıvik,
2017). Assuming that multiple discourses co-exist in similar social contexts leads
to a power relation between them (Foucault, 1972). In this sense, hegemonic
discourses are those that seek to exclude other discourses by finding ways to
demonstrate moral and intellectual leadership, but also are reinforced by domination
and coercion (Gramsci, 1971). As an example, current discourses around science
tend to highlight the issue of trust. While some accept science as a reliable source
of truth, others challenge modern science, including those with a more extreme
resolution to deny certain scientific knowledge, in particular knowledge that does
not support their personal beliefs (Cook, Lewandowsky, & Ecker, 2017; Oreskes,
2019; Thorp, 2020b).
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Marxists argue that a dominant class, an elite rooted in economic power, is
responsible for upstanding hegemonic discourses that are absorbed by lower classes
as their own (Stoddart, 2007). In this sense, hegemonic discourses tend to become
our common sense, guiding our understanding of the world (Laclau & Mouffe,
2001; Stoddart, 2007). Thus, elites hold the power to dominate the discourse,
determining what is true and normative, generally seeking ways to profit from such
beliefs (Freire, 2005; Hopf, 1998; Spence, 2007). In this line of reasoning, for
instance, we associate certain roles to genders as they were naturally born and not
socially constructed. Discourses also frame what a scientist is, what a diplomat
should do, what is expected from each of us in terms of productivity, our role in the
market, and so on. These hegemonic discourses, according to Marxists, act as tools
for oppression by which we relate our individual worth to our role in the market,
somehow limiting our individual freedom (Gramsci, 1971). In this sense, science
diplomacy is impacted by the modern hegemonic discourses that signify the roles
of scientists and diplomats and that drive the way in which they engage and for what
purpose. These assumptions on the social roles of scientists and diplomats and the
ways through which they interrelate can be seen in current literature that often
defines what science diplomats, or the agents of science diplomacy, are in practice
(e.g., Melchor, 2020). In accordance with the poststructuralist approach, positioning
these two actors in distinct boxes creates a power struggle between them, which can
also be extended to the geographical sphere of science diplomacy.
As discussed below, this line of reasoning navigates through language, concepts,
discourse and hegemony. This perception has been critical to understanding the
theoretical framework underpinning my work. For now, I will explore further the
social specificities of both science and diplomacy, referring back to this line of
reasoning when presenting my arguments.

1.2 Science
Science is claimed to be a universal language that, through empirical observation
and evidence-based testing, is based on replicability, transparency, and merit in
search of the truth (Oreskes, 2019; Popper, 1963). Science adopts certain
epistemologies. Epistemology is how we come to know what we know, how we
assemble information and signify it as knowledge, and to which purposes (Moon et
al., 2021). Through the scientific method, scientists evaluate if a given information,
one of many possible perceptions of reality, fits the necessary and mutually agreed
criteria of what can be called scientific knowledge (Khun, 1962; Popper, 2002). For
example, science will accept forms of life to be clustered as a biological species
only if an agreed set of criteria are met, that is, as an aggregate of interbreeding
populations that are reproductively isolated from other groups, creating viable,
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fertile new beings (Mayr, 1982). Despite the general public assuming that science
largely has been able to classify biological species as basic units of ecosystems, this
classification has faced several challenges that are not disclosed, in particular
regarding microorganisms. Not all living beings meet all the necessary criteria to be
classified as a biological species. Yet, our general sense is essentially positivist,
meaning that those not trained in science share a perception that scientists seek to
reveal the truths that are out there waiting to be discovered (Merton, 1973; Smith,
2012). Consequently, other forms of knowledge, other epistemes, are largely
unaccepted by science because they do not fit the requirements of the scientific
method. If these forms of knowledge are not scientific, then the common sense
approach is to challenge that source of truth, or even disregard it, until it passes
through the scrutiny of the scientific method (Harden-Davies et al., 2020; Sharma,
2021).
Science has been responsible for producing a robust body of knowledge about the
natural world that has improved humanity’s well-being and survival (a good
example is the rapid pace by which science responded and produced vaccines for
the COVID-19 pandemic). There is no question about the value that science and
technology have made to the progress of humanity over the past centuries. However,
science has many limitations, one being the elitism that it has reproduced through
the imposition of what a correct episteme is, a feature that can be similar to a
hegemonic discourse (Kopke, Black, & Dozier, 2019; Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2014).
Science has produced a method of work, a sort of code of conduct, that is restricted
to the literate, to the enlightened (Goeminne, 2011; Merton, 1973). Since the
Enlightenment, Western science is responsible for promoting an elite of truthbearers, segregating itself from society, undermining other forms of knowledge, and
suppressing minorities, in particular women, queer communities and people of
colour (Harding, 2008; Hayes, 1992; Smith, 2012). Such an assumption about
science can produce profound consequences to environmental governance, where
scientific evidence is taken for granted, evidence which is grounded in the specific
Western perspective of science (Turnhout & Lahsen, 2022). Understanding science
to be a code, a language, results in it being subject to social constructs, leading to
elitism and, ultimately, power. In line with this argument, science is then
polyphonic, embedded in social and political values that are generally kept
disguised in order to promote it as value-neutral and, in consequence, above the
common human (Latour, 1993; Merton, 1973). Therefore, science is also a political
act (Latour, 1993; Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2017; Thorp, 2020a).
In this sense, one can assume the discourse around what science is supposed to be
as hegemonic. For example, the hegemonic discourse of science holds any person
accountable for being called a scientist if, and only if, he/she is subject and adherent
to that value system, to that code of conduct (Stoddart, 2007). Another hegemony
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in the discourse around science pertains to the value that Western science has over
other sciences. For instance, terms such as “science excellency” represent a Western
perspective grounded in privileged scientific capabilities, which places a burden on
scientists elsewhere to live by those standards (Koskinen & Rolin, 2021).
In the context of science diplomacy, the science which is commonly referred to in
the literature is the one embedded in Western values of science. Thus, disclaiming
that science is polyphonic and diverse will impact our understanding of what science
diplomacy is in different social contexts.
Science progressively became instrumental to international decision- making, based
on Western values of science as this apolitical and neutral entity that informs
diplomacy as the best (and often the only) way forward. Repeatedly, scientific
reports have been called upon to inform humanitarian crises, such as climate change,
the depletion of the ozone layer, and, most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic
(Spence, 2007). During the International Geophysical Year of 1957, an entire
continent was devoted to scientific research. As a result, in the 1960s, diplomacy
found in science a way of pacifying territorial claims in Antarctica and led to the
adoption and implementation of a treaty that is, for many, one of the most important
international legally binding instruments ever negotiated (Berkman et al., 2011). As
a consequence, the current discourse about the role of science in international
diplomatic negotiations promotes science as a powerful means of producing better
engaged and peaceful diplomacy (e.g., Fedoroff, 2009).

1.3 Diplomacy
Diplomacy, similar to science, is grounded in language. Traditional diplomacy is
statecraft with the goal of promoting non-violent international relations, advising,
shaping, and implementing foreign policies (Barston, 2019). Anyone with
experience in diplomatic negotiations knows the amount of time diplomats devote
to finding suitable language. They can spend hours in a room, discussing whether a
chapeaux paragraph to be adopted by the United Nations General Assembly or
indeed the United Nations Security Council should start with the verb “welcome”
instead of the verb “note”, including innumerous possibilities in between, such as
“note with appreciation”.
The choice of language selected will rank the level of importance of a certain
subject. Recently, at the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties
(COP26), India was blamed for watering down the outcomes of the entire meeting
for requesting, at a late stage, the substitution of the verb “phase out” for “phase
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down” in a paragraph regarding coal sourced energy1. States use diplomacy to fuel
a hegemony struggle between interests and domination (Stoddart, 2007). These
power disputes rely intensively on language and its use to dominate a discourse
(Spence, 2007), in particular for promoting a country’s brand, where science acts as
a soft, seductive form of power (Nye, 1990; Raev & Minkman, 2020). Language is,
therefore, critical to both science and diplomacy, as well as to the power relations
inherent to each (Rungius & Flink, 2020).
Since after the Cold War, traditional diplomacy has seen science as a useful tool for
bridging countries and agreeing on less sensitive matters, such as scientific
cooperation and the deployment of large research facilities (Flink & Kaldewey,
2018). Documents from the United States government regarding the role of science
during the Cold War tended to place scientific cooperation within the scope of
cultural diplomacy, making scientists and art performers equally important in
passing on national values (Adamson & Lalli, 2021). The promotion of cultural and
scientific aspects through diplomacy was a way of allowing a dialogue to be started,
sometimes away from the traditional—and formal—diplomatic setting (Flink &
Schreiterer, 2010). The freedom that scientists had to cooperate with their foreign
peers would be encouraged by the State, without much engagement of policy
officers in the initial stages of collaboration. This type of diplomacy, not Statecentered, is termed public diplomacy or Track 2 diplomacy in international relations
scholarship. It refers to the parastatal informal diplomacy in which stakeholders are
not necessarily bound to a government (Jones, 2015). Public diplomacy is said to
be more flexible and to address community and common interests (Gregory, 2008).
Today, it is increasingly becoming an all pervasive feature of ocean affairs,
including the intersessional work of the post-2020 biodiversity framework
(including the BBNJ), as well as the climate change Track 2 negotiations associated
with the implementation of the Paris Agreement (Long & Brincat, 2020).
The literature around science diplomacy generally makes reference to traditional
diplomacy and the role of States (Berkman, 2020). However, there are also those
claiming a powerful role for public diplomacy as the driving force behind science
diplomacy (Nye, 2008). In this view, public diplomacy and soft power are
interrelated and States benefit from such engagement as a means to attract
investment and promote national interests and values abroad (Kim, 2017). In either
view, that of traditional diplomacy or that of public diplomacy, science has
increasingly influenced the international arena, leading scholars to research science
diplomacy.

1

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/13/cop26-countries-agree-to-acceptimperfect-climate-agreement, accessed 15 February 2022.
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1.4 Science Diplomacy
Naturally, with the increasing influence of scientific knowledge in international
decision-making, debate arises on the process by which the power play between
science and diplomacy occurs. This has culminated in the need to coin a new
research field, namely, science diplomacy. Science diplomacy has been described
as an ancient practice, but also a recent field of research (e.g., Turekian, 2018). With
a view that after the World War II large-scale and onerous research projects would
require collaboration in a world seeking a new order, science diplomacy started to
gain political attention (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010; Vadrot et al., 2021). As is evident
from the scholarly literature, science diplomacy is attributed to the enhancement of
the dialogue between nations in spite of geopolitical conflicts (Berkman, 2019;
Fedoroff, 2009; Skolnikoff, 1993; Wagner, 2002). Departing from the perception
that science is apolitical, based in a universal language concerned about finding the
truth and the truth alone, science diplomacy assumes science will inspire
communities to act together and find common grounds for action. Science is said to
be a force that diplomacy can no longer ignore (Berkman, 2018). However,
traditional international relations scholarship historically has devoted less attention
to the role of science in influencing diplomacy and vice versa (Domingues &
Ribeiro Neto, 2018; Mayer, Carpes, & Knoblich, 2014), as science and technology
studies do not fit well into international relations theoretical frameworks (Flink &
Schreiterer, 2010). Consequently, science diplomacy as an interdisciplinar field of
research aims to observe, analyse, conceptualize, and explain the multiple ways by
which research and international affairs interrelate. Although it is a prominent field
of knowledge, it is highly contentious, with a few but nonetheless growing attempts
to define it and to frame the narrative in epistemic terms.
Indeed, there are currently at least two accepted taxonomies of science diplomacy
in academia (Table 1). The first attempt to categorize science diplomacy came after
a meeting held by the Royal Society and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS) (2010). In their report, science is related to
diplomacy in three ways. Science in diplomacy deals with the role of scientific
advice in international decision-making, as with the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) informing the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is a cogent and compelling example. In the
alternative, science for diplomacy stands for the bridging of communities from
different countries around joint and collaborative research endeavours, such as the
Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) in Switzerland. Finally, it
is argued that by building international relations around scientific research practices,
scientific communities would benefit from enhanced visibility, funding, and
capacity development schemes. The latter is coined as diplomacy for science. These
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three very different taxonomies are shown in Table 1. However they do not tell the
full story or capture the malleable nature of the concept.
Table 1: Science diplomacy taxonomies as per presented in current academic literature

For instance, Gluckman, Turekian, Grimes, & Kishi (2018) proposed three new
categories based on the interests of countries of being involved in science diplomacy
practices. To these authors, the classification suggested by the Royal Society and
AAAS ignored the forces that these interests would play in driving science
diplomacy. Thus, they propose that science diplomacy could be framed in actions
designed to (i) directly advance a country's national needs, (ii) address cross-border
interests, and (iii) meet global needs and challenges. According to their proposition,
this scale of interests would determine how science diplomacy operates and which
drivers will propel the relationship between research and international relations.
The debate around the usefulness of such taxonomies points to the fact that the most
important features of science diplomacy are not being discussed and that there is a
general lack of empirical evidence to support such claims (Epping, 2020). Issues
such as power disputes, industrial espionage, and the misuse of science and
scientists are among such critical features underlying science diplomacy (Flink,
2020; Ruffini, 2020a). Not surprisingly, science diplomacy has been a term
increasingly present in political statements (Legrand & Stone, 2018; Moedas, 2016;
Pandor, 2017). In fact, Ruffini (2020b) advocates that most of the available
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literature on the theme comes from political perspectives rather than scientific
evidence. Therefore, despite the promotion of science diplomacy as a beneficial tool
to foster better international engagement, evidence is lacking on the drivers and
products of such interaction (Flink & Rüffin, 2019). Consequently, research is
needed to unveil the social phenomena related to science diplomacy from multiple
areas of expertise. An appropriate and illustrative case arises in this regard in
relation to ocean affairs, which we turn to next.

1.5 Ocean Science Diplomacy
The ocean has been claimed to be a global commons (Vogler, 2012), a shared
humanitarian common good (Wolfrum, 1983), and impacted by humans without
much concern about its thresholds (Rockström et al., 2009). The ocean has been
neglected by world leaders both in terms of investment in research and management
and in terms of public policies for enhanced sustainable exploitation of marine
resources (Costanza, 1999; IOC-UNESCO, 2020a; Singh et al., 2021). Threats such
as pollution, climate change, and loss of biodiversity make the ocean an endangered
life-supporting system. In addition to such environmental concerns, the ocean is also
a stage for historical conflicts and disputes, which motivated the negotiation and
adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Koh &
Jayakumar, 1977; Ranganathan, 2020). Whether from the environmental
perspective or the regulatory standpoint, science has always had a critical role in
informing decisions with regard to the state of the ocean and in tendering possible
innovative solutions (Robinson, 2020a). Therefore, diplomacy and science meet in
almost all aspects of international ocean governance. Indeed, the latter is the
principal reason why this body of work adopts the term “ocean science diplomacy”
(Paper 1 - Polejack, 2021). Ocean science diplomacy stands for the interaction of
ocean sciences with international affairs, be it between communities of practice,
between countries, in multilateral arrangements, or through intergovernmental
frameworks. As a core part of this work, ocean science diplomacy both as a concept
and as a practice is explained in more detail in the first paper of this dissertation,
which explores the importance of ocean science diplomacy for ocean affairs, global
sustainability, and the UN Decade of Ocean Science (Polejack, 2021).
In general, science diplomacy is focused on anthropogenic impacts and
environmental interaction within and on the terrestrial environment, in other words,
on land. Ocean science diplomacy is relatively more complex due to the importance
that scientific evidence has had in the drafting of the international regime regulating
ocean activities (Brown & Fabian, 1974). Moreover, the overlap in mandates and
jurisdictions in marine spaces adds another layer of complex international
relationships in which science diplomacy seems to be a good fit (Boyes & Elliott,
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2014; Robinson, 2020a). Finally, the lack of sufficient scientific information on
marine environments, as well as the technological race to exploit the ocean, have
been responsible for conflictual international negotiations on ocean governance
frameworks (Robinson, 2020b). Thus, ocean science diplomacy should hold enough
substantive elements to be a field of research per se and in its own right.
Ocean science diplomacy is embedded in social interactions, from transboundary
community-based resource exploitation to global matters of concern. The ocean
signifies different things to different people and is thus subject to many
epistemologies, that is, different ways of validating ocean knowledge (Costanza,
1999; Moon et al., 2021; Squarcina & Pecorelli, 2017). Science is very influential
in international interactions about the ocean, but not always in a beneficial sense.
The scrutiny of the scientific method, mostly carried out using the peer review
system, has not been enough to prevent science from being applied rightly or
wrongly in international ocean governance schemes to promote individual
countries’ interests (Goncalves & De Santo, 2021). For example, several regional
fisheries management organizations use of science and scientific evidence has been
characterized as subsidies due to relaxing of fishing quotas for some countries
(Belhabib, 2021; Jouffray et al., 2020; Österblom et al., 2020). Therefore,
understanding ocean science diplomacy is a timely issue that needs to be at the very
core of our understanding and respective cognitive fields if we are to promote
sustainability and improve international interactions. Indeed, the latter proposition
often appears to be the desire of those advocating for the strength of science
diplomacy. Furthermore, its importance and validity can be gauged from the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution on the adoption and implementation of the
Decade of Ocean Science (United Nations, 2017).

1.6 The Decade of Ocean Science
Our scientific ignorance about the ocean, with extensive areas still under-sampled
and often unknown to humanity, provided the backdrop for the UN General
Assembly to adopt 2021–2030 as the Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable
Development (Ryabinin et al., 2019). The Decade aims to leverage research efforts
around the globe to produce relevant information for improved decision-making
while bringing societal benefit at the core of its actions (Claudet et al., 2019). The
Decade is led by one of the most relevant and historical institutions to develop ocean
science diplomacy, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of
UNESCO (IOC). The Decade is a compelling case and context for the research
discussed here. The discourse around the Decade reflects to a great extent the
language used by multilateral arrangements when combining ocean science with
diplomacy. Therefore, investigating the Decade has the potential to expose the
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current discourse around ocean science diplomacy, despite the lack of such a
concept in official documents establishing the Decade (Polejack, 2021). Thus, the
Decade is present in almost all the results of this research (e.g., Papers 1–6),
reflecting a mechanism by which ocean science diplomacy is put into practice, but
also from which it evolves. In this sense, the papers integral to this dissertation
present a few recommendations of how the Decade should become central to and
leverage favourable outcomes from the practice of ocean science diplomacy.

1.7 The All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance
The Decade is a global effort and very difficult to explore from an analytic
perspective due to the multiplicity of endeavours and regimes adopted in different
countries and regions. Accordingly, the focus here is on one specific international
arrangement in the Atlantic Ocean; namely, the All-Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance. The Alliance aims to apply science diplomacy to foster engagement and
ocean stewardship to promote an Atlantic ocean community around research outputs
(as described in Paper 2 - Polejack et al., 2021).
The Alliance will contribute to the implementation of the Decade objectives, at least
with regard to actions in the Atlantic. The stepwise creation of the Alliance involved
countries from the North and South Atlantic seeking agreements in research
priorities and the alignment of resources, and thus became a petri dish case study
for exploring the realpolitik of ocean science diplomacy in action. This research
drew from this construct to engage with practitioners of science diplomacy in the
Atlantic, as well as to study the issues of national interests in forming it. Paper 2 of
this dissertation (Polejack et al., 2021) explored the Alliance as a case study of
ocean science diplomacy. In that article, the authors attempted to correlate the
science diplomacy taxonomies (as presented in Table 1) as well as to analyse the
political interests driving its establishment. In contrast with the Decade, which is
mainly conducted in an intergovernmental setting, the Alliance relies on national
foreign policies that are debated within restricted groups of decision-makers.
Consequently, analysing the Alliance also provides insights on any existing
differences between ocean science diplomacy in intergovernmental and in bimultilateral frameworks, as discussed in Paper 2.
While focusing on the general aspects that motivated the science diplomacy behind
the creation of such Alliance, one of the multinational research projects funded by
the European Commission as a means of implementing the Alliance was
highlighted. Thus, ocean science diplomacy in practice was analysed by looking at
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the Mission Atlantic Project2, which aims to conduct marine integrated ecosystem
assessments (IEA) from North to South Atlantic. The draft of Paper 5 of this
dissertation presents the work done with regard to the relationship between IEAs
and science diplomacy, informing the implementation of the Alliance.

1.8 Theoretical Underpinnings
This research adopts inductive reasoning, whereby theories are not tested, but are
an outcome of the analysis, that is, the empirical evidence drives reasoning and is
discussed in line with available theories (Bryman, 2012, p. 26). This study rejects
positivism by assuming there is not one single reality that is to be assessed through
universally accepted and empirically tested truths. Instead, consistent with the social
constructivism epistemology, this research departs from the understanding that
reality is multifaceted and interpreted by self constructs, dependent on moral,
cultural, and social imperatives that build the being (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
This work adopted a few assumptions. First, it assumes that science resembles other
social phenomena, that is, guided by social norms and values, mostly shaped by an
elite (in the case of science, the enlightened), as argued by the science and
technology studies scholarship (Latour, 1993). In assuming science as a social
phenomenon, it is also assumed that science is based on discourses that can be
subject to power relations, including disputes over interests, as argued by
poststructuralists (Foucault, 1972).
Second, it is assumed that traditional diplomacy aims at protecting and promoting
national interests, with science being one such interest. In the field of international
relations, this research adheres to critical constructivism (Hopf, 1998). Third,
science diplomacy is understood to foster specific perceptions of science and of
diplomacy, along with specific meanings of what constitutes a scientist and a
diplomat, also along the lines of poststructuralism.
Forth, it is assumed that the world is driven by power conflicts fuelled by interests
and resulting in dominance over the other, in a quest to maintain an elite with power
to determine the normative standard (Foucault, 1995; Gramsci, 1971; Losurdo,
2020). On the latter point, it is also assumed that the dominant view of science
diplomacy departs from Western perceptions of science and diplomacy, combined
now as a new term also centered on Western values. By assuming such claims, it is
also acknowledged that this binary logic (here-there, I-the other) restricts the way
in which we perceive these power relations, where conflict would emerge from
2

https://missionatlantic.eu/, accessed 24 February 2022.
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attempts of one side to dominate the other side (Chimakonam, 2019). This binary
logic becomes a limitation, a simplistic fashion to access this research’s findings.
Therefore, considerations of polimorphisms and multiple perceptions are discussed
along the lines of this study.
As poststructuralists argue, social reality can be explained by analysing social
structures, that is, “patterns and forms of social relations and combinations among
a set of constituent social elements or component parts such as positions, units,
levels, regions and locations, and social formations” (Heydebrand, 2001). The social
structures adopted in this study relate to at least two of the functional social roles
deemed critical to science diplomacy: government officials and researchers
(diplomats and scientists). The goal was to gather insights from key individuals
involved in the establishment of the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. This
community involves countries bordered by the Atlantic which are diverse in terms
of socio-economic development, language, culture, and ultimately, political and
social frameworks. Moreover, these countries have distinct historical colonial ties
with Europe, but with the common feature of having largely adopted European
values of civilization to be the norm.
The theoretical framework that I found most suitable to analyse this research’s
findings was postcolonial theory (Césaire, 1955; Harding, 2021; Said, 1978) and
decolonial studies (Mignolo, 2009; Anibal Quijano, 2000), in particular after being
contrasted with other theories that could be applied alike to the results found in this
research. Table 2 brings a non-exhaustive summary of theories influencing this
study. Elements from these theories were used to discuss this research’s results, with
a main focus on postcolonialism and decolonial theories. This choice is supported
by the premises of post- and decolonial thinking that current reality cannot be
understood without acknowledging the impacts of the colonial past in the world
politics and its current living consequences. As an inductive research, those theories
came to be central to this work because of the collected perceptions of ocean science
diplomacy from its agents in the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, the Atlantic is of major
importance in understanding our colonial history and current coloniality of power
exactly because of its role in the flow of people and resources from colonies to
empires (Anibal Quijano, 2000). A more detailed justification on the adoption of
postcolonial and decolonial reasoning in this body of work can be found both in the
discussion section of this dissertation, as well as in the manuscript of Paper 6.
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Decolonialism

Postcolonialism

Reflexivity

Discursive
Institutionalism

New Institutionalism

Institutionalism

Poststructuralism

Theory

Main ideas
"Poststructuralism focuses on the question of representation and explores the ways in which dominant framings of
world politics produce and reproduce relations of power: how they legitimate certain forms of action while
marginalizing other ways of being." (Çalkıvik, 2017)
"Poststructuralists argue that ‘knowledge’ comes to be accepted due to the power and prominence of certain actors in
society known as ‘elites’, who then impose it upon others. Elites take on a range of forms and occupy many different
roles in contemporary society." (Morrow, 2018)
Recognizes that "political institutional arrangements greatly affect policy processes and outcomes, including dictating
which issues are considered by decision makers, whose interests are represented or the steps and processes through
which decisions can or cannot be made. Assumes institutions to be at the center of policy making, whereas
considerations about their formal structures, culture and mode of operations would shape policy-making" (Parkhurst,
2017)
Departs from the assumptions developed by behavioralism (Sanders, 2018) and rational choice (Hindmoor & Taylor,
2018) that, in contrast to institutionalism, believe that individual agency and actions shaped policy more than
institutional setups. "New institutionalism assumes that an institution transcends individuals to involve groups of
individuals in some sort of patterned interactions that are predictable, based upon specified relationships among
actors. It attempts to understand institutional change over time and the role that individual behavior (or social groups)
have in shaping institutional frameworks." (Peters, 2019)
This theory can be interpreted as an attempt to incorporate discursive power structures in the assumptions of the new
institutionalist school. It assumes institutions to be "defined by their internal discourses, as well as by the discourses
that they utilize to communicate with their environment” (Schmidt, 2008), being subject, inter alia, to the Foulcauldian
rhetoric of power in shaping social dynamics between and within social institutions.
Reflexivity stands for the positionality of the researcher as determinant to the result generated by the scientific
enquire. "Reflexivists emphasize the importance of human self-reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately
for the character of world politics”.
"Scientific knowledge is not simply an expression of one’s class or race or gender or any other categorical or
positional attribute, but instead either reinforces or challenges such social distinctions. This function is not an
accidental impact of knowledge, but is intimately wrapped up with the very production of knowledge in the first place.
For a reflexivist, knowing the world and changing the world are inseparable." (Jackson, 2016)
Postcolonial theory challenges the Western dominant worldview by stating how colonial history has shaped reality and
the value system by which one makes sense of it. "The postcolonial does not privilege the colonial. It is concerned
with colonial history only to the extent that history has determined the configurations and power structures of the
present, to the extent that much of the world still lives in the violent disruptions of its wake, and to the extent that the
anti-colonial liberation movements remain the source and inspiration of its politics.” (Cooper, 2005)
Decolonialists argue that modernity as a concept is a result of a coloniality of power, that is, a political project to
maintain and benefit from colonial domination. "Coloniality of power is based upon ‘racial’ social classification of the
world population under Eurocentered world power. But coloniality of power is not exhausted in the problem of ‘racist’
social relations. It pervaded and modulated the basic instances of the Eurocentered capitalist colonial/modern world
power to become the cornerstone of this coloniality of power." (Quijano, 2000)

Table 2: Theories assessed during the course of this research.

(Mignolo, 2007;
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(Alejandro, 2021;
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(Peters, 2019)

(Parkhurst, 2017)

(Çalkıvik, 2017;
Morrow, 2018)
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Apart from postcolonialism and decolonialism, the other theories presented in Table
2 share a common feature that they depart from a Western centered perspective
when addressing their line of reason. This is because most of its scholars are limited
in discussing reality which they are familiar with and, at the same time, reproducing
colonial values of Eurocentrism. Thus, institutions and other social structures are
debated from the standpoint of ignoring Southern realities and how they differ from
Northern constitutions. Opposite to that, postcolonialists argue that the spread of
Western-centered views and values as the norm and standard to live by is a direct
consequence of historical imperial and colonial rule (Santos, 2016). The historical
ties developed through colonization has at least two consequences or outcomes.
First, the colonizer gives meaning to the colonized, signifying he/she as the other,
as the different and, to a certain extent, less humanized than the colonizer (Fanon,
1965). In establishing this rank of humanity, colonies became extraction sites and
their people were perceived as the servers, as those in need of assistance and
enlightenment (Césaire, 1955). Second, the colonizer imposes a foreign value
system on the colonized, resulting in them being guided by the colonizer’s rule of
right and wrong. In this sense, the colonized uses this foreign value system to signify
him/herself and seek ways to become him/herself the colonizer, the optimal, the
norm (Losurdo, 2020; Quijano, 2000; Said, 1978). As a consequence of the political
European project of colonization, the physical traits of bodies in colonies became a
social construct that built a racial differentiation which guides world politics,
according to decolonial thinking (Quijano, 2000). Decolonialists defend that
modernity, in a sense of progress and development, is a concept based on the
dominance and submission of what were once called colonies, particularly in what
today is termed as Latin America, in a new project of a “coloniality of power”
(Quijano, 2007). I invite the reader to visit Paper 6 of this dissertation where this
argument is discussed in more detail, for the aim of synthesis in this dissertation.
Therefore, due to the impressions shown by interviewees from this research, as well
as the central role of the Atlantic Ocean in the colonial project, both postcolonialism
and decolonialism became central to this work, particularly when addressing what
meaning agents make of ocean science diplomacy in the context of the All-Atlantic
Alliance.
At this stage, it is important to state that positionality matters to this research in
multiple ways. Positionality stands for “how an individual’s perspective is shaped
by their social position, including class, gender and sexuality, racial identity, and
other determinants of social privilege” (Polk & Diver, 2020). In general, our
positionality reflects the sense that we make of the world and the lenses through
which we analyse it, including the hegemonic discourses embedded in this sensemaking (Gramsci, 1971; Waisbich, Roychoudhury & Haug, 2021). My own
positionality embraces the perspective of a Latino white male, trained in the natural
sciences as a biologist, with decades working as a government official in ocean

science and technology in Brazil. My positionality becomes the standpoint from
which my analysis departs and results are discussed. Moreover, my former personal
engagement in the negotiations of both the Alliance and the Decade situates me as
an insider researcher, where positionality also matters (Merriam et al., 2001).
Therefore, reflexivity becomes critical to this work. By analysing my own discourse
in a sense of revisiting my own writings in search for Eurocentric values and
colonial thinking, reflexivity was applied throughout this research (Alejandro,
2021). In this sense, I explored in a series of publications how ocean science
diplomacy practices impact those in the South Atlantic differently than those in the
North. I also used positionality to analyse the perspectives stated by the interviewees
in this research. Consequently, one can assume this research to comprise a thematic
analysis done through the lenses of ocean science diplomacy from a Global South
standpoint (Waisbich et al., 2021).
As a consequence of these assumptions and my own positionality, three different
approaches were designed to attain this research’s goals. First, a general
comprehension of science diplomacy was needed, and how it relates to international
ocean affairs. This was done by conducting a literature review on the scholarship
around science diplomacy, international relations, science-policy interface, and
other related fields. Second, I also assessed in a forensic fashion the official
documents that informed the establishment of the UN Decade of Ocean Science, as
well as the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. Moreover, I reviewed the role of
science in the implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Third,
as language matters to both science and diplomacy, I investigated the perceptions
of ocean science diplomacy from influential individuals in the Atlantic Ocean. My
interviewees were key researchers and government officials in positions of power.
This comprehensive approach allowed me to depart from literature and theories to
assess practitioners’ sense-making of ocean science diplomacy.

1.9 Problem Statement
Science diplomacy is being mainstreamed in the international policy world as a
benign, if not critical, force to build a more sustainable world. However, we lack
clarity on what are the drivers and interests currently shaping this discourse and for
what purpose, especially in relation to ocean governance.
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1.10 Research Questions
1.

Why is science diplomacy important to global ocean affairs?

2.
How has science diplomacy shaped the All-Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance?
3.
Can ocean science diplomacy further benefit the Global South in achieving
shared interests and realizing common values?
4.
What are the meanings and values given to science diplomacy by science
diplomats in the Atlantic?

1.11 Research Objective
This research’s goal was to critically assess what ocean science diplomacy entails
in theory and in practice. Drawing from these findings, recommendations are also
proposed, in particular from a Global South perspective and in the broader context
of the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development.

33

2 Methods

“Methodology can be read as rhetoric, encoding certain assumptions and values
about the social world”
– Ben Agger (1991, p. 114).

This study was designed to accommodate and integrate three different
methodological approaches: a literature review, a document analysis, and a thematic
analysis. The literature review was aimed at understanding the state-of-the-art of the
academic debate around science diplomacy. The document analysis had a goal of
assessing the role of science in diplomatic instruments, such as the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as official documents
establishing and informing the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance and the UN
Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development. The thematic analysis
aimed at assessing individual perceptions about ocean science diplomacy of
scientists and government officials, including diplomats, who were involved in the
All-Atlantic Alliance.

2.1 Literature Review
First, a chain referral literature review on the issues of science diplomacy (e.g.
Bainbridge, Potts, & O’Higgins, 2011) started with the 2010 report by the Royal
Society and AAAS and searched for further references citing that report (The Royal
Society & AAAS, 2010). Subsequently, academic literature was searched for terms
such as “science”, “diplomacy”, “ocean”, “governance”, and “international” using
search engines, including Google Scholar and Web of Science. As this research
continued, a snowballing exercise was done by which the list of references of the
relevant literature was assessed to broaden the scope of the review. Mendeley
Desktop (version 1.19.8) was used as the reference manager software.
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2.2 Document Analysis
Second, the provisions in UNCLOS directly dealing with science were analysed, in
particular the preamble and Parts XIII and XIV (Marine Scientific Research and
Development and Transfer of Marine Technology, respectively). UNCLOS
provisions that indirectly involve science, such as protection and preservation of the
marine environment and settlement of disputes, among others, were also analysed.
Paper 1 (Polejack, 2021) also analysed the UN General Assembly annual omnibus
resolution from 2009 to 2019 to identify modern themes of concern where State
Parties require science to be instrumental. This was the first peer reviewed
publication that undertook such an analysis and synthesis, to the best of my
knowledge.
In addition, official documents supporting and guiding the establishment of the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance and the UN Decade of Ocean Science for
Sustainable Development were assessed. Documents regarding the Alliance
included the Galway and Belém Statements, the South-South Framework for
Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the South and Tropical Atlantic and
Southern Oceans, and other related reports and policy documents that are
instrumental to the Alliance (e.g., Brazil & South Africa, 2017; European
Commission, 2013; European Commission & Argentina, 2018; European
Commission & Cabo Verde, 2018; European Union, 2018; European Union,
Canada, & United States of America, 2013; European Union, South Africa, &
Brazil, 2017). Concerning the UN Decade of Ocean Science, official documents
from the UN General Assembly and from IOC-UNESCO that adopted this
endeavour and inform its implementation were assessed (e.g., IOC-UNESCO, 2017,
2018, 2019, 2020b; United Nations, 2017).

2.3 Thematic Analysis
Third, and more elaborated, a qualitative method to assess individuals’ sensemaking and perceptions of ocean science diplomacy was applied. All these
individuals had an active role in negotiating (and now implementing) the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance. A thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) of
ocean science diplomacy in the Atlantic was conducted. This specific
methodological choice is justifiable for at least two reasons. First, science
diplomacy is an emerging field of research with few empirical data available to date.
Second, there is a need to understand how this concept and social phenomenon is
perceived from the individual perspective, that is, from the standpoint of the science
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diplomat (as defined by Melchor, 2020), from whom the whole process emerges
and is put into practice.
Thematic analysis was chosen (Braun & Clarke, 2006) because it allows the
identification and organization of patterns of meaning, suitable to identify these
individual’s perceptions and values in engaging in ocean science diplomacy
practices, irrespective of the sample size. Thematic analysis, however, is limited to
collect what was said, rather than how interviewees say it, which also limits the
scope of the discussed results. Moreover, positionality is very influential in thematic
analysis for it is the researcher who assigns codes and organize themes, which
naturally denote her/his standpoint, grounded on issues of gender, class, race, and
social realities (Braun & Clarke, 2013, pp. 174–183). In spite of such limitations,
this method was suited to collect the necessary understanding of what agents in the
Atlantic context mean by engaging in science diplomacy practices.
Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted with high-level decision-makers
(13 interviewees) and key researchers (7 interviewees) involved in the setup and
implementation of the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance, coming from
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United
States of America, and the European Commission. Decision-makers were
government officials who occupy high-level hierarchical positions in national
ocean-related science systems, including science and technology State secretaries
and ministers, directors, heads of departments, science managers, and diplomats.
The general profile of the interviewed researcher is a person who has gained
extensive experience in international scientific cooperation by coordinating
transboundary research projects and scientific programs. Another feature is that the
interviewed researchers are involved in the management of large international
research projects.
Semi-structured interviews were done in person (12 interviews) during the AllAtlantic Forum3 (Brussels, February 2020), as well as online (8 interviews), due to
the COVID-19 travel restrictions, from April to October 2020. Vitally, as the author
was involved in drafting and negotiating the All-Atlantic Alliance, his professional
network was accessed to identify and engage with interviewees. These previous
contacts might have improved trust-building and consequently facilitated openness
and sincerity when answering the questions since all interviews were done by the
same researcher.
Interviews were composed of a set of nine questions, of which six were common to
all interviewees, while three additional questions were specific to researchers or
government officials (Table 3). General questions assessed interviewees' sensemaking of science diplomacy, including its applicability, the relevance of the UN
3

https://allatlanticocean.org/view/atlanticforums/2020-brussels, accessed 18 November 2021.
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Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development, and the specificities of
IEAs as concrete actions in the application of ocean science diplomacy. Questions
were purposely designed to be broad enough so interviewees were free to explore
answers at their discretion, supporting the aim of collecting their perceptions of
truth.
Table 3: Interview questions applied in this research
GENERAL SET OF QUESTIONS
1. Can you tell me a bit about yourself? Background, age, experience…?
2. Tell me about science diplomacy, what is it to you?
3. In this context, please let me know how useful science diplomacy could be?
4. Please share your views about the need for a UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development.
5. In your opinion, what should a UN Decade achieve? How (or why)?
6. With regard to tools for collaboration, tell me what you know about integrated ecosystem assessment. Any
ideas on how to measure its success?
QUESTIONS FOR SCIENTISTS ONLY
7. Let’s say you hold an important result that
could help authorities to deal with a problem,
what would you do?
8. Tell me how you feel about your participation
in negotiations (national or international).
9. Would you have any insights on how this
picture could look better?

QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ONLY
7. Please share how you use scientific information in your
work. How to access, apply?
8. Tell me your perception of how negotiations take
scientific information (first nationally, then internationally).
9. Any final recommendations on how to improve this?

Interviews were conducted both in English and Portuguese and were fully
transcribed in their original language. Transcripts were analyzed with the software
MAXQDA Plus 2020 (Release 20.4.1) and codes were assigned to text extracts.
Codes were generated by the author in accordance with grounded theory (Bryman,
2012), meaning that no pre-established codes were used. Coding was revised
multiple times. These revisions included reassessing transcripts and the audio of the
interviews in full, assigning codes relevant to capture the main ideas expressed by
interviewees. The same text (or parts of it) could have been assigned to multiple
codes. Revisions were considered fulfilled when coded segments did not require
further reassignments. The full list of code categories can be seen in Table 4. Codes
were clustered in themes, as per a thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).
Themes were also revised multiple times. Revision of themes was carried out by
clustering all the coded segments under each thematic category (irrespective of the
interviewee or the order in which the element was transmitted) until no further
rearrangement was necessary and the placement of codes under each theme was
considered exhausted. Thematic analysis resulted in two different publications
(Papers 5 and 6) and the generated themes can be seen as subsections of the result
sections of each publication. Translation from Portuguese to English was performed
by the same researcher solely for the purpose of presenting exemplary extracts of
the analysis.
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Table 4: Code categories identified from all interviews. Codes are presented in alphabetical order along with their
frequency (in terms of absolute number of coded segments).
Code System

Frequency

Accessibility to data

14

Broader participation

33

Capacities

18

Collaboration

35

Communicating Science Diplomacy

27

Competition

6

Cross-border interests

23

Diplomacy for Science

17

Equity

18

Funding for research

22

Global interests

34

Intergenerational aspects

10

Limitations to advice

35

Linking national to international

8

National Interests

47

National Science Advice schemes

30

Northern perspectives

22

Operability of Science Diplomacy

23

Other advice/values beyond science

11

Researchers pushed to societal issues

15

Risk in decision making

5

Role of institutions

23

Science as a soft power

11

Science closed in itself

33

Science denial

6

Science Diplomacy examples

24

Science for Diplomacy

49

Science in Diplomacy

24

Science-policy conflict

94

Science-society clashes

40

Skepticism

35

Southern perspectives

53

Trans/interdisciplinarity

27

Unawareness of doing science diplomacy

18

Unseen ocean

23

Values of science diplomacy

78

What science diplomacy should be

42
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3 Results

As a field in need of empirical evidence and due to the urgency of understanding
the importance of science diplomacy to global ocean affairs, this research adopted
a strategy of publishing its results as arguments were developed. The compilation
of these publications (Table 5), including those that are yet to be published,
composes what is termed in Nordic countries as a “red thread”.

3.1 The Red Thread
The red thread is a common concept applied to Nordic Ph.D. dissertations4, by
which a central argument is developed and the research unfolds while exploring this
argument (Lantsoght, 2018, p. 84). Curiously, it makes reference to the Greek myth
of Theseus and the Minotaur, where Ariadne, a Cretan princess, gives Theseus a red
thread so he could navigate the maze where the Minotaur lived. Without this red
thread, Theseus would not be able to kill the Minotaur and retrace his way out of
the maze. Not that this research faces a threat such as the Minotaur, but its red thread
is developed through a path that connects all the elements of this research with the
central argument on the meaning and implications of ocean science diplomacy.
In order to answer the research questions, the logic thread illustrated in Figure 1 was
developed. The results are concentrated in the series of publications produced within
the timeframe of this research. This chain of publications tells a story that starts with
the synthesis of the available theories and discussions on science diplomacy and
how these are reflected in ocean affairs. Applying this paradigm led to the
publication of Paper 1 (Polejack, 2021). It was also an objective of this publication
to explore and frame the UN Decade of Ocean Science as essentially ocean science
diplomacy in practice.

4

https://patthomson.net/2018/04/02/thesis-knowhow-how-the-contribution-can-create-coherence/
acessed 24 February 2022.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the red thread that drove this research

Subsequently, the focus was shifted to the Atlantic Ocean and its inherent social
dynamics, in particular the development of ocean science at the basin scale. Paper
2 (Polejack et al., 2021) describes the setup of the All-Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance and analyzes the interests of the involved countries in engaging in this
ocean science diplomacy practice. Focusing on one of the projects financed by the
Alliance, stakeholders’ perceptions of IEAs were analyzed. This was based on the
assumption that international IEAs are to be developed across jurisdictions and thus
are a tangible case of ocean science diplomacy in practice. Results are discussed in
the draft manuscript of Paper 5 (Polejack, Ramírez-Monsalve, & Wisz, in progress).
In general, the current dominant discourse of ocean science diplomacy reinforces a
perceived beneficial power of science in influencing international decision-making.
The basis for such a claim is the universality and neutrality of science in presenting
diplomacy with empirical evidence unattached to political ambitions. However, the
regulatory framework provided by multilateralism, such as UN conventions and
similar regulatory and hard law regimes, is far from being well implemented and fit
for the purpose of allowing science to act as a powerful influence (Martin, 1992).
Paper 3 (Polejack & Coelho, 2021) explores this perspective, focusing on how
important ocean science diplomacy can be for countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean region. Further, Paper 4 (Muelbert et al., 2021) examined the challenges
that countries in this region face when trying to contribute scientific input to oceanrelated issues in the UNFCCC, revealing that global science is in fact unequal and
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unbalanced. Both publications have a strong Global South perspective, which aligns
with the narrative and underlying arguments of this dissertation.
The Global South perspective becomes even more evident in the last core paper of
this red thread. In the Atlantic, ocean science diplomacy seems to be rooted in the
historical relationships between countries and the communities therein.
Consequently, a power dynamic between the clashing values of science and policy
grounded in the interests of each group, as well as a colonial interrelationship
between the North and South Atlantic seem to prevail in ocean science frameworks
in the Atlantic Ocean. This singular critical analysis is subject to the yet unpublished
manuscript of Paper 6 (Polejack, in progress). These results point to the urgency to
improve understanding of the factual forces and powers at play in the practice of
ocean science diplomacy. Along with these discussions, potential recommendations
for the better entanglement of science and diplomacy in the ocean are suggested.
Full texts of the above-mentioned publications are available as appendixes to this
dissertation.

3.2 Resulting Publications
Table 5 presents the series of publications developed in the course of the current
research, highlighting those which are central to and constitute specific sections in
this dissertation (core publications), together with adjacent work that supports the
arguments (supporting publications), but are not central to the red thread. Ongoing
publications developed in light of the findings of this work (other work) are also
included. In total, a series of 20 publications resulted from this research. This
dissertation addresses the core publications in more detail as they compose the red
thread. Supporting publications are only referenced in this document but can be
accessed through their correspondent DOI number on the web. All the other work
will be made available as soon as possible.
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Table 5: A complete list of the publications developed in the course of this research with reference to the research
questions addressed by them. Core publications represent work that is central to the development of the research
questions and arguments presented in this dissertation. Supporting publications are not central to the dissertation but
highlight specific fields to which this research has contributed and amplified scientific knowledge on the meaning and
practice of ocean science diplomacy. Other work relates to publications developed on the course of this study in different
stages of publication, and not targeted at developing this dissertation, but still relevant to the knowledge produced in
the course of this research.
Core Publications
1

2

3

4

5

6

Polejack, A. (2021). The Importance of Ocean Science Diplomacy for Ocean
Affairs, Global Sustainability, and the UN Decade of Ocean Science. Frontiers in
Marine Science, 8(March). https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2021.664066
Polejack, A., Gruber, S., & Wisz, M. S. (2021). Atlantic Ocean science
diplomacy in action: The pole-to-pole All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance.
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 8(1), 52.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00729-6
Polejack, A., & Coelho, L. F. (2021). Ocean Science Diplomacy Can Be a Game
Changer to Promote the Access to Marine Technology in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics, 6(April), 34–36.
https://doi.org/10.3389/frma.2021.637127
Muelbert, M. M. C., Copertino, M., Cotrim da Cunha, L., Lewis, M. N., Polejack,
A., Peña-Puch, A. del C., & Rivera-Arriaga, E. (2021). The Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate in Latin America: Knowledge Gaps and the
Urgency to Translate Science Into Action. Frontiers in Climate, 3(November).
https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2021.748344
Polejack, A., Ramírez-Monsalve, P., & Wisz, M. S. (submitted). What does
Integrated Ecosystem Assessment mean to research and policy stakeholders
working in the Atlantic ocean science diplomacy? (provisory). To be submitted
to the special issue of Frontiers of Marine Science.
https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/30943/atlantic-ocean-ecosystemassessments-under-multiple-stressors
Polejack, A. (submitted). Coloniality in Science Diplomacy – evidence from the
Atlantic Ocean. Submitted to the special issue of Science and Public Policy
(Oxford). https://academic.oup.com/spp/pages/call-for-papers

Research Questions
1 and 3

2 and 3

1 and 3

1 and 3

1 and 2

1, 2, 3, and 4

Supporting Publications

7

8

9

10

11
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Wisz, M. S., Satterthwaite, E. V, Fudge, M., Fischer, M., Polejack, A., John, M.
S., … Rudd, M. A. (2020). 100 Opportunities for More Inclusive Ocean
Research: Cross-Disciplinary Research Questions for Sustainable Ocean
Governance and Management. Frontiers in Marine Science, 7(576), 1–23.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.00576
Hatje, V., Andrade, R. L. B., Oliveira, C. C. De, Polejack, A., & Gxaba, T.
(2021). Pollutants in the South Atlantic Ocean: Sources, Knowledge Gaps and
Perspectives for the Decade of Ocean Science. Frontiers in Marine Science,
8(March), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2021.644569
Franz, G., Garcia, C. A. E., Pereira, J., de Freitas Assad, L. P., Rollnic, M.,
Garbossa, L. H. P., … Polejack, A. (2021). Coastal Ocean Observing and
Modeling Systems in Brazil: Initiatives and Future Perspectives. Frontiers in
Marine Science, 8(August). https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2021.681619
Polejack, A., & Barros-Platiau, A. F. (2020). A Ciência Oceânica como
ferramenta de Cooperação e Diplomacia no Atlântico. In A. F. Barros-Platiau &
C. C. De Oliveira (Eds.), Conservation of Living Resources in Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction: BBNJ and Antarctica (pp. 45–65). Rio de Janeiro: Lumen
Juris.
Kelly, R., Elsler, L., Polejack, A., van der Linden, S., Tönnesson, K.,
Schoedinger, S. E., … Wisz, M. S. (2021). Empowering Young People with
Climate and Ocean Science: Five Strategies for Adults to Consider. SSRN
Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3961791

1

1 and 3

3

1, 2, and 3

1

Other Works
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20

3.2.1

Polejack, A. (submitted). The UN Decade of Ocean Science stages of grief – skepticism, frustration, fear
of failure, and hope. Marine Policy (under review)
Polejack, A. (in press). Introducing ocean innovation diplomacy to the maritime sector. In: Autonomous
Vessels in Maritime Affairs: Law & Governance Implications (Vol. 1). Palgrave Macmillan
Polejack, A., Oostdijk, M., S. Wisz, M. & Cvitanovic, C. (drafting). The power of ocean science
communication in the science-policy-diplomacy nexus for society.
Polejack, A. & Machado, L. F. C. da S. (in press). The possibilities of ocean innovation diplomacy to
promote transnational innovation ecosystems for the maritime sector. In: Autonomous Vessels in
Maritime Affairs: Law & Governance Implications (Vol. 2). Palgrave Macmillan
Polejack, A. (2021). Há Direito do Mar sem Ciência? A Diplomacia Científica no Oceano. O Estudo Do
Direito Do Mar No Brasil. ARRAES, 64–67.
Polejack, A. (in press). The challenge of conducting marine scientific research under the current COVID19 pandemic. Meridiano 47.
Dalmas, L. & Polejack, A. (in press). Governança, cooperação e diplomacia no oceano. In: Economia
Azul como Vetor do Desenvolvimento Nacional. Santos, T., Beirão, A., Araujo, M. & Carvalho, A. (eds).
EGN, Brasilia, Brazil.
Routledge, E., Vieira, F., Cavalli, R. O., Valenti, W., & Polejack, A. (2022). A Plataforma de Tecnologia e
Inovação em Aquicultura: uma contribuição para a Década da Ciência Oceânica no Brasil. Revista
Parcerias Estratégicas. CGEE, 27(52), 61–76.
Polejack, A., Goveas, J, Robinson, S, Flink, T & Ferreira, G. (drafting). Where is the Global South in the
Science Diplomacy Discourse?

Framing Ocean Science Diplomacy

In Polejack (2021), presented in the appendix as Paper 1, the main goal was to
position ocean affairs in the current debates of science diplomacy. Previous research
had shown how influential science diplomacy was in the negotiation and further
adoption of UNCLOS (Robinson, 2020a). This paper was a timely contribution to
frame ocean science diplomacy by combining scholarship on science diplomacy and
ocean affairs, as well as the law of the sea. The backdrop or broader context was the
beginning of the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (the
Decade) in 2021.
Presenting the evolution of the concept of science diplomacy and analyzing how
critically important it is to the implementation of UNCLOS highlights nonconventional provisions in the Convention where science plays a key role. Issues
such as dispute settlement and boundary delimitation were brought to this analysis.
These issues are non-conventional because UNCLOS clearly states the need for
ocean science in Parts XIII and XIV, which are devoted to marine scientific research
and the transfer of marine technology, respectively. The goal is to show how
essential scientific evidence is to provisions not directly related to marine scientific
research.
One of the weaknesses in UNCLOS is that it does not provide a legal basis for
holding regular meetings of the Parties to allow consensual adjustments to the
course of implementation or an interactive science regulatory dialogue. This
contrasts with the UNFCCC, for example (Long, 2022). In light of this, ten years of
the General Assembly omnibus resolution on oceans and the law of the sea were
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reviewed to determine which issues State Parties were requesting science to inform
diplomacy. Polejack (2021) presents extracts from those resolutions which contain
references to marine science (please refer to Table 1 of Paper 1 in the appendix). In
that context, science is frequently requested to provide knowledge on ocean
conservation and environmental protection. In addition, for the last ten years, the
UN has adopted a chapeau paragraph stating the importance of science to advancing
knowledge, providing well-being to society and contributing to decision-making,
the major expected outcomes of science diplomacy (Berkman, 2020).
The new treaty being negotiated for regulating access to biodiversity on the high
seas was slightly touched upon in Paper 1 because recent work has already looked
into that subject (Harden-Davies, 2018; Long & Chaves, 2015; Tessnow-von
Wysocki & Vadrot, 2020), although it is very interesting from the ocean science
diplomacy point of view. Instead, the focus on the start of the Decade was chosen.
The Decade, as well as the UN 2030 Agenda and its related Sustainable
Development Goals, are substantially ocean science diplomacy practices because
both processes result from the available scientific evidence on the global ocean
threats, which informed and put pressure for diplomatic action to be taken.
At least four features in which ocean science diplomacy can be instrumental were
highlighted: enhancing inclusivity, promoting sustainability, addressing global
inequalities in science and technology capacities, and advancing global community
interests. Such a practice can offer powerful support towards a more just, equitable,
and balanced ocean, in particular during the Decade (in support of Bennett, 2022).
Paper 1 is part of a special issue devoted to the implementation of the ocean
Sustainable Development Goal and currently has over 9,200 views, 1,060
downloads, and eleven citations (according to Google Scholar in June 2022). It has
proven to be a timely contribution to knowledge by raising awareness about the
importance of ocean science diplomacy and stimulating the ocean community to
explore this practice in a more coordinated manner. Paper 1 contributes to
answering our research questions 1 and 3, as stated in item 1.2 of this dissertation.
It began to unveil the genesis of the dominant discourse of what ocean science
diplomacy means in practice to the global community.

3.2.2

The All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance

To advance from the theoretical perspective explored in Paper 1, it was necessary
to focus on specific ocean science diplomacy practices. For a series of reasons, the
All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance (hereafter, the Alliance) was chosen for
analysis. First, the Alliance was not intentionally planned to scale up as it did.
Initially, it was established in order to enhance marine scientific research while at
the same time reducing costs by aligning the scientific superpowers of the North
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Atlantic. Second, as the Alliance shifted to the South Atlantic, through the
coordinated work of the European Commission in pursuing its interests, Brazil
became an important participant in its activities. As a government official in the
Brazilian branch of science and technology, I was involved in the process at a very
early stage, giving me an insider (and Southern) perspective on ocean diplomacy in
action and participatory research. Third, and subsequently, my previous experience
in the Alliance facilitated the identification and engagement with relevant actors
involved in this process. Consequently, Paper 2 (Polejack et al., 2021) came to be
both a descriptive article on the Alliance and a first attempt to analyze the interests
of countries in establishing it. This aligns well with the core arguments used by
Gluckman et al. (2018) to frame a new concept of science diplomacy based on
interests, as shown in Table 1 of this dissertation.
Paper 2 describes the stepwise process of negotiating the establishment of the
Alliance, which was initiated by the signing of the 2013 Galway Statement between
the EU, Canada, and the United States and focused exclusively on the North
Atlantic. Nations in the South, in particular Brazil and South Africa, proceeded to
also align their research efforts in the South Atlantic, jointly signing a marine
research South-South Framework in 2017. More than just defining research
priorities and courses of action, this Framework also seeks ways to influence the
Galway Statement with provisions devoted to using science diplomacy to advance
Southern national agendas. Subsequently, bridging the South and the North, was the
signing of the 2017 Belém Statement between the EU, Brazil, and South Africa,
effectively creating the All-Atlantic Alliance. This stepwise process is illustrated in
Figure 2.

Figure 2: Map of the Atlantic Ocean showing the process of creating the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance with
the involved countries’ flags
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The description of this process, as well as the working method of the Alliance, was
missing from the academic literature. This was the principal reason why much of
Paper 2 is devoted to showing the complexities involved in the process of its
establishment. Also important was the comparison of the three basic documents
setting up the Alliance, which showed the priorities defined by each region and the
results of a combination of South and North perspectives. These results are
summarized in Paper 2 and presented therein as Table 1.
Paper 2 also discussed how incremental the European Commission was in pursuing
its interests in the Atlantic, as per the mandate in official EU documents. In this
regard, we showed how impactful the role of the EU’s interests were in shaping
such an endeavor. Moreover, similar to previous work by Dolan (2012), we showed
how the EU successfully used bilateral arrangements in pursuing its broader foreign
policy goals for the Atlantic. We concluded by affirming that the All-Atlantic
Alliance is a case of ocean science diplomacy in practice and presented a few
suggestions on what the future may hold for it, in particular how influential the
Alliance could be in implementing the UN Decade of Ocean Science in the Atlantic
region.
As can be seen, our discussion focused on what the Alliance means to the ocean
science community in the South. Most especially, how Brazil and South Africa were
also successful in achieving their goals in influencing the North on setting the
agenda for the South Atlantic. In the course of this research, new insights were
provided into the role of the Global South in developing ocean science diplomacy
schemes. Moreover, it came to influence the direction and content of further
publications that rest at the core of this dissertation. To date (June 2022), Polejack
et al. (2021) has gained international attention in the specialist literature, having
over 3,000 accesses and 13 citations. Crucially, this article filled an important gap
in the literature as it is one of only a few articles led by a Southern researcher
published as part of a special issue that focusses on the past, present, and future of
European science diplomacy in Humanities and Social Sciences Communication
(formerly known as Palgrave Communications), a Nature group journal. This article
contributes to answering research questions 2 and 3, as stated in item 1.2 of this
dissertation.

3.2.3

Ocean Science Diplomacy as a Game Changer for Latin
America & the Caribbean Region

Paper 1 (Polejack, 2021) and Paper 2 (Polejack et al., 2021) narrowed the research
conceptualization. Specifically, they came from the perspective of a broader
analysis of science diplomacy applied to ocean affairs and offered a practical
example of how influential ocean science diplomacy can be in building up an
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Atlantic ocean science community. Both articles also set the stage for discussions
on how beneficial science diplomacy could be for countries in the South. It is with
this aim that Paper 3 (Polejack & Coelho, 2021) was published.
There is a widely held assumption that the provisions in UNCLOS were designed
to balance science and technology capacities worldwide (Robinson, 2020b). They
are, however, still failing to reach that goal (Harden-Davies et al., 2020; HardenDavies & Snelgrove, 2020; Harden-Davies et al., 2022; Tolochko & Vadrot, 2021a,
2021b). Accordingly, we investigated what role ocean science diplomacy could
have in promoting change in this status quo and achieve a more just and equitable
international legal order, taking into account the special interests and needs of the
Global South.
In combining our research, Mrs. Coelho, a legal scholar and fellow PhD candidate,
and I were able to expose the struggles faced by the ocean science community in
Latin America and the Caribbean countries and how ineffective UNCLOS
provisions have been in building capacity and transferring marine technologies to
the region. By analysing the provisions under Part XIV of UNCLOS, which is
devoted to the transfer of marine technologies, and related instruments, our article
discusses and shows how Latin America and the Caribbean count less on
institutional action and more on individual researchers’ agency. In addition, direct
involvement of the private sector and international regulatory mechanisms for
intellectual property rights are basic components of the transfer of marine
technologies that have impeded further engagement and the realization of
UNCLOS. In this context, we advocate that countries in the region can greatly
benefit from adopting the strategy of ocean science diplomacy to fulfil national
requirements and negotiate better international agreements, especially on the
transfer of marine technology. We provide a few concrete examples of transfer of
marine technology made under the ocean science diplomacy framework. Finally,
we frame the UN Decade of Ocean Science as a timely opportunity for establishing
the necessary diplomatic debate to better coordinate technology transfer
mechanisms to meet the current needs of the Global South.
Paper 3 was an invited contribution to a special issue dedicated to Science
Diplomacy and Sustainable Development: Perspectives from Latin America, in
Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics. From an action research perspective,
it achieved all of its aims in so far as it is currently the fourth most viewed paper in
the special issue, which included sixteen articles in total. With over 6,800 views and
553 downloads, this article has been cited seven times in less than a year since its
publication. Paper 3 contributes to answering research questions 1 and 3, as stated
in item 1.2 of this dissertation.
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3.2.4

Ocean-Climate Nexus for Latin America

Due to the progressive advancement of this research and its resulting publications,
I was invited to join a group of ocean natural scientists, two of which were the only
invited authors from Brazil and Mexico, in the recent IPCC Special Report on the
Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC) (IPCC, 2019). This dearth
of representation from the Global South tells its own story, supporting a central
finding of this thesis. These scholars wanted to address the unequal participation of
researchers (and knowledge) from Latin America in producing this overdue oceandedicated report of the IPCC. From their experience, the ultimate goal of such
reports, that is, to inform diplomacy on the possible courses of action to reduce the
consequences of climate change, was hindered by this lack of inclusion and equity.
They believed that ocean science diplomacy had much to offer if we are to move
forward as a global ocean community. With all the authors being from the natural
sciences, this interaction with a social scientist on defining the scope and advancing
discussions was a positive sign of how ocean science diplomacy is already
informing better coordination in Latin America. In fact, a similar situation happened
with other supporting publications coming out of this research where I was
frequently the only social scientist and the person presenting new perspectives on
the potential of ocean science diplomacy to the benefit of the ocean science
community in Latin America (e.g., Franz et al., 2021; Goncalves & Polejack, 2022;
Hatje et al., 2021; Routledge et al., 2022).
In Paper 4 (Muelbert et al., 2021), we exposed the unbalanced representation of
Latin America in SROCC concerning knowledge gaps and opportunities that we
identified and organized under five themes: (i) climate assessment information and
regional policies, (ii) knowledge production, (iii) knowledge accessibility, (iv)
knowledge impact to policy, and (v) long-term monitoring for decision-making.
After conducting a preliminary assessment of national official documents related to
climate change, we were able to expose how tangential the ocean agenda is in
climate adaptation and mitigation plans in the policies of the countries in Latin
America.
We highlighted how local researchers are hindered from taking action in global
reporting exercises such as SROCC, which results in less uptake of global scientific
knowledge to local governments. As a result, we presented an appeal to increase the
contribution of the Global South and bring forward national and regional
perspectives to these reporting exercises. Climate change can no longer be seen
solely from the Western perspective in the Global North and must embrace local
realities and fight against hegemonic discourses in such reports (Spence, 2007).
We concluded by advocating that the uptake of the scientific findings of the Special
Report could be enhanced in Latin America in four ways. First, by embracing local
realities and knowledge producers. Second, by empowering local researchers and
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other knowledge producers to inform global assessments and also to be able to adapt
those findings to local realities. Third, by enhancing regional research capabilities
and building excellence in science from the regional perspective. Lastly, by securing
long-term ocean observations and including these results to better-informed
decision-making.
Paper 4 was an invited contribution to the special issue of Frontiers in Climate
addressing the knowledge gaps from the SROCC and recent advances. Although its
publication is very recent (November 2021), there have been more than 2,200 views,
with over two hundred downloads and two citations so far. This article aids in
answering research questions 1 and 2, as per item 1.2 of this dissertation.

3.2.5

Ocean Science Diplomacy and Integrated Ecosystem
Assessments

The manuscript of Paper 5 (Polejack et al. (in progress)) reports on the first results
of my interviews. We assessed the meaning of IEAs as understood by key
stakeholders pertaining to research and policy in the All-Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance. We focused on IEAs as the end goal of the Mission Atlantic Project5, an
European Commission funded project in support of implementing the All-Atlantic
Alliance, our case study. Mission Atlantic brings together a set of researchers from
the South and North Atlantic looking at conducting international IEAs in different
regions. International IEAs are transboundary, conducted across jurisdictions, or in
international ocean spaces. This paper represents the first attempt to look at IEAs
through the bifocal lenses of science diplomacy. We advocate that international
IEAs are essentially the practice of ocean science diplomacy since, per the IEA
process, they bring together stakeholders from different ocean sectors to evaluate
and monitor the scientific results with a view to informing international managerial
and decision-making processes.
The draft of Paper 5 analyses the perceptions of research and policy stakeholders on
the meaning of IEAs. We interviewed government officials and scientists who are
in positions of power of influencing IEAs in the context of the All-Atlantic Ocean
Research Alliance. Most of these individuals stated not having had previous
experience with IEAs, being generally unaware of IEAs concepts and process.
However, this lack of understanding of IEA was no impediment for them to share
what they believe IEA is or how it should proceed. According to their perceptions,
IEAs have the main goal of co-producing knowledge with regard to manage human
threats to the ocean. In this sense, humans are separate from the marine
environment, with the power to both disturb and manage it. The scientists and
5

https://missionatlantic.eu/, accessed 24 February 2022.
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government officials I interviewed seemed to make sense of IEAs in different ways.
Scientists reflected on the complexities of assessing integrated ecosystems and
rarely placed economic benefit as a priority. Officials meant the IEA as the
environmental component of a broader system devoted to maximize profit at lower
environmental risk. We discuss that IEA in the Atlantic seems to be revolving
around the provision of solutions from research to enhance economic profit, with
the understanding of the complexity of the marine environment as a path to achieve
that economic goal. We question whether it is possible to determine what a low
environmental cost is and also who determines it. With regard to these perceptions,
we draw a few recommendations, in particular for those marine IEAs that are
transboundary. We advocate that the scoping phase of an IEA is of critical
importance. It is during the scoping phase that stakeholders are identified and
engaged. The involved stakeholders will bring along their sector’s interests that
need to be disclaimed and accounted for. During the scoping phase, a safe and open
space needs to be secured, so these interests are negotiated and mutual
understanding on concepts, roles in the process and the possible outcomes are
achieved.
We also advocate that applying principles of science diplomacy, that is, bridging a
diversity of communities of practice and revealing the stakes and power at play, can
facilitate the conduct of international IEAs. We suggest the inclusion of diplomats
in international IEA processes because of their training in negotiating successful
outcomes and also because of their role in defending national interests with clarity.
We advocate that using science diplomacy can be a benefit to those conducting
international IEAs.
Paper 5 is an invited contribution to the special issue of Frontiers in Marine Science
on Atlantic Ocean ecosystem assessments under multiple stressors. This article
contributes to answering research questions 1 and 2, as per item 1.2 of this
dissertation.

3.2.6

Colonialism in Atlantic Ocean Science Diplomacy

Following the red thread, the publications emanating from this research have
reviewed both documental and empirical evidence of ocean science diplomacy from
the Atlantic. The case choice for this study, the All-Atlantic Alliance, has been very
interesting because it brings perspectives from not just between government
officials and researchers, but also from the South and North Atlantic. This diversity
in realities and perspectives has greatly enriched the evidence. We now turn to the
last core paper of this thread. From identifying the dominant discourse in academia
to researching in the field with the agents of science diplomacy, we have reached a
critical understanding of what ocean science diplomacy entails.
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Paper 6 (Polejack, in progress) analyses the perceptions of ocean science diplomacy
revealed by the interviews in the All-Atlantic Alliance context. This evidence
invites an in-depth analysis into the field. This analysis commences with a
discussion around the power and the need for science to influence diplomacy.
Science, in this perspective, is expressed by mainly as being cooperative,
international, neutral, and powerful in leading to peace among nations. Diplomacy
would openly welcome such science and consequently make better-informed
decisions, awarding scientists with recognition, funding, and capacity development.
Going one layer down, a certain reality is evident due to clashing values between
policy and science. Interviewed scientists do not feel part of the decision-making
processes, nor wish to become so. They have experienced misuse of their research
and goodwill, and are suspicious of the ethics involved in the political decisionmaking processes. Interviewed government officials were no different. They
recognize the politics behind science-making and how influential this can be in
diplomatic contexts. However, this is not always in a good, benevolent sense.
Interviewed diplomats expressed their concerns about trusting processes grounded
on scientific evidence presented by scientists from other countries. Further, some
government managers believe that science needs to be limited on how and when it
contributes to policy.
Furthermore, interviewees expressed a perceived segregation between the South and
North Atlantic. The interviewed Northern government officials generally expressed
science as a soft power (as opposed to the hard power of force and coercion, as per
the description of Nye (1990)). Interviewed Northern researchers often identified
their Southern peers as those in need of assistance and capacity. In turn, the
interviewed Southern researchers often expressed experiences of tokenistic
participation in ocean research projects that were led by their Northern counterparts.
Similarly, the interviewed Southern government officials stressed how impactful
inequalities in research capacities are to their national advising systems and
resulting agency in international negotiations. Indeed this is also evident in relation
to the concept of “parachute science” (Stefanoudis et al., 2021; Vos & Schwartz,
2022). Figure 3, reproduced from the draft manuscript, presents examples of
extracts taken from the interviews.
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Figure 3: Notable and exemplary quotes extracted from the interviews conducted in the course of this research. The
top of the image shows both government officials and researchers, irrespective of their region, signifying ocean science
diplomacy as an overall beneficial practice. One layer down shows the existence of the clashing values between
researchers and government officials. The bottom of the figure exemplifies different perceptions from the interviewed
officials and scientists from North and South Atlantic.
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Post- and decolonialism offers at least two relevant assumptions. First, the colonizer
imposes a value system on the colonized, who consents to this alien system and
starts to apply this value system to signify its very own existence (Said, 1978).
Second, the colonized are cast as being lesser, as those in need of assistance, as
those yet to become full beings, which can only happen by adopting the colonizer
standards (Harding, 2008; Quijano, 2000). In ocean science diplomacy this feature
has been detrimental to the full development of true bonding of the ocean
community towards the common goal of sustainability (Polejack, 2021). The
evidence presented in Paper 6 deconstructs these perceptions of ocean science
diplomacy as being a powerful tool to foster better-informed decision-making
internationally. Instead, it shows how critical it is to acknowledge these different
perspectives of reality and to embrace these differences to produce a framework in
which both science and diplomacy can reach their full potential.
Paper 6 aligns very well with the arguments developed in previous articles and
aggregates the results from this dissertation. By doing so, it greatly contributes to
answering the four research questions. It also paves the way for future work on
ocean science diplomacy in terms of justice and equity. Polejack (in progress) is an
invited contribution to the special issue on science diplomacy in the Global South,
from the Oxford journal Science and Public Policy.
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4 Discussion

The main topics and arguments developed in this research are summarized by the
relevant publications derived from it. In each academic paper, a separate discussion
section addresses the specific arguments and findings in light of current theory and
practice. The aim of the discussion section of this dissertation is different in so far
it focuses on issues that cut across and are in some instances common to those
publications, with a view to answering the research questions addressed by this
dissertation. Figure 4 presents a visualization of the interrelation between the
research questions with the core publications of this dissertation.

Figure 4: Schematic representation of the links between the research questions with the core publications that are
part of this dissertation.
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4.1 Why Is Science Diplomacy Important for Global
Ocean Affairs?
Advocates of science diplomacy often highlight that international relations
scholarship has undermined the role of science in influencing foreign affairs,
probably because issues of science do not fit well under traditional international
relations theoretical schools and paradigms, such as realism (Flink & Schreiterer,
2010; Nye & Welch, 2017). Policy-makers raised the value of science in official
international engagements, particularly in building trustful and peaceful
relationships between countries, prominently after the Cold War (Flink &
Schreiterer, 2010; Hennessey, 2019; Lord & Turekian, 2007). Consequently,
academics became interested in understanding the processes that form the basis of
the interrelationship between research and foreign affairs. This push resulted in an
emerging field of interdisciplinary research known as science diplomacy. Today,
science diplomacy scholarship seeks empirical evidence to ascertain the assumed
benefits of science diplomacy. Further, there is also a rise in the critical analysis of
the power play behind and the motivations of those engaging in science diplomacy
practices (Flink, 2020; Rungius & Flink, 2020). Naturally, this quest has been
dominated by Western perspectives of science diplomacy, whereas the search for
Global South epistemes is still incipient in academic papers (Soler, 2021).
In general, science diplomacy scholarship is focused on land-based themes of
analysis. This might be because it is simpler to deal with geographical boundaries
that are historically set and have defined jurisdictional spaces. Science diplomacy
themes that are truly global and affect humanity despite geography and citizenship
are only a few. They are more challenging due to overlapping jurisdictions,
conflicting regimes, and limited reinforcement measures. Among such themes
where science diplomacy plays a critical role are outer space, Antarctica, climate
change, and, of course, the ocean (Berkman et al., 2011; Robinson, 2020a; Ruffini,
2018). Antarctica and outer space are subject to international arrangements that
curtail certain countries from taking action, with only a few determining the possible
outcomes. The ocean and climate, on the other hand, are still on the verge of
implementing sophisticated regulatory regimes that are science dependent
(Polejack, 2021; Polejack & Coelho, 2021). Despite the apparent modernity in the
international climate regime (Ruffini, 2018), there are still setbacks in its
implementation, in particular issues of equity and justice (Muelbert et al., 2021).
The regulatory regime for the ocean is complex and multilayered (RamírezMonsalve & van Tatenhove, 2020). As such, it also faces critical challenges in its
implementation, and yet is expected to provide just and fair transitions to
sustainability (Bennett, 2022; Bennett et al., 2021; Österblom et al., 2020).
Moreover, legal provisions under the framework of UNCLOS, such as the common
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heritage of (hu)mankind principle (Wolfrum, 1983), extend inequality and injustice
to those less privileged (Vadrot et al., 2021).
It seems logical to ascertain that ocean science diplomacy is dependent on the
unique milieu it occurs in. Ocean science diplomacy seems inevitably intertwined
with the particular context in which it takes form, both in terms of the
actors/stakeholders involved as well as the institutional framework within which it
unfolds. It also seems logical to assume that contexts change over time and in face
of a constantly changing regulatory and political landscape. In the European
context, for example, ocean governance related to environmental protection is such
a complex scenario that researchers developed what they call a “horrendogram”
(Boyes & Elliott, 2014), reproduced in Figure 5 to illustrate this complexity.

Figure 5: The “horrendogram” developed by Boyes & Elliott (2014) featuring the international, European and English
legislation with reference to marine environment protection. Source: Boyes & Elliott (2014).

Assuming ocean science diplomacy to be context-dependent would pose a necessity
to assess a framework similar to the above ‘horrendogram’, an issue that was not
possible to accomplish during the timeframe of this research. Even in light of the
case study analysed through this work, addressed in the next section, it would be
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virtually impossible to survey the institutions and actors involved in all countries
pertaining to the All-Atlantic Alliance. Nonetheless, science diplomacy in the ocean
appears to be more challenging to understand although equally fascinating from
research, public policy and epistemic perspectives.
Clearly, science was and still is present in the global ocean regime, informing on
ocean thresholds, issues of concern to the global community, and possible solutions
to these problems that should be debated in diplomatic settings (Chambers et al.,
2022; Tessnow-von Wysocki & Vadrot, 2020). However, the influence of ocean
science in traditional diplomacy goes well beyond any such expected contribution
or outcome. For example, the level of scientific capacity influenced countries’
positions when negotiating UNCLOS and led to many of the Convention’s outputs
(Robinson, 2020b). In this context, even issues not usually related to science, such
as dispute settlement and boundary delimitation, are influenced intrinsically by the
input of ocean science (Polejack, 2021). Thus, one can analyse UNCLOS as a core
framework for the application of ocean science diplomacy (Harden-Davies, 2018;
Polejack & Coelho, 2021). A recent development illustrates the veracity and
compelling nature of this argument. The adoption of a Decade of Ocean Science for
Sustainable Development by the UN General Assembly ascertains how timely and
necessary it is to study the products of scientific input to multilateral decisionmaking. The Decade is requesting that UN Member States align research efforts and
budgets to jointly produce scientific knowledge that improve marine ecosystem
conservation and societal well-being along the lines of the leitmotiv: “The ocean we
need for the future we want” (Ryabinin et al., 2019). Consequently, it is clear that
ocean science diplomacy is an unrecognized pillar of the Decade and an underlying
process in almost all contemporary international negotiations on the ocean and
related issues (Polejack, 2021). It can be argued that the Decade is in its early,
formative stages, and it would be hasty to jump into conclusions about the critical
role of ocean science diplomacy in its implementation. However, this argument
dismisses the long negotiation process of the Decade itself, both at the level of the
IOC as well as at the UN General Assembly. This feature points to the argument
that ocean science diplomacy has ever been present in the discussions that triggered
the adoption of such a Decade. Being focused on ocean science instead of raising
threats on economic endeavours, such as lucrative fisheries and the yet-toaccomplish seabed mining, the Decade negotiation also assumed science to be value
neutral and necessary from the global ocean community standpoint. It will be
interesting to further observe the implementation of the Decade through the means
of its programs, actions and projects, to assess whether this implementation has
reproduced old habits of concentrating agency, budget and capacities in the Global
North, as seems to be the case with current projects, such as the one called Seabed
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20306, where almost all research vessels and scientists come from countries in the
North.
Throughout this research I have advocated for the critical importance of
understanding the different incentives and interests at play in international
engagement around ocean affairs. Ocean science diplomacy research is an effective
framework to pursue such a goal. Ocean science diplomacy is important at the UN
or similar multilateral frameworks, where traditional diplomacy works at its fullest.
Ocean science diplomacy is also present in usual scientific international
collaboration on issues such as to combatting marine pollution (Hatje et al., 2021),
pursuing better public engagement with science (Kelly et al., 2021; Wisz et al.,
2020), advancing mutual understanding and management of marine ecosystem
threats (Polejack et al., in progress), or even fostering national coastal observing
systems (Franz et al., 2021). Indeed, all of these issues were dealt with during and
by this research. It is thus critical to understand, on one hand, the current practices
of science diplomacy that could leverage ocean international affairs, and, on the
other, unveil the powers and stakes at play, which are often driven by the interests
of a few. In other words, one has to look behind the veil. Power is not a linear
phenomenon, but rather diverse in terms of policy arrangements (Arts, Tatenhove,
& Leroy, 2000), as well as at different ocean governance levels (Ramírez-Monsalve
& van Tatenhove, 2020). Consequently, it is evident that research on the power
disputes between interest groups in ocean international affairs where science and
diplomacy are closely interrelated becomes an absolute prerequisite for ensuring
successful outcomes from the Decade.

4.2 How Has Science Diplomacy Shaped the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance?
National interests may be determinant in justifying a country’s engagement in ocean
science diplomacy practices (Gluckman et al., 2018). Evidence supports such a
statement in regard to the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance (Polejack et al.,
2021). The interests that drove the EU, Brazil, and South Africa to pursue the
strengthening of this Alliance may be different, but are certainly compelling
examples of current practices in ocean science diplomacy. The EU used science
diplomacy as a strategy in achieving its foreign policies in the Atlantic, while both
Brazil and South Africa sought to influence the investment in research and
development in the North Atlantic by pushing their interest agenda further in the
Alliance. In the All-Atlantic Alliance, ocean science diplomacy was used as a force
6

https://seabed2030.org/ accessed in August 2nd, 2022
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to bring together a set of diverse countries, each at a different development stage in
terms of ocean science capabilities. By doing so, the Alliance’s aim of applying
science diplomacy was as much present from a governmental perspective as it was
from a scientific community standpoint. Researchers were interested in opening
channels for collaboration by accessing critical environmental features in the South
Atlantic, as well as research infrastructure in the North.
How the Alliance was established can also be examined from a science diplomacy
strategy standpoint. By exploring bilateral agreements with each of the partners in
the North and in the South, it is clear that the European Union leveraged an oceanbasin regional diplomatic arrangement, which might raise European influence over
the regional priorities in the many fields of ocean science. A natural outcome of
such regional coordination is the influence of this agenda-setting in the overall
organization of the Decade of Ocean Science. At least in the Atlantic Ocean, the
communities are engaged and organized through the Alliance and can coordinate
their activities to support the goals of the Decade. In this sense, there is a chance
that the Alliance will also influence the global ocean community by working
regionally towards achieving the Decade’s outcomes and thus become a model for
other basins. It will be interesting to witness whether European influence in the
Decade will be facilitated by the actions of the All-Atlantic Alliance.
The Alliance should not be seen as a single entity, for it encompasses a diversity of
political and developmental frameworks within the countries that are part of it. From
a social perspective, the Alliance is an intriguing case of ocean science diplomacy
exactly due to these differences. By bringing South-South, North-North, and finally,
South-North cooperative arrangements together, implementing such an Alliance
reproduces much of the impacts that accrue from the inequality in science capacity
noted in official documents such as the Global Ocean Science Report (IOCUNESCO, 2020a). These impacts include the power exercised by the North in
pursuing national political agendas, defining research priorities, and allocating
funds for research, among others. The South, in contrast, seems to use ocean science
diplomacy to improve research capacity and international cooperation agreements
(Paper 2, Paper 6). As a result, the Alliance tends to reinforce colonialism in ocean
science, which then becomes a strong asset in ocean science diplomacy, a subject
addressed in the next section. At this point, I wish to highlight that this is a central
finding of my research and analysis that goes directly to the core of this dissertation.
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4.3 Can Ocean Science Diplomacy Further Benefit the
Global South in Achieving Shared Interests and
Realizing Common Values?
The Global South is a contested definition that refers to less privileged countries in
terms of socio-economic development as well as research capacity and
infrastructure (Kloß, 2017). The term Global South is preferred in contrast to others,
such as developing countries or Third World countries, because it captures the
notion of former colonies that still struggle with power asymmetries, although
countries may not physically be located in the Southern Hemisphere, making
geography less important in applying such a term (Tripathi, 2021).
In general, a perspective of science diplomacy in the South is missing and often
expressed from the perspectives of Northern researchers (Bonilla et al., 2021;
Kraemer-Mbula et al., 2020, p. 21). In this sense, there is currently a call for
countries in the Global South to identify what science diplomacy means from their
realities and assess what it should encompass (Mencía-Ripley et al., 2021). In ocean
affairs, countries in the Global South have applied ocean science diplomacy since
the inception of the UNCLOS negotiations, even without the formal concept of
science diplomacy having been developed (Robinson, 2020a). In this case, it was
because of the lack of scientific capacity and the fear of being left behind in
technology developments that those countries were able to adopt Parts XIII and XIV
of UNCLOS, with the specific aim of securing fair development of marine scientific
research and just transfer of marine technologies (Harden-Davies, 2016; Robinson,
2020b). For countries in the Global South, ocean science diplomacy strategies are a
matter of balancing the diplomatic power game by allowing equal opportunities to
access marine technologies (Polejack & Coelho, 2021), influencing the research
agenda in the North (Polejack et al., 2021), and ascertaining their value by voicing
their local realities and other local epistemologies (Muelbert et al., 2021; Rodrigues,
2021).
Ocean science diplomacy can be beneficial to the Global South as a means to
negotiate better international agreements in search of fulfilling countries’ foreign
policies. As a first step towards this goal, each country needs to nationally identify,
organize and coordinate ocean research efforts based on local needs (Polejack &
Coelho, 2021; Polejack & Machado, in press). In view of their ocean science and
technology systems, as well as the limits in their advisory schemes, countries in the
South can identify Northern foreign strategies disguised as international scientific
cooperation which are in fact looking at expanding markets, accessing marine
natural resources beyond national limits, or even testing new products and
technologies abroad, just to name a few (Hoogvelt, 2001; Ruffini, 2020a).
Therefore, adopting a strategy to foster ocean science diplomacy brings both
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internal and external benefits, and countries in the Global South should pursue such
a goal (Bonilla et al., 2021; Echeverría King et al., 2021).
While conducting this research, a specific case in time triggered the debate around
the coloniality of science diplomacy. In 2022, a European academic event on
science diplomacy, entitled “Science Diplomacy, Diversity and the Global South”
had the ambition to “address different, sometime conflictual, perspectives on how a
new vision and practice of science diplomacy may be critical to bridge the Global
North and the Global South interests and contribute to finding common, albeit
diverse, solutions”7. Unfortunately, this event reproduced a Eurocentric pattern,
whereby the Global South was only represented by seven speakers, in contrast with
the fifty-eight panellists from the Global North. The justifications for such a lack of
representation presented by the organizers ranged from time-zone differences to
unavailability of speakers. Nonetheless, the sole fact that the event was held without
proper representation of the South while debating it from a Global North perspective
denotes the coloniality behind this line of thinking (Quijano, 2000). Consequently,
I am currently leading the draft of a manuscript on the coloniality of science
diplomacy together with a group of researchers. This specific draft manuscript is a
spin-off of this research, thus not presented as a core paper in this dissertation. This
draft manuscript presents science diplomacy from a postcolonial perspective,
pointing to timely issues of equality and parachute science (Stefanoudis et al., 2021;
Vos & Schwartz, 2022), as well as the value behind North-South relationships. It is
hoped to be submitted to the Research Policy Journal in 2022.
Naturally, science diplomacy is put into practice by its agents, the science diplomats
(Melchor, 2020). It is through science diplomats that this social phenomenon and
concept flourishes. Individual science diplomats differ in their instruments and
mandates between the North and South Atlantic, as their local realities also differ.
Therefore, it is imperative to understand the meaning that these science diplomats
attach to engaging in ocean science diplomacy practices, and the perceived value
fostering those practices through various processes and strategies that permeate
contemporary ocean affairs (Polejack, in progress; Polejack et al., in progress).

7
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4.4 What Are the Meanings and Values Given to
Science Diplomacy by Science Diplomats in the
Atlantic?
The discussion above has shown a difference in the perceptions and goals applied
to ocean science diplomacy between the North and South Atlantic. In this context,
postcolonial and decolonial theories shed light on how such engagement between
empires and colonies has shaped current reality and influences the current meaning
of ocean science diplomacy. Postcolonial theory states that current reality cannot be
seen without acknowledging and referencing the results of historical colonial and
imperial rule (Said, 1978). Colonies were explored, catechized, and educated to
adopt an alien value system to signify their very existence, to differentiate right from
wrong (Fanon, 1965; Harding, 2011; Losurdo, 2020). By doing so, the colonizer
sets up a rank of humanity, with the colonizer as the normative fully human, while
the other is less human, less capable, and thus seeking by all means to become the
colonizer (Tripathi, 2021). In addition, the colonizer utilizes its dominance to
interpret and make sense of the other, ignoring the colonized perception of self. On
the other hand, colonized beings adopt the settler’s value system by which they
signify their existence (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). Being oppressed by this system of
values, the colonized wants at any cost to approach their existence to the normative,
to resemble the colonizer (Freire, 2005, p. 62).
It could be said that colonialism saw its epilogue with the political independency of
colonies. However, this Eurocentrism has continued to rank and segregate humanity
in terms of class, gender and race (Mignolo, 2009). While postcolonial theory
postulates that the modern social fabric cannot be understood without
acknowledging this ‘colonial wound’ (Losurdo, 2020; Santos, 2009; Spivak, 2010),
decolonial scholars attribute this persistent legacy of colonialism to be a redesign of
power relations and dominance in modern international relations, termed as
coloniality of power (Mignolo 2007; Quijano 2000). Coloniality then represents the
new colonial project, referring to the social, economic and political consequences
of historical colonialism that gives the backbone for the core-periphery relationships
today (Mignolo, 2009). Coloniality can also provide an explanation to how
resources still flow from peripheric (and semi-peripheric) countries to enrichen core
countries, as addressed by dependency theorists (Furtado, 2020). In this sense,
colonialism would be a social formation, while coloniality a “political and symbolic
condition” (Lissovoy & Bailón, 2019).
Historically, the Atlantic has been the main stage for colonization and imperial
expansion (Games, 2006). Colonialism was responsible for the wealth that
European empires enjoyed from exploring Atlantic colonies (Mignolo, 1995).
Colonialism was possible due to the technological advancements in navigation,
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intensified in the sixteenth century with the Atlantic Ocean at the heart of the matter
(Kohn & Reddy, 2022). Apart from exploring natural resources, colonialism
systematically selected what was considered beneficial to the wealth of the crown,
expropriating local knowledge, specially about the local natural environment, and
repressing those that were considered unfit (Quijano 2007). Consequently,
colonialism established a relationship between the settlers and the colony based on
dominance. Scholars argue that the colonialization of what today is termed as Latin
America facilitated the creation of Europe as a socially and politically constructed
identity, where the European would be the civilized and superior to the colonized,
who were perceived as the savage deprived of civility and enlightenment (Quijano
2007). The differences in the physical traits of the colonized and the settler would
have nurtured the notion of race as a social classification, placing non-Europeans as
the inferior other, persistent in current social fabric as a means of dominance
(Harding, 2008; Said, 1978). As a result, these relations of superiority and inferiority
legitimized dominance and permitted the Eurocentric perspective to be the standard
of civility and scientific epistemology (Quijano 2000). The historical and political
colonialism (and its subsequent Eurocentrism) is relevant to understand the modern
international relations between former colonies and empires in the Atlantic
(Alejandro, 2019), and hence composes the backstage of this research.
In the Atlantic, perceptions of ocean science diplomacy seems to reinforce such
coloniality. It has been observed that interviewees from the North Atlantic often
refer to their Southern partners of the All-Atlantic Alliance as those seeking
assistance, which naturally results in the North as the assistance provider, denoting
a sense of superiority. Southern subjects, in turn, voiced the deleterious
consequences of this assistance philosophy and tokenism, both in research as in
diplomacy. This feature is not exclusive to this Alliance, but rather a common
practice in international aid, particularly on issues of health, as recently discussed
by Khan et al. (2022). Thus, coloniality of power would advise on South-North
relationships in ocean science diplomacy. From the manner by which Northern
individuals make sense of their Southern peers to issues of equity in the access to
funding, research infrastructure and human capital, all could be rooted in a project
of coloniality. This project would seek to maintain countries in the Global North as
the holders of scientific capabilities, culminating in more influential roles in the
international agenda setting on ocean affairs, which seems to happen with regard to
the negotiations on the conservation and sustainable use of the biodiversity that
occurs out of national jurisdictions, for instance (Tolochko & Vadrot, 2021b; Vadrot
et al., 2021). Examples of this coloniality in science diplomacy could include the
incipient participation of Southern scientists in developing critical scientific reports
to influence diplomatic negotiations (Muelbert et al., 2021).
As part of the colonial wound, Southern scientists are bound to Western criteria of
excellence, even if these criteria are largely unfit to the reality in which they exist
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(Kraemer-Mbula et al., 2020). This criteria of excellence not only affect scientists,
but also traditional and indigenous knowledge, the millennium survival kit for
individual decision making in every Southern former colony. Western science
determines which epistemes are fit and valuable to the eyes of the modern, widely
accepted and, of course, Western scientific method (Hesselmann, 2019; Sharma,
2021; Smith, 2012). This epistemicide, or the murder of knowledge (Santos, 2016),
translates how ineffective coloniality has been on de facto producing knowledge
that is fit-for-purpose, questioning if science has ever been either universal or
apolitical (Latour, 1993). In addition, this epistemic injustice has shown how
detrimental epistemicide is to build any possibility of a better planet (Koskinen &
Rolin, 2021).
Considering these views, ocean science diplomacy in the Atlantic is still in its
infancy in reaching the goal of becoming a uniting force for building a true and
peaceful All-Atlantic community. Before this goal can be reached, ocean science
diplomacy should undertake an evaluation of internal procedures to seek balance in
research capacities as well as a mutual understanding of these diverse realities, and
determine where action is needed to foster a better governed Atlantic ocean. In sum,
ocean science diplomacy needs to be decolonized so it becomes the desired
powerful tool to bridge communities and foster better-informed decision-making.
Otherwise, we run the risk of reinforcing ancient divisive values that have created
the challenges the Atlantic historically faces.
At this point in time, it seems inevitable to also question whether the very concept
of science diplomacy makes sense to Southern communities as it seems to do for
those in the North. As a concept developed in the USA with further debates in
Europe, science diplomacy may be yet another manifestation of coloniality of
power. According to the interviews reported in Paper 6, diplomacy is distinctively
influenced by science in the North and South, turning the definition of what would
be a Southern-centered science diplomacy a matter of interest, if indeed this
definition is desired by the South. Noteworthy, the search of what a Southern
science diplomacy would look like can greatly differ between epistemic
communities and countries, reinforcing the artificiality of the term South as
including many different realities. However, science diplomacy has been reported
as a tool for the globalized advancement of humanity as a single entity (Berkman,
2019; Gluckman et al., 2018), so caution is necessary with the Northern approach
to using science as a source of power to chase political interests abroad, what could
reinforce relationships of dominance and coloniality of power with the South, all
things considered (Flink 2020; Ruffini 2020b; Rungius & Flink 2020). It is time for
the many countries and communities in the Global South to signify science
diplomacy to local realities and build meaningful international engagements for
these communities’ benefit (Mencía-Ripley et al., 2021).
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4.5 The Contribution of this Work to Scholarship
In addition to the questions answered in previous sections, this research may
represent a decisive step in elucidating the values attributed to science diplomacy
by key agents in the Atlantic Ocean. In this context, it contributes to the debate on
the meaning of science diplomacy, exposing the ocean as a fascinating stage and
cognitive area for the development of further studies. This work also showcases
how ocean science diplomacy can act as an influential practice underlying multiple
negotiations in ocean affairs. By illustrating the role of ocean science diplomacy in
issues ranging from the implementation of international regimes to fostering better
ocean observing systems, this research has shown how timely and critical it is to
elucidate the mechanisms and dynamics produced by the mutual influence of
science and diplomacy.
As inductive research, this work did not aim to test theories and thus it was not my
goal to unveil the relationship between science and diplomacy from a colonial
perspective. Rather, it was because of the perceived values and inherent
positionality of the individuals contributing to the interviews that coloniality was
centrally placed in this discussion and in the narrative that underpins this
dissertation.
The sense these individuals make of ocean science diplomacy reflects the way they
perceive the interaction between science and diplomacy in international
negotiations. This sense-making reveals conflictual oppositions as a binary logic.
However, I acknowledge that reality goes beyond binary and fairly simplistic
relationships. There exists a multitude of shades and tones between these green and
blue positions. As Chimakonam (2019) suggests, binary logic contributes less to
decolonizing reality because it naturally places the colonized and the colonizer as
different entities in dispute. Chimakonam argues that if we simply substitute one
power for another, there will still be opposing forces, following the detrimental logic
of the “winner takes it all”. This is not the case. Humanity should seek ways to
abandon this binary opposition and find the opportunity for dialogic encounters
where science and diplomacy acknowledge, respect and thrive because of their
differences. As defended by Freire (2005), humans should seek the humanization of
us all, liberating the oppression that limits our capacities and knowledge
development. On the other hand, it seems timely that we, as ocean stewards,
recognize this colonial past, this open colonial wound. Recognizing this non-binary
reality, expressed by many of the interviewees to be reflection of coloniality, is
possibly a necessary step to negotiating more just and fair international agreements
for scientific development. In this case, the momentum created by the Decade of
Ocean Science can be the opportunity to start a serious assessment of the underlying
power disputes that seem to fuel ocean international agendas. Furthermore, it can
kick-start a badly needed process of reform.
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Following a similar line of argumentation, the use of the terms “Global South” and
“Global North” results in conflicting perceptions and an inaccurate generalization
of these regions as a binary system. I acknowledge that there is as much diversity
within the Global South as there is in a Global North. Both terms are highly
criticized (Haug, Braveboy-Wagner, & Maihold, 2021; Schneider, 2017), but were
adopted in this research for the sake of making arguments clearer and as an
analytical paradigm. Indeed, using Global South as a term tends to detract a certain
notion of subalternity that similar terms tend to evoke, such as “Third World”,
“developing” and “underdeveloped” (Spivak, 2010). The use of such language tends
to position these countries to a lesser degree than those which are developed or
belong to a “first” world. The main idea behind the use of Global North or Global
South is the core-periphery relationship, where privileged countries enjoy better
conditions because of the historical exploitation of less-privileged countries in the
periphery (Tickner, 2013).
The consequences of such a difference in privilege go much beyond the simple use
of a term. De Sousa Santos (2016) advocates that it is because of this core-periphery
relation that we experience today an epistemicide, that is, the destruction of
knowledge that does not attain and satiate Western values and norms. Dainotto
(2017), supported by decolonial reasoning, questions if what we experience today
in peripheral countries is the production or the consumption of knowledge. Carchedi
& Roberts (2021) present interesting evidence on the economic profit that core
countries continue to enjoy as a result of imperial and colonial exploitation of the
periphery.
Pragmatically, countries on the periphery have less access to research infrastructure
(Polejack & Coelho, 2021), struggle to do science in English (Márquez & Porras,
2020), are less visible to the core scientific community (Gomez, Herman & Parigi,
2022), and tend to be negatively impacted by open access fees in scientific journals
(Kwon, 2022; Smith et al., 2022). However, periphery countries have also found
ways to foster cooperation among their peers (Gray & Gills, 2016), finding grounds
for transformative acts (Pereira et al., 2020), as science matters equally to those on
the periphery as it does to core countries (Rodrigues, 2021). Therefore, beyond the
term in itself, it seems critical that contributions are made in relation to the
perspective of this periphery, even if these countries are idealized as those with less
scientific capability and excellence (Kraemer-Mbula et al., 2020; Tolochko &
Vadrot, 2021b). Therefore, this research should greatly contribute to the body of
knowledge necessary to understanding the reality faced by periphery countries,
despite the recognized limitations that come along with using the term and framing
the narrative around the Global South.
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4.6 Limitations of this work
4.6.1

Methodological

This research being inductive implies in a certain set of limitations in its scope. First,
its exploratory characteristic drove the search for individual realities and truths, by
means of collecting impressions from key interviewees. No previous assumptions
on testing theories were made. Consequently, results are limited to the specific set
of individuals assessed in a given context and time, not to be extrapolated to a
population or any sort of generalization. It is acknowledged, however, that this
specific set of individuals are indeed very influential in the agenda-setting in the
Atlantic Ocean science landscape. Second, results indicate a snapshot of a certain
social and historical context, but are also limited to the representation of twenty
individuals. If this research goal was to test previously assumed hypothesis, then a
higher sample would be required. Third, we present this work in light of constructed
discourses, among which those which can be perceived as hegemonic. The
conducted thematic analysis along with the sample size limit this work to identify
individual perceptions rather than ascertain what are the discourses around ocean
science diplomacy, including the identification of hegemonic discourses. In this
sense, this work contributes by bringing forward evidence of how these perceptions
can indeed influence the overall landscape of science diplomacy in the Atlantic
Ocean science-policy community. Further work desiring to unveil hegemony would
require a larger sample encompassing other countries’ key respondents, actors from
other societal sectors and the analysis of official documents and possibly media
discourses, none of which were the goal of this work. Lastly, applying reflexive
analysis of the produced texts resulting of this research has also exposed my own
positionality as a key factor to both determine the methodology and the theoretical
basis of the discussion of results. My own involvement with the general context of
this research should be taken into consideration as a limiting factor of analysis.

4.6.2

Theoretical

Along the lines of this inductive research, I was undressed of theoretical
assumptions when designing the research protocol. Exactly because of the truths
generously shared with me by interviewees that I then started to study theories that
could aid in explaining the results. In addition, as a transdisciplinary research, this
search included theories of siloed fields of scholarship, such as International
Relations, Political Sciences, and even Behavioral Psychology, among many others.
The effort of combining siloed theoretical schools of thought was in itself
challenging. A few theories seemed adequate to address the results, as shown in
Table 2 of this dissertation. Among these theories, it was a personal choice to
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discuss results in light of postcolonialism and decolonial thought. Both theories
challenge the very basic concepts one adopts when inferring about the institutional
setup of ocean science diplomacy, or even what this new concept means, on which
grounds it is being shaped. It felt timely to open this discussion on decolonization
once the UN Decade of Ocean Science is just starting to be implemented. Rather
than investing in already established research programs that have traditionally
informed diplomacy, mainly coordinated by Global North institutions, we should
amplify our efforts in search for equity in the development of ocean science and
better equipped advisory schemes to policy-making. Thus, postcolonialism and
decolonialism rightfully present alternatives to decolonize science diplomacy that
should be further considered. In this sense, once again my own positionality has
major influence over this theoretical choice, but nonetheless explore truths brought
from interviewees as how their world operates, particularly in South-North
cooperative frameworks.

4.6.3

Contextual

This research explored ocean science diplomacy practices in the context of the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance. However, it focused on assessing individual
truths. The research design could have had a focus on the existing institutional
frameworks and policy networks developing ocean science diplomacy in the
Atlantic Ocean, which would be one way to evaluate their roles in the conduct of
science diplomacy in the region. Indeed, it would be important to unveil the
institutional setups and individual agency in promoting ocean science diplomacy in
the Atlantic in order to understand the stakes at play and drivers of action. However,
this approach could only be developed once an understanding of the role of science
diplomacy in the region, along with the individual perceptions of this phenomenon
were explored, which was successfully achieved through the lines of this research.
Assessing the institutional discursive practices and individual agency will require a
surplus effort in first navigating through the ‘horredogram’ of ocean governance in
the Atlantic region (Boyes & Elliott, 2014), which I recommend as a future research.

4.7 Recommended Further Research
A few unresolved issues have been highlighted throughout this work, which require
further research. In particular, the power clashes between science and policy in
international settings would be an interesting question to explore further. In this
context, I would recommend assessing other stakeholders involved in ocean science
diplomacy, such as industry, civil society and non-State actors in general. It was not
within this research’s scope to evaluate the perceptions of these groups, although I
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have identified their critical role in different places of this dissertation and
throughout the publications that derive from it. Moreover, the institutional
framework influencing the exchange between science in diplomacy in the region
and also in intergovernmental arenas would complement the research done with
individual/groups agency.
It would also be interesting to follow the implementation of the UN Decade of
Ocean Science in terms of programs and actions that involve countries from the
Global North and the Global South. It would be of particular interest to study the
interactions between stakeholders self-identified as belonging to the North or South
and evaluate if coloniality is a matter of routine work or a perspective given in a
certain time and context by this research interviewees.
Overall, I expect this research to have contributed to raising the important topic of
ocean science diplomacy as a critical process that requires further studies and
engagement by epistemic communities. The international ocean governance
framework can benefit from such assessments to find more equitable and suitable
ways to promote better decision-making in all aspects of ocean affairs that rest at
the science policy interface.
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5 Conclusions

This work provides a baseline on what ocean science diplomacy entails by
demonstrating the importance of science diplomacy as a fundamental phenomenon
in global ocean governance. This is due to the role of science in informing ocean
management and also to the role of diplomacy in increased requests for scientific
advice in face of the insufficient knowledge about the ocean. As a result, it is
suggested that the term ocean science diplomacy be adopted to differentiate the
challenges in dealing with the multidimensional and plural systems at sea, including
the intrinsic differences from land in terms of regulatory, legal, and socio-economic
frameworks. Ocean governance is realized through overlapping regulatory
mandates and anarchic systems in which science (or the lack of sufficient scientific
evidence) plays a critical role. Science diplomacy in the context of ocean
governance becomes dependent on the context in which it occurs. Thus, further
research could consider analysing institutional structures and practitioners’ agency,
including the study of policy networks and institutional dynamics involving the
broad range of actors termed as ‘science diplomats’. In the dawn of the UN Decade
of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development, an apt stage for the further
development of ocean science diplomacy frameworks, practitioners should consider
strengthening dialogic encounters amongst different sectors by means of enhanced
communication and exchange of multiple forms of knowledge. Actions regarding
the building of alliances during the Decade should go to heart of this international
effort, by which enhanced access to research inputs and equitable, inclusive and
non-discriminatory participation of stakeholders must be promoted. Opportunities
need to be co-created with the involvement of all so we truly aim for the “science
we need for the ocean we want”.
Ocean science diplomacy is a mainstream policy option as a beneficial strategy to
bring communities together around shared goals with the ultimate objective of
improving the state of the ocean and safeguarding human life. Deriving from this
work’s findings, it is noted that practitioners of ocean science diplomacy share a
perspective of it that is based on specific assumptions of science and of diplomacy.
Science is usually referred to as a neutral, apolitical and universal practice, while
diplomacy is viewed as pertaining exclusively to governments and shaped by
countries’ foreign policies. However, science is, as all other social phenomena,
influenced by the contextual setup in which it is developed and results from a
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socially constructed contract that establishes the criteria to qualify its practices, a
contract that is itself shaped by other socio-cultural phenomena. Diplomacy, in turn,
has been progressively influenced by non-State actors that engage internationally in
spite of countries’ foreign policy objectives, a feature termed as public diplomacy.
Those general assumptions about science and diplomacy that tend to perceive
science as apolitical and diplomacy something that occurs only under the power of
States denote a hegemony of Western values in detriment of other epistemologies.
It seems necessary to acknowledge and understand how grounded in inequality and
elitism ocean science diplomacy can be. For ocean science diplomacy to act as a
driver of unity and peace, as desired by many, science diplomats ought to recognize
the power disputes that appear to be at the core of engagement in its practices.
Therefore, ocean science diplomacy is a complex phenomenon that is contextdependent and can go far beyond being limited to Western perceptions of science
and diplomacy.
The individuals surveyed in the course of this research have kindly shown me their
colourful truths about science diplomacy. In a humble attempt to analyse their
truths, I became part of the process absorbing their truths to my own self, and, to a
certain extent, developing the narrative. It is in such a realm that colonialism gained
attention as one possible way of looking at these truths. This self-perception posits
fundamental challenges to the development of ocean science diplomacy practices.
Issues such as tokenism in the scientific peer-to-peer relationship and top-down
decision-making frameworks with questionable ethical procedures reflect tensions
resulting from power disputes among sectors. Because of this multiple sense
making, I invested in postcolonial and decolonial thought to challenge the very
fundaments of the social fabric pertaining ocean science diplomacy. Questions on
agents’ boundary limitations and disputes between epistemic communities are
raised in an attempt to decolonize modes of reasoning ocean science diplomacy.
Inevitably, and by reflexively looking back at my writings, I find myself as an
intellectual-activist, concurring with Boaventura de Sousa Santos:
“By calling myself an intellectual-activist I wish to suggest a possible way of living
the impossibility of communicating the unsayable in a productive way, thereby
creating new possibilities. (…) I am part of a collective by being aware of how I
separate myself from it in order to write.” (Santos, 2016).

In the context of this work, a few attempts of recommending further actions from
science diplomats were made. These recommendations should be carefully taken as
contextual frameworks differ greatly and influence the mode of operation of ocean
science diplomacy. In addition, recommendations depart from the narrative
developed throughout this dissertation and encompass the author’s positionality. All
things considered, interviewees have argued for a need of improved South-South
cooperation, for abandoning colonial practices in science and for seeking equity in
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the access and use of science. In practical terms, it could be argued that countries in
the South should enhance marine advisory mechanisms, broadening the
participation of all ways of knowing, seeking support for beneficial international
engagement around science and improved science-based international informed
decision-making. Similarly, countries in the Global North should engage in dialogue
with peers in the South to understand their realities and promote actions in support
of those views, by leveraging capital and human resources abroad and enhancing
scientific capabilities locally. Science diplomacy as an emerging term might
represent a social construct with intrinsic Western values that are adopted by
communities in the Global South without much understanding of the power disputes
that it entails. By concurring with this somehow naive view of an apolitical and
neutral science as a driver to promote better international relationships, the Global
South might be missing the opportunity to realign science diplomacy to local
realities and develop a fit-for-purpose concept, applicable as a strategy to pursue
their interests and needs. In sum, I argue for the decolonization of science
diplomacy. As a principle of this research, decolonization pertains to social
institutions, but mostly a call to decolonize the self, a process by which includes
myself. This means to undress ourselves from preconceived assumptions in order to
find a worldview in which liberation of us all is critical and overdue. In this last
attempt of decolonizing ourselves, I end by quoting Boaventura Santos once again:
“We live on the other side of the line that someone traced while thinking of us but
aiming at not thinking of us anymore. We are invisible, inaudible, and illegible
because the success of previous revolutions decided not to include us. If our here is
invisible, our now is even more so. According to those revolutions, we have, at most,
a past, but no future. We were never allowed to write the history books.” (Santos,
2016)

Let us liberate ourselves to change the history books.
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The ocean is highly impacted by human activities, and ambitious levels of science are
urgently needed to support decision making in order to achieve sustainability. Due to
the high cost and risk associated with ocean exploration and monitoring in time and
space, vast areas of the oceanic social ecological system remain under-sampled or
unknown. Governments have recognized that no single nation can on its own fill these
scientific knowledge gaps, and this has led to a number of agreements to support
international scientific collaboration and the exchange of information and capacity. This
paper reviews current discussions on ocean science diplomacy, i.e., the intersection
of science with international ocean affairs. Ocean science is intrinsically connected
with diplomacy in supporting negotiations toward a more sustainable future. Diplomacy
supports essential aspects of scientific work such as capacity building, technology and
information/knowledge exchange, and access and sharing of research platforms. Ocean
science diplomacy underlies the work of many intergovernmental organizations that
provide scientific guidance, such as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
(IOC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), and United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To illustrate how critical science diplomacy is to global ocean
affairs, this paper examines examples of the influence of ocean science diplomacy in
UNCLOS. Furthermore, this paper discusses the utility of ocean science diplomacy in
support of the UN 2030 agenda, and the UN Decade of Ocean Science.
Keywords: science diplomacy, United Nations (UN), sustainability, Decade of Ocean Science, 2030 Agenda and
SDGs, Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), transdisciplinary science

SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Science is a universal language that through empirical observation and evidence-based testing
stands on grounds of replicability, transparency, and merit in search of the truth (Oreskes, 2019,
p. 24). Science facilitates communication and cooperation as scientists seek ways to compare results
across time and space to understand reality and socio-ecological phenomena (Wagner, 2002).
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Science is generally perceived by society as apolitical and free
of values, a search for evidence that enlightens our knowledge
(Iñiguez et al., 2012). Despite the important debate in Academia
on the political basis of science (Jasanoff, 1998; McCain, 2016),
this public perception promotes science as a reliable source of
knowledge that is widely used by policymakers and diplomats,
from advising policy to reinforcing political values (Weiss, 2005;
Pielke, 2007; Oliver and Cairney, 2019).
Modern diplomacy can be understood as a statecraft in
building non-violent international relations advising, shaping,
and implementing foreign policy (Barston, 2019; Boyd et al.,
2019), whereby diplomats protect and promote national
values and interests abroad (Kaltofen and Acuto, 2018a). In
international relations, science can act as a country’s soft power,
as opposed to the traditional hard powers of force and coercion
(Nye, 2017), reinforcing and spreading national views and values
(e.g., House of Lords, 2014). Evidence-based negotiations bridge
international relations and science (Kaltofen and Acuto, 2018b),
posing a necessity to strengthen the participation of national
science and technology communities in negotiation processes
(Colglazier, 2016).
As the global community increasingly meets Anthropocene
challenges, the integration of science and diplomacy is pivotal
(Steffen et al., 2011; Kotzé, 2014). One current example involves
climate science feeding diplomatic negotiations at the UN
level. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
reports have informed diplomatic discussions and resulted in
progressive commitments from countries. From Kyoto to Paris,
scientific advice has informed more assertive commitments to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Ruffini, 2018). A new field
of study has emerged to understand this interlinkage between
science and international relations under le chapeau of science
diplomacy (Fedoroff, 2009). Science diplomacy, though a new
term, is being increasingly used by policymakers as a way
of promoting international engagement around evidence-based
decision making (e.g., Pandor, 2017; Moedas, 2019).
This paper aims to present current discussions on science
diplomacy and its application in the context of ocean affairs.
Here, I review different examples of what constitutes ocean
science diplomacy by briefly analyzing the work of some
key intergovernmental organizations, such as the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). A more
in-depth analysis is presented for the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (hereafter the Convention)
and its implementing institutions as critical avenues for the
application of ocean science diplomacy practices and power
play among States in vital matters concerning ocean affairs. In
addition, I explore the relationship between the UN 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development and the upcoming UN Decade
of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030), as
both processes result from ocean science diplomacy practices
and contribute to the implementation of the Convention. Finally,
I discuss the current and future importance of ocean science
diplomacy in global governance frameworks, in particular with
a view to enhancing sustainability and regional ocean science and
technology capabilities.

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

METHODS
The work presented here results from a literature review and a
desktop analysis of the Convention and related implementing
instruments. I analyzed the current theoretical discussions
around science diplomacy and framed these into practical
examples of the Convention’s implementation. The evolution of
the implementation of the provisions in the Convention can
also be assessed by analyzing the annual UN General Assembly
(UNGA)’s Omnibus resolutions for Oceans and the Law of the
Sea, where States Parties agree on mutual issues of concern and
calls for action with regard to ocean health, sustainability, and
use. Therefore, I reviewed the last 10 years (2009–2019) of the
omnibus resolution in search of the terms “science,” “scientific,”
“research,” and “knowledge.” I extracted and compiled the full
text of the agreed paragraphs that addressed ocean science at
some level, to look for the main themes that States called for
scientific expertise. By doing so, I present the recent updates on
the role of science to international ocean affairs after the adoption
of the Convention, as a means to illustrate the role of science
diplomacy in progressing matters of common concern in the law
of the sea and ocean affairs among States.

PROGRESSIVE EVOLUTION OF A NEW
CONCEPT: SCIENCE DIPLOMACY
Science diplomacy practices date back to ancient times (e.g.,
Turekian et al., 2015). Reports from the negotiations of the
Treaty of Kadesh, in a conflicted Egypt in 1300 B.C., show letters
asking for doctors to be exchanged between the powers in dispute
(Turekian, 2018). Contemporary examples of science diplomacy
include the SESAME synchrotron light facility in the Middle East.
SESAME has allowed researchers to cooperate in a politically
tense region, arranging member countries to form a dialogue
based on science (Rungius, 2020).
There is much debate on what science diplomacy means.
International relation scholarship has traditionally placed science
exogenous to theoretical discussions (Mayer et al., 2014), a
picture that is slowly changing due to the political power that
science can exercise in international negotiations, in face of global
environmental uncertainties. Consequently, science diplomacy
has emerged as a new field to understand the interplay between
science and international relations, in particular where there are
global, transborder, and regional issues of common concern or
interest (Berkman, 2019; Flink and Rüffin, 2019). Studies in this
field include the influence of science in diplomatic relations,
the dynamics of science acting as a source of power between
nations, and the support that diplomacy can provide to research
and innovation (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010; Leite et al., 2020).
In this sense, science diplomacy can be framed as a discipline
grounded on the fields of international relations, science–policy
interface, and Science and Technology Studies (Fähnrich, 2017).
Science diplomacy can also be described as a practice, and
some have advocated that this is the dominant view in the
literature, based on practitioners’ perspectives and requiring
further empirical basis (Ruffini, 2020). Science diplomacy as
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diplomacy, and science is one of the many features considered in
the decision-making process (Ruffini, 2020). In this case, science
can both influence but also be influenced by diplomacy, grounded
in national political agendas (Flink, 2020).
Globalization has provided many pathways for researchers
to collaborate in global environmental agendas and engage
with international decision makers, without undue regard to
national political agendas (Leguey-Feilleux, 2017). Non-State
organizations have been particularly active in engaging society
and calling attention to environmental concerns grounded in
scientific findings. These organizations, which include nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, provide
scientific evidence to international discussions by preparing
policy briefs, community white papers, and side events in
Convention of the Parties, for independent discussion based on
science. This track 2 diplomacy, parallel to State-led diplomacy,
has being identified as a more flexible and forthcoming form
of international relations by which science can exercise its
freedom and best address societal benefits and community
interests (Jones, 2015; Gore et al., 2020). One example of
such is the ongoing negotiation at the UN on a new
legally binding instrument to regulate the access and benefit
sharing of the marine biodiversity in areas beyond national
jurisdiction (Harden-Davies, 2018). Science diplomacy facilitates
how national political agendas can be brought into balance
with community interests, with researchers centrally placed to
provide evidence and inform future joint decisions (Legrand and
Stone, 2018). As a pay-off, researchers are provided with access

a practice involves the collection, synthesis, and presentation
of evidence to international decision-making processes, joint
research projects acting as a dialog hub between nations, and
scientific cooperation calling society to address humanitarian
challenges (Rungius et al., 2018).
Discussions in science diplomacy generally frame the results
into two distinct taxonomies due to the lack of a generally
accepted definition of the concept. One of those taxonomies was
provided by the Royal Society and the American Association for
the Advancement of Science as a result of an event held in 2010
(The Royal Society, and AAAS, 2010). The concept is categorized
as shown and exemplified in Figure 1.
Subsequently, Gluckman et al. (2018) proposed another
set of categories that highlight the utility of the concept in
transnational relations. According to those authors, science
diplomacy practices would fall into three categories, namely:
i Actions designed to directly advance a country’s national
needs;
ii Actions designed to address cross-border interests; and
iii Actions primarily designed to meet global needs and
challenges.
Both taxonomies, when confronted, show a progressing
evolution of the concept. The Royal Society and AAAS taxonomy
disregarded the role played by national interests in advancing
science diplomacy, being brought to the discussion by Gluckman
and colleagues in 2018. National interests are an essential part of

FIGURE 1 | Diagram showing the three categories of Science Diplomacy as informed by The Royal Society, and AAAS (2010), followed by examples of current
matters in ocean affairs that illustrate this taxonomy.
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IOC has been central in organizing and pushing ocean science
under the mandate of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). IOC
relies upon at least two definitions of ocean science. First, ocean
science includes all disciplines related to the ocean, i.e., the
classical fields of oceanography: physical, biological, chemical,
and geological, as well as hydrography, health and social sciences,
engineering, the humanities, and multidisciplinary research on
the relationship between humans and the ocean (IOC-UNESCO,
2017, p. 19). Second, and more recently in the context of the
UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development,
this definition has been expanded to include the supporting
infrastructure (observations, data systems, etc.); societal benefits,
such as knowledge transfer and applications in regions that
are lacking science capacity; science-policy/user interface; and
local and indigenous knowledge (IOC-UNESCO, 2020b, p. 2).
Although both definitions are debatable, the key message is
that ocean science is transdisciplinary in essence and is now
being used to fulfill other roles, such as producing goods
for social benefit and fostering transfer of technology and
capacity development.

to infrastructure and international funding (Berkman, 2019).
Consequently, global environmental conundrums are excellent
cases for science diplomacy.

THE OCEAN AS A RICH FIELD FOR
SCIENCE DIPLOMACY
The ocean supports life on the planet by providing food (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020),
climate regulation (IPCC, 2019), and other essential ecosystem
services (Lubchenco and Petes, 2010). Perceived as humankind’s
last frontier (Gibney, 1978), our relation to the ocean is not
only economical (Fleming, 2010), but also social and spiritual
(Costanza, 1999). At the same time, the ocean is highly impacted
by human activities, including overfishing (Jackson et al., 2001),
the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services (Worm et al.,
2006; Hughes et al., 2018), ocean warming (Poloczanska et al.,
2013; Cheng et al., 2020), and sea level rise as a direct
consequence of climate change (Small and Nicholls, 2003). Ocean
ecosystem services are beneficial to humanity in its entirety.
Land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States, with low
or no proximity to coastal areas, still depend on marine transport
systems, as well as food provision, climate regulation, and leisure
services from the ocean (Nash et al., 2017).
The marine environment is considered as a global commons,
and it is on humanity’s best interest to preserve and sustainably
use its resources and services (Vogler, 2012; Rudolph et al.,
2020). Ocean management relies both on national policies and
regulations and on international cooperation (Attard, 2018).
Scientists are best placed to identify and comprehend hazardous
anthropomorphic phenomena in the ocean, seeking answers to
inform policy (Nursey-Bray et al., 2014; Tengö et al., 2014;
Sudhakar, 2020). Therefore, ocean science is essential both to
assess ocean environmental limits (Baähr, 2017; Nash et al.,
2017) and to provide evidence to sustainably limit our efforts on
crossing those ocean boundaries (Ingeman et al., 2019).
International non-governmental and intergovernmental
organizations play an important role in the international
ocean decision-making. For instance, ICES, a North Atlantic
intergovernmental scientific body, has been advising policy since
1902, in particular with regard to fisheries management. ICES
provides evidence to support regional and national decision
making, but also assists countries on crafting their positions in
international fora when requested to do so. Advice is delivered
by a broad network of scientists who use their peer collaboration
to reach out even further and conduct scenario-building, so
information is policy-relevant (ICES, 2019). In fact, Robinson
(2020a) advocates that ICES has developed subsequent ocean
science diplomacy mechanisms, describing ICES critical role
in shaping ocean science diplomacy. Historically, ICES is well
respected and cooperates closely with other relevant international
organizations, such as the IOC of UNESCO.
The IOC is broadly recognized as the international scientific
body for ocean affairs at the UN level (Pavliha and Gutiérrez,
2010). It is an institution that has combined science and
diplomacy since its inception in 1960. With 150 Member States,

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA
The Convention on the Law of the Sea sets the rights and
obligations of State Parties in relation to the law of the sea
and ocean affairs, thereby providing a global ocean governance
framework that is almost universally accepted (Koh, 1982).
The Convention is a living example of how national interests
are balanced with global interests regarding the exploration
and conservation of the ocean (Long, 2007). National interests
included States claims to extended maritime spaces. Global
interests were mainly the expanding threat of unregulated natural
resources exploration (Brown and Fabian, 1974). Consequently,
the United Nations General Assembly convened the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea—UNCLOS III in 1973
to discuss ocean matters in plenitude (Koh and Jayakumar, 1977).
It was only after 9 years of long and intense negotiations at the UN
that the Convention was finally adopted in 1982 and entered into
force in 1994. Today, it is the globally recognized regime dealing
with all matters relating to the law of the sea, being ratified by 167
States Parties and the EU (United Nations, 2019b).
Science was at the very core of negotiations at UNCLOS III
(1973–1982) (Hayes, 2011). Diplomats needed to be supported
by scientific information to negotiate Convention matters as
well as to rebut evidence presented by other parties. This power
of science was very influential to inform the agenda setting as
well as the advancement of the negotiations (Brown and Fabian,
1974). For example, during the process of framing the draft
provisions of the new treaty, it became evident that countries
with better scientific capabilities could drive negotiations by
presenting strong evidence that anchored discussions around
that information, something called in negotiation theory as the
anchoring effect (Furnham and Boo, 2011).
One example of this anchoring effect in ocean negotiations
involves the discussions on deep sea mining, which were central
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States’ technical capacities to implement the Convention. The
same applies to Part XIV, in which countries are called to share
and transfer marine technologies to less capable nations, so
that they can manage their jurisdictional waters and gain the
benefits of the resources therein, as well as avail of their rights
and discharge their obligations under the Convention. Although
essential to the implementation of the Convention, these
provisions are among the least implemented (Salpin et al., 2018).
Science in the Convention goes beyond Parts XIII and
XIV. For instance, Part XV sets a complex compulsory dispute
settlement mechanism for resolving disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of the law of the sea (Doelle, 2006).
Disputes must be solved peacefully and by negotiation in the
first instance, and thereafter by recourse to judicial settlement,
such as international arbitration. Resolving disputes are often
dependent on the evidence tendered by the parties. For example,
if the dispute is about maritime delimitation, countries need to
present data on baselines and geological features such as islands,
rocks, and low-tide elevations. If it is on natural resources, such
as fisheries, evidence on aspects such as fish population dynamics
and ecosystems health is needed. In this context, research
capacities become a matter of statecraft in international ocean
negotiations. Countries with high technical capabilities are best
placed to provide stronger arguments that can result in solving
disputes in their benefit. Furthermore, scientific experts and their
opinions can have a major bearing on the outcomes of judicial
settlement (Boyle and Harrison, 2013). Scientific evidence is
increasingly decisive in the resolution of international disputes
concerning damage to biodiversity and degraded ecosystems
(Long, 2019).

to the successful conclusion of UNCLOS III. Evidence on
mineral richness and potential commercial value resulted in
the creation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) under
the Convention. The ISA is an organization by which States
Parties organize, administer, and control activities in the “Area,”
i.e., the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction [Convention’s Art 1 (1)].
The Authority organizes and controls activities guided by the
principle that sets the Area as a common heritage of (hu)mankind
(Wedding et al., 2015) as adopted by the Convention and later
reinforced in the Convention’s 1994 Implementation Agreement
(Lodge and Verlaan, 2018). Therefore, even States which are
not part of the Convention are still bound to the Authority’s
role in regulating this common heritage as part of customary
international law, overseeing equitable opportunities in the Area
(Willaert, 2021). ISA’s raison d’être is basically to apply scientific
evidence to regulate both mining and environmental protection,
making sure that any resulting benefits are shared among all.
The ISA continually develops and enhances codes of conducts
and technical guidelines, all based on evidence presented by
States Parties. Considering that our knowledge of the deep sea
is still inadequate, the lack of sufficient scientific evidence is a
common ground, a situation in which the precautionary principle
is generally applied (Ardron et al., 2018). However, most Member
States to the Convention lack the capacity to produce or evaluate
scientific evidence in relation to the deep ocean, leaving those
States with higher capabilities to drive the regulatory framework
for mining and environment impact assessments of this common
heritage of humankind (Wolfrum, 1983).
Historically, disparities in science and technology capacities
drove countries to adopt distinct positions in negotiating the
Convention. Developing countries recognized their lack of
scientific and technological capabilities as a threat, undermining
their ability to properly address technical issues as well
as progressing on the potential exploration of the marine
natural resources and resulting incomes (Hayes, 2011). In
addition, sociotechnical imaginaries1 , i.e., technologies that were
not yet available or commercially viable, drove developing
countries’ concerns in relation to sovereignty rights, access,
and potential benefit sharing of those explorations (Robinson,
2020b). Developed countries, in turn, were concerned whether
the Convention would post obstacles on the conduct of marine
research abroad, limiting their access to foreign waters and
therefore any potential prospective research on marine resources
(Shapley, 1973), in addition that it would require the mandatory
exchange of ocean technologies to developing countries.
Consequently, the Convention recognized the importance of
ocean science in adopting Parts XIII and XIV, addressing Marine
Scientific Research and the Development and Transfer of Marine
Technology, respectively.
Part XIII calls for international scientific cooperation for
peaceful purposes, seeking to diminish the gaps between Member

CURRENT EXAMPLES OF THE ROLE OF
OCEAN SCIENCE IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA
There are many examples of how ocean science is essential to
implement the Convention, from direct provisions such as Parts
XIII and XIV, to provisions indirectly impacted by ocean science,
such as dispute settlements and maritime delimitation. We will
address a few of these examples regarding how ocean science
can be impactful in defining maritime boundaries, setting limits
for the exploration of natural resources and regulating access to
ocean areas out of national jurisdictions. This non-exhaustive
list of examples aims to illustrate the importance of evidence
provision to international decision making in ocean affairs.

Boundary Delineation and Delimitation
States Parties to the Convention have the right to define
and claim the outer limit of their continental shelf where it
exceeds 200 nautical miles. According to Article 76 of the
Convention, this right only applies to the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil, not the water column and air space above.
This can result in large oceanic areas under States Parties’
rights to commercially explore living and non-living resources
such as minerals, oil, and gas. As a rule, the establishment of
maritime boundaries is within the sovereign powers of countries,

1

Sociotechnical imaginaries are defined by Jasanoff and Kim (2009) as “collectively
imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfillment
of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects.” Robinson (2020b)
further explores how the ocean imaginaries caused uncertainty in the international
community leading to the UNCLOS negotiations.
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component of decision making in fisheries with potentially huge
economic, social, and environmental consequences (Robinson,
2020a). Ocean science diplomacy has a major bearing on how
this evidence is used by RFMOs to address these complex issues
and, once again, scientific and technical capacities are of pivotal
importance to statecraft and to redressing global conservation
concerns (Worm and Branch, 2012).
Unknowns abound in vast parts of the ocean. Many questions
remain unanswered by ocean science. Diplomacy walked hand in
hand with science even in face of great uncertainties at UNCLOS
III and subsequent negotiations on the seabed mining regime
in 1994 and the straddling fish stock agreement in 1995. Both
science and diplomacy inform all aspects of this engagement. As
more evidence becomes available due to progressive availability
application of new ocean technologies and research tools, the
possibility arises that States and intergovernmental organizations
can press ahead in addressing some of the issues left unresolved
by UNCLOS III. A case in point relates to the regulation of
the access and benefit sharing arising from the exploration
of the biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, or simply
BBNJ (Long and Chaves, 2015). The BBNJ negotiating process
is currently underway, based on a draft text for this new
implementing agreement (United Nations, 2019a). Negotiations
are centered in four main themes: marine genetic resources,
including questions on the sharing of benefits; measures such as
area-based management tools, including marine protected areas,
environmental impact assessments and capacity-building, and
the transfer of marine technology. The current draft posits the use
of the best available scientific knowledge as a guiding principle.
Ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction are among the least
known by science, so this agreement, if successfully negotiated,
can improve the scientific endeavor needed to unveil almost half
of the Earth’s surface (St. John et al., 2016). Scientific evidence
will be determinant to identify the source of living resources and
to advance in marine omics. Diplomacy will be essential to foster
programs of capacity building and transfer of marine technology.
In addition, the governance of international marine protected
areas and the conduction of ecosystem impact assessments will
rely intensively on the dynamics between science and diplomacy.
Thus, BBNJ is a new interesting case of science diplomacy in
action, as pointed out by Harden-Davies (2018).

with the sole exception of establishing the outer limit of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which is subject
to an important international oversight process and procedural
obligations regarding the tendering of scientific evidence to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).
The latter is the body responsible for analyzing States Parties
submissions and drawing recommendations on the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. Scientific evidence is
all that matters to CLCS, made up of scientific and technical
experts, and the outer limit established by the coastal State on
the basis of the recommendations of the Commission are final
and binding (as per paragraph 8 of article 76 of the Convention).
These recommendations can impact demanding States Parties
economically, geopolitically, and socially (Suarez, 2013). States
Parties had 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention,
or until 2004, to submit their claims (as per article 4 of the Annex
II of the Convention). Countries with less capabilities to provide
such evidence are disadvantaged in exploring their rights over
any potential extension of their continental shelf or in meeting
the required timeline for making a submission to the CLCS.
This shows how technical capacities and scientific evidence
are determinant to the Convention’s implementation by coastal
States. Noteworthy, some countries still proclaim extensions of
the continental shelf unilaterally despite the requirements of the
Convention (Morales, 2020).

Exploration and Regulation of Living
Resources
Another good example of ocean science interaction with the law
of the sea is the regulatory framework for the exploration of
straddling and migratory fish stocks. This framework was the
outcome of its own diplomatic negotiation after the adoption of
the Convention and once again ocean science played a central
role in its adoption. In 1995, an implementing agreement was
adopted under the Convention, with a very long title, namely:
the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the UNCLOS relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, or “Fish
Stocks Agreement” (FSA) (United Nations, 1995). The FSA sets
the general procedures to manage and conserve fish stocks and
is given effect in regional fisheries management organizations
(RFMOs), where intense diplomatic negotiations take place,
regarding the allocation of fishing entitlements and the setting of
conservation and management measures to prevent the collapse
of the overall fish stocks. Scientific evidence in the form of
stock assessment advice has a bearing on decisions, on the one
hand, to close highly lucrative commercial fisheries or, on the
other, to facilitate the over exploitation of fish populations. The
Agreement provides a solid legal basis for the application of the
best available scientific knowledge, the precautionary approach2 ,
and the ecosystem-based management. Thus, the Agreement
is aimed at ensuring that scientific evidence is an intrinsic

OCEAN SCIENCE IN THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
In the previous section, we presented examples of major aspects
of the law of the sea which require science to inform State
practice as well as diplomatic processes under the Convention.
Since the Convention does not hold regular Conference of
the Parties as other UN conventions do (e.g., Climate Change
Convention), the evolution of themes that concern States about
ocean health can be assessed in the annual omnibus resolution
on the ocean and law of the sea adopted by the UNGA. These
UNGA resolutions reflect the progress that is being made and
the challenges that arise in implementing the Convention,
along with emerging issues of States Parties’ concern.

2

Art. 6 (2)—States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain,
unreliable, or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not
be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management
measures.

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

6

March 2021 | Volume 8 | Article 664066

fmars-08-664066

March 15, 2021

Time: 15:57

#7

Polejack

The Importance of Ocean Science Diplomacy

and work closely with international affairs and purveyors of
traditional knowledge.
Scientists are answering this call and are expecting much from
the implementation of this UN Decade (Claudet et al., 2019). The
Decade presents itself as “an important opportunity to address
gaps in ocean science, increase knowledge, improve synergies,
and support the sustainable conservation and management
of marine resources” (A/RES/74/19, para. 301, Table 1). The
Decade’s roadmap (IOC-UNESCO, 2018) highlights how critical
it is to coordinate and cooperate in ocean sciences to progress
sustainable development. Four distinctive aspects of the role
of ocean science diplomacy are highlighted below around
the thematic areas of inclusivity, sustainability, inequality, and
community interests.

Table 1 presents the full extract of the adopted paragraphs
in a 10-year timeline (2009–2019), with the corresponding
numbering of each paragraph for further reference.
Over the past 10 years, ocean science issues of concern
have increased, resulting in UNGA’s omnibus resolutions to
expand each year in term of the number of paragraphs as
well as in terms of themes covered. Three issues have been
present for the past 10 years. First, the UNGA has adopted
a chapeau paragraph stating how important ocean science is
to advance knowledge, provide well-being, and contribute to
decision making. Second, ocean science was acknowledged as
essential to improve risk management tools in conserving and
managing vulnerable marine ecosystems. Lastly, ocean science
is essential to the establishment of marine protected areas.
Another recurring theme since 2010 is the use of ocean
science to identify and protect ecologically or biologically
significant areas. In brief, science was identified as relevant
for social, economic, and cultural benefit as well as more
generally to promote marine conservation. More recently, there
has been a distinct focus on the issue of pollution in the
UNGA’s resolution, with marine litter and underwater noise
being addressed since 2016 and 2018, respectively. Looking
at this 10-year sample, we can identify that once a subject
is incorporated into the UNGA resolution, it remains there.
Such a feature opens to the possibility of two hypotheses:
(i) there is an inefficiency of the adopted measures to solve
those issues or (ii) there is a lack of sufficient scientific
evidence to support effective conservation measures. These
two hypotheses open a series of questions on the efficiency
of UN actions toward ocean conservation. Efficiency in this
case is of course dependent on States’ national policies and
regulations, which are very diverse on the use of the available
scientific information. Further research on how UNGA’s annual
resolutions are impacting national policies shall be necessary
and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as we will
discuss later, can present a good case. Science diplomacy can
be challenged in this sense on how effectively it is producing
better policies and public goods. For now, provisions on the
importance of ocean science are thus recurring items of the
UNGA’s resolution. Accordingly, it can be expected that the
progressive implementation of the UN Decade of Ocean Science
for Sustainable Development (2021–2030) shall be continuously
updated in years to come.

Enhancing Inclusivity
Perhaps, a major oversight to date is that official documents
from this Decade primarily highlight natural science’s evidence,
with far limited participation from social sciences. The seven
societal goals themselves very much reflect the gaps identified by
traditional natural science, such as oceanography and hydrology.
These gaps have been already identified in several documents (e.g.
Inniss et al., 2017; IOC-UNESCO, 2017, 2019; Miloslavich et al.,
2018) which, up to this point, have been largely unsuccessful in
producing the desired change through decision maker’s actions.
In times when Governments are failing to implement effective
solutions to global problems and trust in science is diminished,
public engagement becomes essential (Colglazier, 2020). Social
sciences can provide evidence in support of actions to improve
public engagement and science uptake in decision-making
processes (Bennett et al., 2019). Thus, this UN Decade of
Ocean Science should be a turning point for a more equitable
participation of knowledge producers and users (along with the
difficulties in identifying them). In this context, it needs to
be transdisciplinary. Transdisciplinary actions in the Decade of
Ocean Science need to start by building up research questions
and hypotheses among different disciplines and stakeholders (as
in Rudd, 2014). As Jahn and colleagues propose:
Transdisciplinarity is a critical and self-reflexive research approach
that relates societal with scientific problems; it produces new
knowledge by integrating different scientific and extra-scientific
insights; its aim is to contribute to both societal and scientific
progress; integration is the cognitive operation of establishing
a novel, hitherto non-existent connection between the distinct
epistemic, social–organizational, and communicative entities that
make up the given problem context. (Jahn et al., 2012, p. 8)

THE UN DECADE OF OCEAN SCIENCE
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Therefore, the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable
Development is an opportunity to change how scientists organize
themselves around a common goal, as well as interact with
policymakers and society in general (Wisz et al., 2020). In turn, it
can represent an avenue for society to better acknowledge science
and engage in science making through citizen science (Schrögel
and Kolleck, 2019) and be empowered through Ocean Literacy
(for further readings on the later, please refer to Santoro et al.,
2017; Squarcina and Pecorelli, 2017; Marrero et al., 2019).

The Decade of Ocean Science shall be an important opportunity
for science diplomacy to target global community interests in
spite of national interests in the ocean.
The Decade targets seven societal goals, with ambitions
to achieve a clean, resilient, productive, safe, well-observed,
documented, and predicted ocean (Ryabinin et al., 2019). It
also envisages engaging with society and delivering results for
an evidence-based decision making, based on sustainability
and peace. Ocean scientists are being urged to break the silos
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Encourages States, in this regard, to further progress toward the establishment of
marine protected areas, including representative networks, and calls upon States to
further consider options to identify and protect ecologically or biologically significant
areas, consistent with international law and on the basis of the best available
scientific information

Recognizes the need for better understanding of the sources, amounts, pathways,
distribution, trends, nature, and impacts of marine debris, especially plastics and
microplastics, and to examine possible measures and best available techniques
and environmental practices to prevent its accumulation and minimize its levels in
the marine environment, and welcomes in this regard the work conducted under
the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental
Protection, led by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, and its report
entitled “Sources, fate and effects of microplastics in the marine environment—a
global assessment,” and the report of the Executive Director of the United Nations
Environment Program on marine plastic debris and microplastics, which reviews
best-available knowledge and experiences in this regard and gives
recommendations for further steps to reduce plastic litter and microplastic in the
oceans
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*

*
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211

206

Preamble

2013

*
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225
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221

Preamble
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*

*
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Preamble

2015

*
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254

249

Preamble

2016

*

209

257
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252

Preamble

2017

275

210

259

261

254

Preamble

2018

(Continued)

281

218

265

267

260

Preamble

2019
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*

134

Reaffirms the need for States to continue and intensify their efforts, directly and
through competent international organizations, to develop and facilitate the use of
diverse approaches and tools for conserving and managing vulnerable marine
ecosystems, including the possible establishment of marine protected areas,
consistent with international law, as reflected in the Convention, and based on the
best scientific information available

150

Preamble

2010

Time: 15:57

Calls upon States to consider appropriate cost-effective measures and approaches
to assess and address the potential socioeconomic and environmental impacts of
anthropogenic underwater noise, taking into account the precautionary approach
and ecosystem approaches and the best available scientific information, as
appropriate

132

Preamble

2009

Year and corresponding paragraph in the original text

March 15, 2021

Reaffirms the need for States, individually or through competent international
organizations, to urgently consider ways to integrate and improve, based on the
best available scientific information and the precautionary approach and in
accordance with the Convention and related agreements and instruments, the
management of risks to the marine biodiversity of seamounts, cold water corals,
hydrothermal vents, and certain other underwater features

Recalling that marine science is important for eradicating poverty, contributing to
food security, conserving the world’s marine environment and resources, helping to
understand, predict, and respond to natural events, and promoting the sustainable
development of the oceans and seas, by improving knowledge, through sustained
research efforts and the evaluation of monitoring results, and applying such
knowledge to management and decision-making

Original text in the resolution

TABLE 1 | Exact extracts from the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea in which references to marine science or scientific are made. Ten years of exerts (2009–19)a .
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“*” means the absence of a paragraph in that year’s UNGA resolution.
a Documents included were A/RES/64/71; A/RES/65/37A; A/RES/66/231; A/RES/67/78; A/RES/68/70; A/RES/69/245; A/RES/70/235; A/RES/71/257; A/RES/72/73; and A/RES/73/124; A/RES/74/19. Accessed in
June, 2020 at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_resolutions.htm.

*
*
Notes the discussions at the twentieth meeting of the Informal
Consultative Process, from 10 to 14 June 2019, on the theme of
ocean science and the United Nations Decade of Ocean Science
for Sustainable Development, during which delegations, inter alia,
stressed the importance of marine scientific research, international
cooperation and coordination, as well as of a stronger
science–policy interface in understanding and effectively addressing
the unprecedented pressures on the ocean, provided input to assist
in preparing for the Decade and considered that the Decade will be
an important opportunity to address gaps in ocean science,
increase knowledge, improve synergies, and support the
sustainable conservation and management of marine resources,
and during which several delegations underlined the important
complementary role of traditional knowledge held by indigenous
peoples and local communities

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009

Year and corresponding paragraph in the original text
Original text in the resolution

TABLE 1 | Continued
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Surprisingly, neither the UNGA resolutions nor the Decade’s
official documents express the importance of science diplomacy
as a concept that bring about transformative change in relation
to the ocean. All the elements associated with science diplomacy
are, however, evident expressly or implicitly in the UNGA
resolutions (as discussed above) and the Decade’s official
documents: science advising policy making, diplomacy relying
on evidence, and promoting further research in answer to global
challenges, countries overcoming political tensions to address
global concerns, and building a science-based dialog. The Decade
of Ocean Science is an opportunity to recognize and highlight the
importance of science diplomacy in achieving the objectives of
the Decade. On this basis, there is a compelling case that ocean
science diplomacy should be one of the pillars of this UN Decade
for it highlights how multi-stakeholder partnerships are built to
deal with global ocean matters, as was done during UNCLOS III
negotiations and other international multilateral mechanisms.

Promoting Sustainability
The Decade should be recognized as a science diplomacy process
intended to feed into another UN process based on science
diplomacy: the 2030 Agenda on the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). The Decade’s motto “The science we need for
the future we want” is a clear reference to the UN document
“the Future we Want” that constitutes the basis for the 2030
Agenda (United Nations, 2012), making one effort directed to
achieve the other.
The SDGs were established by the UNGA in 2015 as agreed
goals negotiated by UN Member States to achieve a more
sustainable world. It brings society, economy, environment,
policy, and international relations together around 17 goals
(Nilsson et al., 2016). The goals deal with social challenges
such as poverty, education, equality, as well as environmental
concerns related to the ocean, land and atmosphere. They are
a result of diplomatic negotiations underpinned by information
and knowledge, most of which is scientific, in particular to Earth’s
capacities to sustain life as we know (Sachs et al., 2019).
Science is particularly important to achieve ocean
sustainability, which is addressed by Goal 14—life under
water (hereafter, SDG 14) (Visbeck, 2018). SDG 14 has been
identified as the most transversal of the 17 (Singh et al., 2018;
Nash et al., 2020), although not considered as a priority in almost
all political settings in different regions (Custer et al., 2018).
When it comes to investment and development, leaders typically
choose other priorities which are not environment themed, like
education (Goal 4), peace and justice (Goal 16), and decent
work (Goal 08) (McDonnell, 2018). Goal 14, however, is the only
one that has an explicit call for more investment in science and
technology3 , which complements the aims of the UN Decade
of Ocean Science.
3

Objective 14.A—Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity,
and transfer marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine
Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contribution of
marine biodiversity to the development of developing countries, in particular small
island developing States and least developed countries.

9

March 2021 | Volume 8 | Article 664066

fmars-08-664066

March 15, 2021

Time: 15:57

# 10

Polejack

The Importance of Ocean Science Diplomacy

in a win–win situation. It is therefore necessary to identify
where developing countries and SIDS strengths and weakness lie
so as to negotiate directly or through competent international
organizations in demanding the “fair and reasonable terms and
conditions” in agreements, as predicated by the Convention
[Article 266 (1)].

The existence of SDG 14 was made possible through an intense
science diplomacy process at the UN. Small Islands Developing
States (SIDS, but also known as Large Ocean States), pushed for
an ocean related SDG that would bring their concerns forward
and were skillful in presenting sufficient evidence on how their
livelihoods are affected by a healthy ocean system (Quirk and
Hanich, 2016). This diplomatic effort exemplifies how democratic
ocean science diplomacy can be. SIDS countries usually have
limited research capacities and international cooperation is a
useful tool to access foreign research infrastructure. By building
these partnerships, SIDS have the potential to access foreign
funding and infrastructure and drive research projects to their
own needs, generating evidence to feed their domestic policies.
As a result, the civil understanding of the importance of a healthy
ocean has influenced these countries’ external policies in search
for more just international relations.
Most developing countries and SIDS need to pool resources
to access ocean research infrastructure and undertake projects
that will enable them to implement SDG 14. Thus, international
cooperation is also an important tool to deliver capacity for
the 2030 Agenda. Ocean science diplomacy can present the
necessary mechanisms for countries to advance their scientific
capacities in exchange of granting foreign access to their waters,

Addressing Global Inequalities
As seen previously, the disparities in ocean science and
technology capacities between countries are determinant of
their success in implementing the Convention and related
instruments. Implementing Goal 14 and the UN Decade of Ocean
Science will be particularly challenging for developing countries.
Not many countries in the world have access to the necessary
technology and human capacity to deliver ocean science,
especially due to the high costs associated with marine research
infrastructure and the challenges to develop and maintain
scientific capacities domestically. UNESCO’s Global Ocean
Science Report (IOC-UNESCO, 2017) highlights the global
disparities in science indicators, particularly the production
of ocean science publications and citations (Figure 2). These
disparities result, inter alia, in large sampling and knowledge gaps
for immense ocean spaces, in particular the Southern parts of the

FIGURE 2 | Reproduced from the Global Ocean Science Report (IOC-UNESCO, 2017, p. 28). Original caption: “Publication and citation map of the world. The area
of each country is scaled and resized according to the number of ocean science publications (top) or citations received (bottom). Different colors indicate a different
number of publications (top) or citations (bottom).”
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by promoting citizenry engagement in both research and decision
making. In this regard, the role of indigenous and traditional
knowledge has been gaining much attention in ocean affairs and
that specific community shares important interests that both
scientists and diplomats must consider (Kaiser et al., 2019).

Atlantic and the Pacific (on the need for a more comprehensive
assessment, see Inniss et al., 2017).
While most developing countries depend on foreign
research capacities to explore their waters and offshore
resources, developed countries gain benefits from accessing
other coastal States’ waters and exploiting the natural
resources therein. Developing countries need to take their
geopolitical needs into consideration when negotiating access
to infrastructure and scientific capacities with more capable
nations. By working together through science diplomacy
schemes, they can then enhance their scientific capacities
and gain the necessary knowledge to promote better ocean
management and sustainability nationally and internationally.
In this context, ocean science diplomacy can be a gamechanger in finding common grounds of understanding and
promoting research capacities worldwide by providing access
to research infrastructure and human capacities (HardenDavies and Snelgrove, 2020). The central issue to be resolved
is to understand and apply science diplomacy as an aid to
reorganize relevant stakeholders internationally to solve wicked
humanitarian puzzles.

CONCLUSION
Science diplomacy research can promote better coordination and
transdisciplinary science in global ocean affairs. Ocean science
diplomacy can also ensure the conduct of more effective equitable
negotiations and the attainment of fair agreements between
States and other entities, including international organizations,
by balancing national interests with regional and global shared
goals, as prescribed by the Convention. Understanding past
negotiations in ocean affairs can help us shape future scenarios
where science and international relations leverage expertise and
scientific capacity to inform transnational decision making, as
exemplified by the success of UNCLOS III and subsequent law of
the sea negotiations. Clearly, there is a historical gap in scientific
capacities between developed and developing countries (IOCUNESCO, 2020a). This gap shaped different positions at the
UNCLOS III negotiations. However, diplomacy, supported by
scientific evidence, was successful in advancing on the adoption
of the Convention and establishing mechanisms to address
these differences. The necessary diplomacy to overcome those
differences involved clustering (e.g., G77 + China, Landlocked,
etc.) and trade-offs among States in achieving the compromises
and the package of issues codified by the Convention. Capacity
building and access to research infrastructure were some of
those elements being traded over negotiations, in particular by
countries with less capabilities (Nordquist et al., 1990). However,
as shown by the Global Ocean Science Report (Figure 2), the
mechanisms in place to boost research capacity and technology
transfer have not yet been effective (Salpin et al., 2018; IOCUNESCO, 2020a).
With the upcoming UN Decade of Ocean Science for
Sustainable Development, there is a chance to look back
and to learn from previous lessons in successful law of the
sea negotiations. Ocean science diplomacy will be essential
in advancing coordination of the necessary elements needed
to overcome historical difficulties. The Decade should be an
opportunity to understand how ocean science happens in the
global south and what is needed to balance these inequalities to
deliver the expected results, for instance, in the 2030 Agenda.
The Decade not only represents an opportunity to continue
long identified but necessary science initiatives, like mapping
the entire seafloor (about this ambition, please refer to the
Seabed 2030 Project in Mayer et al., 2018) and improving ocean
forecast, but also to capture these certainly important actions
in a broader framework. This framework will be cognizant
of enabling developing countries to thrive in their national
ocean scientific capacities in order to contribute over time with
the necessary evidence for future decision making. The ocean
community needs to leave the assistance provider view and adopt
a co-ownership and co-development perspective in relation to

Advancing Community Interests
Governments frequently fail to apply the best available scientific
knowledge for making decisions, and the ocean science
diplomacy framework proposed in this paper shall aid authorities
to recognize the benefits in further applying evidence to
international policymaking. A force in this regard pertains to
organizations that are not under the scrutiny of governments.
Non-governmental organizations can have a leading role in
presenting updated research evidence and call States to promote
change. Non-State actors and international organizations have
proven to be effective in promoting the linkage of science and
international affairs on urgent ocean matters (Kaltofen and
Acuto, 2018a). Experience in international and national decisionmaking processes over the past three decades demonstrates that
NGOs in particular are very effective in gathering experts on
certain topics and promoting public concern and engagement
around what can be understood as a community interest (Cohen,
2011), communities here being defined as a group of individuals
who share common values and concerns (Besson, 2018). Thus,
NGOs and other non-State stakeholders promote evidence
provision and community interests in international negotiations
by organizing the technical debate and assisting delegations with
experts and the organization of events. In this regard, these
actions should also be considered as science diplomacy practices
and a form of Track 2 diplomacy, i.e., diplomacy that happens
beyond the formal State channels (Jones, 2015). This para-State
form of international relations gives voice to societal concerns
and foster community interests that are not necessarily aligned
with any country’s political view.
As official UN documents call for a stronger participation
of knowledge producers and users in both the science and
policy making, it will be critical to promote inclusiveness and
transparency. Ocean science diplomacy practices in the past and
present have broken silos and promoted better communication.
It thus represents a tool to assess and foster community interests,
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studies on public engagement, public perception of science, and
ocean literacy will certainly be key to inform the implementation
process of the Decade of Ocean Science. In this context, ocean
science diplomacy is one of the possible ways of promoting
this post-normal science, allowing inclusive participation of
non-experts, and bridging communities. Further research on this
aspect should also be promoted.
From a national perspective, countries need to build internal
mechanisms to align researchers with policymakers and society
to identify gaps and strengths in its science and technology
domestic frameworks. This will help enable States to negotiate
internationally on fairer grounds. Science diplomacy research can
provide good examples of practices that have progressed in this
sense, such as the designation of science attachés to Embassies to
act together with diplomats in both identifying opportunities for
collaboration as well as promoting national’s endeavors abroad
(AAAS, 2017). Domestically, appointing science advisors to high
Government hierarchies has proven to be an effective way to
advance in the science–policy interface that desirably should
connect to the country’s external policy in negotiating possible
solutions to national challenges (Gluckman, 2014).
Ocean science diplomacy can significantly contribute to global
agendas on sustainable uses of the ocean that rely on national
policies and international frameworks. It can be a change
in balancing ocean research capabilities, allowing a broader
participation of scientists and communities in the international
decision-making process, and finding some hope for a more
sustainable ocean in the future.

transnational processes, so finally “no one is left behind” becomes
an imperative for a sustainable future (United Nations, 2016).
Fairness and justice would entail properly addressing
intellectual property rights of ocean technologies, discussing
benefit sharing mechanisms, investing in local communities,
and establishing researchers in key areas so innovation and
development would follow. The Decade is a global movement
that needs to be dealt with through diplomacy, informed
by cross disciplinary ocean science. The invisibility of local
researchers that do not have access to ships and equipment,
nor are able to calibrate and maintain oceanic instruments,
needs to be properly addressed by diplomacy. Business as
usual will not solve the problems. The Decade, however, can if
it genuinely and successfully encourages partnerships through
which change can be made.
Indeed, the effective management of current ocean issues
demands broader participation and better communication
between sectors, not just scientists and policymakers, but also
society, private sector, coastal communities, educators, NGOs,
and so on. Since there is still much to be revealed about the
functioning of the ocean and science is being called upon to have
a stronger societal role, investments need to be made in research
infrastructure and human capacities, so our collective will be able
to produce the necessary knowledge to feed into public policies
and international negotiations.
Our dependency in the ocean is clear: as our life-supporting
system or as the basis for many economies, life cannot thrive
without healthy oceans. On the other hand, food provision
in face of exponential population growth calls for a wise
change in the use of marine resources. Science can certainly
provide information, but not in the necessary pace. Thus,
stakes are high, so are uncertainties, a scenario that fits well
within the post-normal science theory (Funtowicz et al., 1991;
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Post-normal science states that
if science is to keep producing knowledge in the normal
mode, established under the Kuhnian scientific method, it
will not be effective enough to address community interests
as fast as necessary. Academia needs to break the silos
and allow a broader peer review community, encompassing
the views from non-Academics into the scientific process
(Kønig et al., 2017). By doing so, reorientations can be
promoted in accordance with user’s needs and results can
be combined with traditional and indigenous knowledge, for
example (Nursey-Bray et al., 2014). This approach facilitates
better communication and mutual understanding would be
triggered around a shared goal, exactly as the UN Decade for
Ocean Science and the SDG’s 2030 Agenda are requesting.
Further research will be needed to understand the connecting
dots on how post-normal science theory can boost science
diplomacy mechanisms since both call for a break of silos and
stronger interaction.
Society’s participation in science and policymaking should not
be undermined (Kahan et al., 2011; Stilgoe et al., 2014; Porter and
Dessai, 2017; Squarcina and Pecorelli, 2017). Therefore, further
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the impacts of human activities. Ocean sustainability requires ambitious levels of scientiﬁc
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Introduction
he ocean is essential to human life. It regulates our climate
by storing carbon and heat (Cheng et al., 2020), produces
half of our oxygen (Körtzinger et al., 2004), provides food
for billions of people (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, 2020), as well as alternative sources of energy
(Pelc and Fujita, 2002). The ocean lays mineral resources (Cuyvers et al., 2018) and hosts a rich, and yet unknown biodiversity,
which holds the potential for the development of new materials,
medicines and other products (Halvorson and Quezada, 2009).
Nearly 40% of the global population lives within 100 km of a
coastline (Small and Nicholls, 2003), and for many, the ocean is a
workplace supporting ﬁshing, transport, shipping, and tourism.
The ocean is, however, under threat from human activities.
Examples of these threats range from climate change, overﬁshing
and destructive ﬁshing, marine pollution, ocean acidiﬁcation,
under water noise, habitat degradation/loss, invasive species,
eutrophication, and the cumulative impact of these and many
other pressures (Halpern et al., 2008; Rockström et al., 2009).
Human activities have changed the ocean, undermined its health
and impaired its capacity to deliver beneﬁts to humanity (Lubchenco and Petes, 2010). For these reasons, the ocean has been
recognized as a global commons: it is in humanity’s best interest
to maintain a healthy and sustainable ocean for future generations (Vogler, 2012).
Human activities must be managed and governed in order to
maintain ocean health, resilience and function so that it will
continue to safely deliver beneﬁts to humankind (Lubchenco and
Gaines, 2019). Such management and governance requires
ambitious levels of scientiﬁc evidence to inform decision making
(Stenseth et al., 2020; Visbeck, 2018). Science is needed to
understand the way the ocean functions and to predict the state of
the ocean. It is also needed to inform decisions about how to plan
and regulate human activities that impact the ocean. It is also
needed to establish safety and warning systems and to help
society to respond and adapt to a changing environment and
climate (Bax et al., 2018; Duarte et al., 2020).
Ocean science requires high technological capacity, equipment,
and data sharing in order to investigate the complexities of the
globally connected ocean (deYoung et al., 2019). Ocean observations and monitoring apply a multiplicity of research platforms,
ranging from moored and drifting buoys to satellite imagery,
often governed by intergovernmental coordinating mechanisms
(Tanhua et al., 2019; Todd et al., 2019). Science at this scale is
very costly, and must be coordinated over wide regions in space
and time (Miloslavich et al., 2018). Such coordination of efforts
and co-investment between Nations can be facilitated through
science diplomacy, i.e., the intersection between science and
international relations (Wagner, 2002).
Although science diplomacy is not a new practice (for a historical perspective, see Turekian, 2018; Turekian et al., 2015), the
concept is relatively new and still debated (Flink and Rüfﬁn, 2019;
Rufﬁni, 2020). The taxonomy provided by The Royal Society &
AAAS (2010) frames this intersection as science in diplomacy,
i.e., scientiﬁc evidence feeding diplomatic decision making;
diplomacy for science, where diplomatic mechanisms facilitate
research and development; and science for diplomacy, where
countries build a dialog by establishing joint research endeavors.
The ocean international regime has been centered on ocean
science (Robinson, 2020). Nevertheless, ocean science diplomacy
has largely been overlooked in marine science and ocean policy
academic literature. To highlight the important role that ocean
science diplomacy has on scientiﬁc collaboration and international agreements, this paper examines the case of ocean science
diplomacy in the Atlantic. The Atlantic offers a very interesting
example of ocean sciece diplomacy for a number of reasons. First,
2

the Atlantic is rich in ecosystem services, and challenged by a
diversity of threats (Inniss et al., 2017). Second, The Atlantic is
bordered by a wide diversity of nations. These countries differ
signiﬁcantly in culture, politics, wealth, and scientiﬁc capacity,
and must collaborate to deliver basin-scale ocean science (Brunelle, 2013). Third, several international agreements have
emerged to promote science diplomacy in the Atlantic region and
have given rise to rapidly expanding scientiﬁc collaboration
between nations.
In this paper, we will describe the All Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance (the Alliance) as science diplomacy in action. First, we
present an overview on the Atlantic Ocean research landscape.
Second, we describe the three speciﬁc international science and
technology instruments that support the Alliance: the Galway
Statement (2013), the South–South Framework for Scientiﬁc and
Technical Cooperation in the South and Tropical Atlantic and the
Southern Oceans (2017) and the Belém Statement (2017). Third,
we analyze the political and scientiﬁc motivations for the adoption of the Alliance. Finally, we discuss the results achieved and
potential future outcomes of this ocean science diplomacy
endeavor.
International relations to support ocean science collaboration
in the Atlantic Region
The Atlantic Ocean Research landscape. Atlantic ocean research
is concentrated in higher latitudes (Inniss et al., 2017). Research
capacities, both in terms of marine research infrastructure as in
human capital, are concentrated in Northern countries (IOCUNESCO, 2017), as is the majority of the research ﬂeet (Nieuwejaar et al., 2019). UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission—IOC dataset on marine experts show that
the absolute number of researchers auto-declared as Atlantic
experts is similar between the South (731 researches) and the
North (807 researchers) (IOC-UNESCO, 2017). Most of the
publications in marine science, however, come from North
America and Europe with a focus on the North Atlantic (as per
the assessment from 1996 to 2013 presented in Inniss et al., 2017).
Consequently, the South Atlantic, the region between the Equator
and the Southern Ocean at 60°S, is one of the least known, under
mapped and under sampled ocean spaces on Earth (Miloslavich
et al., 2011).
Knowledge gaps undermine the potential for societies to
properly understand and manage ecosystem services that impact
countries throughout the Atlantic (Duchez et al., 2016; Lopez
et al., 2016). Countries in the Atlantic seek to intensify research
on the interconnections and dynamics between South and North
Atlantic, by which southern countries’ research capabilities are
enhanced through the access to ocean research infrastructure,
human capacities and funding. Over the years, Atlantic-wide
scientiﬁc institutions have demonstrated an interest to cross
disciplines and establish cooperative ties between South and
North Atlantic (Mackenzie et al., 2019; Schmidt et al., 2019). Such
cooperative ties require international alliances to deﬁne priorities,
investments, and desired outcomes, such as policy-relevant
knowledge to be applied to a better management of the Atlantic
(deYoung et al., 2019). Consequently, diplomatic negotiations
were commended to strengthen ocean science in the Atlantic.
The backdrop for the establishment of the Alliance
The need for cooperation between nations on ocean research in
the Atlantic basin created an opportunity for the practice of ocean
science diplomacy. The All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance is
the result of a stepwise diplomatic negotiation process with the
goal of producing knowledge-based solutions for an improved
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management of the Atlantic Ocean. The Alliance results from a
science diplomacy effort that bridged countries, aligning
research capacities, sharing costs and co-developing knowledge
for societal beneﬁt. The European Commission triggered the
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negotiation process in 2013 involving ﬁrst the US and Canada,
followed by Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Cape Verde to
implement the internationalization of the European Atlantic
Strategy (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 EU’s strategic framework in support of the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. This ﬁgure is covered by the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License. Reproduced with permission from Andrei Polejack; copyright © Andrei Polejack, all rights reserved.
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The European Union’s Integrated Maritime Policy coordinates
fragmented marine policies at the EU level and establishes sea
basin speciﬁc strategies that oversee cooperation with third
countries (European Commission, 2007). The Atlantic Maritime
Strategy (European Commission, 2011a) and its subsequent
action plans (European Commission, 2013, 2020) are the implementing arm of the Integrated Maritime Policy for the Atlantic.
This Atlantic Strategy is relevant because it gives the mandate to
the Commission to reach out for partners in the Atlantic Ocean
for further collaboration. Part of the success of the EU’s Atlantic
Strategy depends on international cooperation.
The ﬁrst step in implementing the internationalization of the
Atlantic Strategy was the Galway Statement. The Galway Statement is a North-North coalition on ocean science and technology
signed between Canada, the European Union and the United
States of America in 2013. The second step was the South–South
Framework. The South–South Framework joined Brazil and
South Africa in bilateral ocean science and technology arrangements and was informed by the Commission on the outcomes of
the Galway Statement. Finally, South and North were bridged by
the signing of the Belém Statement between EU, Brazil and South
Africa, setting up an All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. The
following sections will describe the history and development of
these three agreements.
The three international Science and Technology Statements
which applied science diplomacy in the Atlantic
North–North—The Galway Statement. In 2013, the European
Union (EU), the United States of America (USA) and Canada
started a negotiation process that would trigger a North-centered
Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance through an instrument called
the Galway Statement on Atlantic Cooperation (hereafter the
Galway Statement). The Galway Statement was signed as a result
of a large bottom-up consultative process with scientists, government ofﬁcials and industry (European Union, Canada, and
United States of America, 2013). The Galway Statement builds
upon the bilateral Science & Technology agreements between the
EU and Canada and between the EU and the USA. The document
also highlights the relevance of the EU’s Atlantic Maritime
Strategy.
The Galway Statement’s main purpose is to “(…) increase our
knowledge of the Atlantic Ocean and its dynamic systemsincluding interlinks with the portion of the Arctic that borders
Atlantic-by aligning our ocean observation efforts to improve
ocean health and stewardship and promote the sustainable
management of its resources”.
The priorities set therein are as follows: i. to align ocean
observation efforts; ii. to improve ocean health and stewardship;
iii. the sustainable management of the resources; iv. to coordinate
data sharing and interoperability; v. seabed and benthic habitat
mapping; vi. ocean literacy; vii. researcher mobility; and viii.
harness public–private partnerships. By doing so, the expected
outcomes were: better ecosystem assessments and forecasts;
deeper understanding of vulnerabilities and risk (specially climate
related); and new tools to increase resilience, conserve rich
biodiversity, manage risk and determine social, environmental
and economic priorities (European Union et al., 2013).
A Trilateral Galway Statement Implementation Committee was
established in 2013 to oversee the work needed to achieve this
Statement’s goals. The institutions that lead this Committee are
the European Commission’s Directorate General on Research &
Innovation, the USA’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and Canada’s Department of Fisheries and
Oceans.
4

The European Commission launched a series of calls for
proposals in 2014 in support of the implementation of the Galway
Statement through the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for
Research and Innovation (European Commission, 2017b, 2019).
Proposals involved not only research projects, but also the
interesting mechanism of the Coordination and Support Actions
—CSA. The CSAs are intended to accompany measures such as
standardization, dissemination, awareness-raising and communication, networking, and coordination or support services. CSAs
also support policy dialogs and mutual learning exercises/studies,
aiding activities of strategic planning, networking and coordination between programs in different countries. As such, CSAs
function as support mechanisms for policy, bridging Academia,
Government, Civil Society and Industry in and out Europe.
One Coordination and Support Action was funded to support
the implementation of the Galway Statement: the Atlantic Ocean
Research Alliance Coordination and Support Action, or AORACSA1. This CSA, due in 2020, was coordinated by the Marine
Institute Ireland and involved a consortium spread across key
marine organizations in Europe. AORAC-SA overall objectives
were to improve the international cooperation framework under
the Galway Statement and to create a foundation for the
development of large scale joint international marine research
programs. AORAC-SA established a High-Level Advisory Board
to follow the implementation of the project and make further
recommendations and guidance. The High-Level Advisory Board
was composed of representatives from the three signatories plus
representatives from Brazil and South Africa. AORAC-SA was
meant to support the implementation of the Galway Statement
and thus lacked research institutions from Brazil and South
Africa in the consortium. The participation of Brazil and South
Africa in this board was important to exchange relevant
information on actions in the South and in the North. The
High-Level Advisory Board acted at the CSA level, advising the
Trilateral Galway Statement Implementation Committee. This
Implementation Committee, composed by the three signatory
parties, was responsible to guide, propose and implement
concrete actions to the Galway Statement.
The Trilateral Galway Statement Implementation Committee
established working groups to operationalize the political
commitments taken by the cosignatories of the Galway Statement
on speciﬁc areas of common interest. These working groups were:
Ocean Literacy; Aquaculture; Ecosystem Approach to Ocean
Health and Stressors; and Seabed Mapping. The Committee
decided not to create a speciﬁc group for ocean observations
because the AtlantOS project (Optimizing and Enhancing the
Integrated Atlantic Ocean Observing Systems), as we will address
in detail further, was mandated to coordinate observational
systems in the Atlantic. The working group on Seabed Mapping
was responsible for coordinating the North Atlantic seaﬂoor
mapping. This coordination included ship time and equipment
sharing that has proven to be effective (AORA, 2018; Raineault
and Flanders, 2019). The ﬁndings of the seaﬂoor-mapping
working group resulted in a special issue of the research journal
Frontiers in Marine Science2.
The European Commission ﬁrst negotiated the terms of the
Galway Statement bilaterally, by establishing speciﬁc ocean
working groups in each of the existing bilateral science and
technology agreements with the US and Canada. The Commission used this strategy to establish strong diplomatic and political
grounds tied to the bilateral formal agreements. As a consequence, the bilateral working groups resulted immediately into
trilateral working groups after the signing of the Galway
Statement. The Commission applied similar strategy southwards
in the Atlantic, as we will present further.
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South–South: the Framework. In 2013, the same year the Galway Statement was signed, the EU-Brazil Joint Steering Committee on Science and Technology decided to create a Working
Group on Ocean Science and Technology. Co-chairs from both
the European Commission and the Brazilian Ministry of Science,
Technology and Innovations were assigned to coordinate this
work. As a result, a bilateral ocean-speciﬁc agreement was signed
in 2015 (European Union and Brazil, 2015). Similar process
occurred in South Africa, with a resulting agreement in 2016
(European Union and South Africa, 2016).
Brazil and South Africa had closely followed the developments
under the Galway Statement both because of the bilateral
negotiations with the European Commission and their participation in the advisory board of the AORAC-SA. Both Southern
countries realized the beneﬁt arising from such a coordination
and resolved to develop a similar process in the South Atlantic.
As a result, a South–South scientiﬁc agenda was crafted for the
South Atlantic and Southern Ocean. The initial partners in this
discussion included Academics and government ofﬁcials from
Argentina, Namibia, Angola and Uruguay. Brazil and South
Africa decided to extend the invitation to the European
Commission and European researchers involved in projects in
the South Atlantic. The South–South Framework for Scientiﬁc
and Technical Cooperation in the South and Tropical Atlantic
and Southern Oceans was developed after a series of two technical
seminars that were ﬁnancially supported by the European
Commission (Brazil and South Africa, 2017). The Framework is
centered in the inputs from the South Atlantic community,
including the views from those Northern researches who work
cooperatively with the South (Claassen et al., 2019).
The South–South Framework is a bilaterally agreed plan for
scientiﬁc cooperation in oceanic research between South Africa
and Brazil. The process of negotiating the Framework included
inputs from Argentina, Angola, Namibia, and Uruguay. The ﬁnal
document was adopted only by Brazil and South Africa because
internal political processes prevented the other countries to adopt
it immediately. Thus, the Framework is open to all countries in
the region and is intended to promote scientiﬁc cooperation and
capacity building among South Atlantic countries. The Framework promotes the exchange of expertize and knowledge of ocean
science and technology for the environmental and socioeconomic beneﬁts of countries in the region.
The priorities deﬁned in the South–South Framework include
three broad themes that are followed by a more detailed program.
The priorities are: i. Climate Variability and Change; ii.
Ecosystem Variability and Controlling Processes; and iii. Living
and Nonliving resources, and biodiversity. Three cross-cutting
areas were identiﬁed: human capital development; development
and deployment of various platforms for data collection; and
collaboration on relevant aspects of big data.
The South–South Framework goes beyond the typical research
cooperation to aim also in contributing to the greater economic,
political and diplomatic alignment of South Atlantic nations. The
document ambitions the development of common and joint
imperatives for the South and Tropical Atlantic and the Southern
Oceans. The Framework also states the intention to position
South Atlantic Ocean countries as global focal points leading joint
and individual observational and research endeavors in the South
Atlantic.
The will to align the South–South with the Galway Statement
can be seen in at least two statements present in the Framework.
“Ultimately, it is hoped that the Framework will guide not only
South–South, but also South–North scientiﬁc cooperation (p. 2)”.
Also, “(the Framework) is intended to address and build-on
current collaborative research programs between Southern countries, and in alignment with Northern countries, with the aim of
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developing basin scale ocean science and technology development,
enhancing human capacity, strengthening ongoing projects, and
identifying potential activities and opportunities for further
development within this cooperation (p. 9)”.
South–North: the Belém Statement. The South–South Framework, through its organization of the Southern nations, was an
important pre-requisite toward the development of a basin-scale
Atlantic scientiﬁc cooperation. Upon the establishment of the
South–South Framework, the European Commission, Brazil and
South Africa organized a series of seminars to propose a new
instrument to establish the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance.
This instrument is the Belém Statement.
The Belém Statement on Atlantic Research and Innovation
Cooperation (European Union, South Africa, and Brazil, 2017)
was signed in the Belém Tower of Lisbon in 2017. The Statement
main purpose is to improve the collaborative scientiﬁc efforts in
the Atlantic Ocean and sustainably cooperate on marine science,
research and innovation. The Belém Statement highlights the
mutual beneﬁt on linking research activities in the South Atlantic
and Southern Ocean with those in the North Atlantic. Moreover,
the Belém Statement aims to leverage from already existent
endeavors, such as the Benguela Current Commission.
The Belém Statement is based on the principles of shared
responsibility and mutual beneﬁt. The aims of the Statement are
to: promote and facilitate human capital development and
scientiﬁc exchange; provide a platform and opportunities for
scientiﬁc and technological cooperation resulting in joint
activities; and, encourage new models for cooperation on a
coordinated and partnership-based approach to tackle the
scientiﬁc and societal challenges of the Atlantic Ocean. The
Statement connects oceans and climate change, oceans and food,
and oceans and energy systems, as well as the dynamics of the
Atlantic Ocean and its interconnected circulation systems from
Antarctica to the Arctic, representing a pole to pole research
effort.
The priority areas set in the Belém Statement are aligned with
those decided in the documents forging the North-North and the
South–South cooperation (Table 1). The common areas of
interest are: 1. Climate variability and ecosystem approaches; 2.
Ocean observation (including seabed mapping), forecasting and
monitoring processes and systems; 3. Food security, ﬁsheries
management, aquaculture and biodiversity; 4. Oceans technology
(including for observation and renewable marine energy); 5. The
effects of emerging pollutants; and, 6. Polar research (especially
interconnections between the Atlantic, the Southern Ocean and
Antarctica).
The proposed outcomes of the Belém Statement include: better
monitoring and forecasting capacities; improved safety at sea,
human health and well-being; sustainable use of marine
resources; new and emerging technologies to service societal
needs and new value chains; and, ocean-engaged citizens through
enhanced ocean literacy activities.
The European Commission allocated funding of approximately
64 million euros in the Horizon 2020 Work Programme to
implement the Belém Statement, more precisely under the Blue
Growth calls for proposals (European Commission, 2017a). A
Coordination and Support Action (CSA) was also funded to
support the implementation of the Belém Statement, similar to
what was done for the Galway Statement. The All Atlantic
Cooperation for Ocean Research and Innovation Coordination and
Support Action–AANCHOR CSA aims to support the international cooperation between Europe and South Atlantic countries.
AANCHOR also seeks the connection with the different ongoing
initiatives and projects in the North Atlantic beyond Europe.

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2021)8:52 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00729-6

5

ARTICLE

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00729-6

Table 1 Comparison among the priority areas deﬁned by each of the negotiation processes of the three Atlantic international
arrangements on ocean research and development (STI: Science, Technology, and Innovation).

STI priority areas
Ocean observation (including seabed mapping), forecasting
and monitoring processes and systems
Ocean health, including pollutants
Sustainable management of the resources
Data sharing and interoperability
Seabed and benthic habitat mapping
Ocean Literacy
Climate Variability and Change
Ecosystem Variability and Controlling Processes
Nonliving resources
Biodiversity
Food security, ﬁsheries management & aquaculture
Oceans technology (including for observation and
renewable marine energy)
Polar research (especially interconnections between the
Atlantic, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica)
Earth system model
Inter-ocean exchanges and large scale circulation
Air-sea exchanges and storage
Paleo evolution
Biological production and biogeochemistry
Continent-Shelf-Ocean continuum
Surface Ocean-Deep Ocean links
Marine biotechnology
Cross-cutting areas
Researcher mobility
Public–private partnerships
Human capital development
Sharing of research infrastructures

Galway Statement (2013)

South–South
Framework (2017)

Belém Statement (2017)

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

AANCHOR differs from its North Atlantic sister project, the
AORA-CSA, on including institutions from Latin America and
Africa as part of the consortium. A High-Level Board was
established to guide AANCHOR. Membership include each of
the three signatories plus representatives from the USA,
Canada, Argentina and Cape Verde. The High-Level Board
in the Belém Statement is similar to the one set up for the
Galway Statement in the sense of including partners that are
not signatories to the Statement. In fact, Argentina and Cape
Verde were included in AANCHOR just after signing bilateral
science and technology implementing arrangements for ocean
research with the European Commission (European Commission and Argentina, 2018; European Commission and Cabo
Verde, 2018). The High-Level Board acts at the CSA level. The
implementation of the Belém Statement at a higher political
level is done by a trilateral committee composed by the three
cosignatories, similar to what was done for the Galway
Statement.
AANCHOR assembles experts from around the Atlantic in
multi-stakeholder platforms to identify collaborative activities.
There are currently ﬁve platforms acting as think tanks under
AANCHOR. These platforms are: 1. reinforcing capacity
building; 2. promoting academia-industry knowledge transfer; 3.
developing common standards (including data); 4. enhancing
citizen awareness and ocean literacy; 5. converging and aligning
R&I infrastructure initiatives. These multi-stakeholder platforms
are expected to deﬁne long term measures for the cooperation
framework of the Belém Statement, beyond the project’s lifetime.
Part of the scope of the Belém Statement is about capacity
development, particularly for younger generations. The All
6

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Atlantic Ocean Youth Ambassadors program was a response to
that objective. The program targets young ocean leaders who are
required to promote ocean literacy, outreach and communication
strategies. Ambassadors should act both in local community
engagement as well as in regional/global communities, advancing
their role as early career science diplomats. The ﬁrst Ambassadors’ training happened in 2019 with participants from
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, Europe (several countries), South Africa and the USA (AORA and AANCHOR,
2019b). Recently, the European Commissioner for Innovation,
Research, Culture, Education and Youth, Mariya Gabriel ofﬁcially
launched the program3 and announced a second round of
training, planned for 20214.
The Belém Statement implementation is underway with
ongoing efforts in research and engagement. As the Belém
Statement implementation progresses, interest in the region
arises. For example, the European Commission and the Kingdom
of Morocco signed in December 2020 an administrative
arrangement on marine research and innovation, which highlights the work undergoing in the Belém Statement5. Moreover,
the African Union has shown interest in the capacity development component. In general, these statements of interests are
done at the All Atlantic Forum, an event that has gathered this
new Atlantic community to discuss common issues of concern.
The Forum happens once a year and have started in Brazil,
followed by one edition in Europe and, in 2020, in South Africa6.
Hopefully, this Alliance will also attract other international
initiatives and donors, such as philanthropy, private agents, and
NGOs. It will be interesting to follow how impactful this Alliance
will be in the future.
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Discussion
The All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance as an example of
science diplomacy. The process of adopting and creating the All
Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance can be framed in the taxonomy
proposed by The Royal Society and AAAS (2010). First, it is an
example of “science in diplomacy” because scientiﬁc advice supported the process of the three above-described international
instruments, identifying priority areas and targeted countries.
Second, it is an example of “diplomacy for science” since the
ofﬁcial documents supporting the Alliance, i.e., bilateral and
multilateral agreements, foster research projects and access to
infrastructure. Finally, it is an example of “science for diplomacy”
because the science-based dialog is bridging countries in the
Atlantic around the common goal of societal beneﬁt. This dialog is
set in both the existing diplomatic instruments, as well as in the
funded research projects.
Science diplomacy addresses goals shaped by (i) national
interests and needs; (ii) cross-border interests; and (iii) global
needs (Gluckman et al., 2018). The All Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance uses science diplomacy to address goals shaped by similar
interests. First, the Alliance was triggered by national interests, in
particular the Commission’s interests in internationalizing its
Atlantic Strategy. Second, the stepwise process of implementing the
Alliance covers cross-border interests ranging from North–North
and South–South coalitions to a whole basin coordination. Lastly,
the aims of the Alliance cover global ocean community interests.
Europe’s early role in science diplomacy strategies in the
Atlantic. In 2011, the Directorate-General for Research and
Innovation of the European Commission, promoted the event
“The Atlantic Geopolitical Space: common opportunities and
challenges”, discussing the Atlantic values to economy and trade,
to energy provision and security (European Commission, 2011b).
The report of this event highlighted the Atlantic as of major
importance to Europe and recommends that alliances are built, by
which scientiﬁc cooperation should be both a pillar and a facilitator (European Commission, 2011b). The EU’s Atlantic Strategy
was launched in 2011, stressing scientiﬁc cooperation. The
Atlantic Strategy offered the political mandate for the European
Commission to explore alliances as part of the Strategy’s internationalization component. This political context facilitated the
signing of the Galway Statement and the bilateral agreements
with Brazil and South Africa 2 years later, triggering the process
of building up the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. Europe’s
initiation of a basin-scale ocean science diplomacy endeavor
could help to inspire similar initiatives in other basins.
In the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance, bilateralism
provided the backbone for multilateral science diplomacy. The
European Commission used bilateral formal agreements on ocean
science and technology with each partner country to progressively
build the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. These bilateral
agreements included ﬁrst the US (2012) and Canada (2012),
second Brazil (2015) and South Africa (2016) and more recently
Argentina (2018), Cape Verde (2018) and the Kingdom of
Morocco (2020). This strategy allowed the Commission to
establish commitments and compliance from each partnering
country when progressing to a multilateral setting. Bilateral
science and technology agreements were reported to be useful in
promoting science diplomacy (Dolan, 2012).
According to Rufﬁni (2020), science diplomacy is fueled by
national interests. The three science diplomacy instruments in the
All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance support multi-national
collaboration on scientiﬁc research and potentially also the
national interests of the countries involved. For example, the
European Commission has been very successful in pushing
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forward its views, strategies and policies at the international
arena, utilizing science diplomacy tools to pursue its goals in the
Atlantic (European Union, 2019; López de San Román and
Schunz, 2018). European interests in the Atlantic go beyond than
acquiring evidence on essential natural assets (European Union,
2020). The Atlantic is an essential part of Europe’s Blue Growth
agenda to generate jobs and advance industrial development and
recovery through ocean and coastal innovation (European
Commission, 2013). The Atlantic is also essential to the new
European Green Deal in terms of renewable sources of energy
and technology developments for food provision and other ocean
services (European Commision, 2019).
The Southern interests in the All Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance. Southern Countries, in particular Brazil and South
Africa, have had a long running history of scientiﬁc cooperation
in ocean science that precedes the All Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance.
Since 2005, Brazil and South Africa are both part in the IBAS
(India, Brazil, and South Africa) dialog on ocean science
(Arkhangelskaya, 2010) and more recently, in 2017, in the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) working group for
ocean and polar sciences7. Moreover, Brazil and South Africa
have shared an ocean observing system in the South Atlantic
since 2010 as a result of the engagement in multilateral ocean
science endeavors (Ansorge et al., 2014). These activities allowed
ocean science communities from Brazil and South Africa to
interact overtime, and to deﬁne research priorities and gaps. As a
result, researchers from both countries informed the negotiation
of the South–South Framework and ultimately the Belém
Statement.
By the means of the South–South Framework, Southern
nations were able to coordinate their national interests and
exercise this power with the North, inﬂuencing the Atlantic
research agenda and further investments. On the signing event of
the Belém Statement, the then Commissioner for Research and
Innovation, Carlos Moedas announced a political and ﬁnancial
commitment to promote joint research projects under the
implementation of the Belém Statement. This was further
promoted and consolidated through the Horizon 2020’s Blue
Growth calls for research proposals. Proposals in these calls were
encouraged to partner with institutions from Brazil and South
Africa. This was particularly important for Brazilian researchers
because of the current national science budget crisis (Angelo,
2017, 2019; Rodríguez Mega, 2019). Therefore, access to research
funding can be seen as national interests to Brazil and South
Africa.
The South–South Framework highlights the willingness of
Brazil and South Africa to align their national interests and build
regional, science-based coalitions aimed at inﬂuencing global
ocean agendas. The Framework makes explicit reference to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
Convention on Biodiversity, the goals of the Food and
Agricultural Organization and the International Whaling
Commission.
South–South cooperation in this space would address highproﬁle scientiﬁc questions that could provide relevant
information to address national priorities as well as lead to
opportunities to play an active role in the global sphere
(Brazil and South Africa, 2017).
The Alliance’s impact in addressing global interests. The
Atlantic Ocean is of critical importance to the global ocean and
climate dynamics. The All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance
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contributes to the global ocean knowledge by intensifying
research in the Atlantic. One of the main goals of the Alliance is
to generate knowledge for social beneﬁt. It is a global community
interest to promote an improved ocean governance through the
application of the scientiﬁc knowledge in decision making (Wisz
et al., 2020). The upcoming UN Decade of Ocean Science for
Sustainable Development shall be a good opportunity for the All
Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance to contribute with research to
address global ocean concerns (Claudet et al., 2019).
The Decade of Ocean Science was approved by the UN General
Assembly in 2017. UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission (IOC) was mandated to prepare an implementation
plan in consultation with Member States, UN partners and other
relevant stakeholders for the 2021–2030 period (United Nations,
2017). IOC has then prepared a Decade’s roadmap as an initial
guide for the steps and processes needed to develop the requested
plan (IOC-UNESCO, 2018; Ryabinin et al., 2019). In this roadmap,
international cooperation is urged. Although not explicitly stated,
science diplomacy seems essential to implement this Decade.
It is hoped that coordinated region-wide efforts, such as the
Belém Statement, will facilitate the implementation of the Decade
of Ocean Science. Efforts are currently underway to identify how
the Belém Statement’s implementation will contribute to the
Decade (AORA and AANCHOR, 2019a). In addition, the North
Atlantic and South Atlantic Ocean Decade planning workshops
were coordinated to align with the work of the All Atlantic Ocean
Research Alliance. The Decade of Ocean Science and the Galway
and Belém Statements will interact promoting science diplomacy
in the Atlantic. It is so far unclear which drivers will guide this
interaction, such as governance issues (top-down) or scientiﬁctechnical criteria (bottom-up) or a combination of both.
As the Decade of Ocean Science is intended to support
sustainable development, the science must support societal needs.
Both the Decade and the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance
aim to address societal needs by making scientiﬁc information
relevant, useful and accessible (Ryabinin et al., 2019). The
Alliance has put mechanisms in place for public engagement that
can be leveraged by the Decade of Ocean Science implementing
process. It will be interesting to monitor how countries will
incorporate scientiﬁc results from the All Atlantic Ocean
Research Alliance into their national strategies, which in turn
shall support the implementation of the Decade of Ocean Science.
So far, the Alliance is a valuable vehicle to bring people together,
work on commonly identiﬁed challenges and ensure that results of
this cooperation will deliver what coastal communities need in
terms of scientiﬁc output and translated tools. Thus, there is an
added value of ongoing cooperation as a model to inspire others
within the wider context of the Decade of Ocean Science.
The future of the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. Some of
the Galway projects such as AtlantOS (Optimizing and Enhancing the Integrated Atlantic Ocean Observing Systems) resulted
in an important basin-scale coordination of ocean observatories.
There is a proposal that AtlantOS continue as a new program
connected to IOC’s Global Ocean Observing System–GOOS
(deYoung et al., 2019). There is a clear link between the new
AtlantOS program and the objectives of the Belém Statement,
which indicates a future integration towards users’ needs and
societal beneﬁt (Fritz, 2016). Science diplomacy will be at stage in
promoting the means to facilitate research, ranging from national
budgets to an international basin-wide collaboration, as well as
absorbing the data and results that can feed back into national
policies on ocean forecast and monitoring.
A new set of research projects have been funded by the
Horizon 2020 Programme in support of the implementation of
8

the Belém Statement and beyond. These research projects will act
in large geographical areas, covering the whole Atlantic basin. For
example, the Mission Atlantic project aims to conduct integrated
ecosystem assessments in the Atlantic basin, a challenge in
addressing environmental concerns and commercial activities.
Integrated ecosystem assessment is a tool to support the
ecosystem-based management by applying an Integrated Ecosystem Approach—IEA (Levin et al., 2009). IEA is the comprehensive integrated management of human activities based on the best
available scientiﬁc knowledge about the ecosystem, and its
dynamics, in order to identify and take action that will support
ecosystem health, integrity and sustainability (Smith and Maltby,
2003; UNEP, 2009). A legitimate IEA needs to address different
scales (e.g., local, to regional, to basin to global) to better
understand the intrinsic relations between different systems
(Levin et al., 2009). Ocean science diplomacy can facilitate the
work of Mission Atlantic by identifying options to internationally
bridge the science needed to support decision making. Mission
Atlantic will need to consider the regulatory diversity in the
Atlantic and develop practical ways to feed scientiﬁc evidence
into ocean management in diverse settings. Its IEA framework
will help give stakeholders a practical view on how research
projects under the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance can
impact the relations between the countries and provide the
relevant knowledge for better decision making.
The new Research and Innovation Program of the European
Union, Horizon Europe, will incorporate research and innovation
missions to increase the effectiveness of funding by pursuing
clearly deﬁned targets (Mazzucato, 2018). One of the ﬁve target
missions is on healthy oceans, seas, coastal and inland waters. The
recently proposed Mission Starﬁsh 2030 establishes several
priorities for ocean research that are very much aligned with
the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance (Lamy et al., 2020).
Mission Starﬁsh 2030 also posits international cooperation as part
of the desired outcomes and makes explicit reference to the All
Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance as an action to be supported.
The All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance’s Youth Ambassadors pilot program has called the attention of different countries,
showcasing the Atlantic science diplomacy through ocean literacy
and citizen engagement. In only six months of campaigns, the
Ambassadors have reached and promoted the Belém and Galway
Statements in >100 events. It is proving to be effective in
promoting the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance and in
fulﬁlling Belém’s mandate on better engaged citizens. The
program should now be broaden to other donors and countries
in the region, so the Ambassadors would mainstream ocean
science diplomacy throughout the Atlantic.
Finally, there is a potential for the All Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance to serve as a model for other ocean basins. If that shall be
the case, ocean science diplomacy practices will have to adapt to
different regions’ realities and lessons can be learned from the All
Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance.
Conclusion
This article presents a case of ocean science diplomacy in action in
establishing an All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. The All
Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance has emerged from three agreements between different Atlantic bordering countries (the Galway
Statement, the South–South Framework, and the Belém Statement).
These agreements and the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance have
triggered EU funding calls, new research projects (e.g., AtlantOs,
AANCHOR, and now Mission Atlantic). These projects have bolstered scientiﬁc collaboration, scientiﬁc exchange and capacity
building through the Atlantic in the generation and sharing of new
scientiﬁc data, knowledge, forecasting and early warning/decision
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support tools. Moreover, the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance
has already contributed to a diversity of other EU’s strategies.
Examples include the Blue Growth Strategy, the European Green
Deal, and the EU Science, Research and Innovation Policies.
Science informed the diplomatic negotiations of these agreements on priorities and actions needed to provide society with
relevant knowledge. Moreover, European Commission played an
important role in triggering the negotiation process, motivated by
the implementation of the European Union’s Atlantic Maritime
Strategy, and in particular its international dimension. The process of creating the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance resulted
in a balance between national/European and ocean community
interests. On one hand, we presented European Commission
interests in implementing its Atlantic Maritime Strategy. On the
other, we discussed the interests of Brazil and South Africa in
advancing national gaps in ocean research. The main goal of the
All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance is to develop science to
serve global community interests regarding ocean sustainability.
Science diplomacy was applied as a tool to balance national
interests and broader ocean community interests in the case of
the All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance.
We highlighted the pro-active role that the European Commission played in the Atlantic science diplomacy. The European
Commission was very effective at overcoming challenges presented
by its multi-level governance, and diverse internal differences within
member states (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010; Rüfﬁn, 2020). The
Commission based the construction of this Alliance on the existing
bilateral agreements with each of the involved countries to support a
multilateral alliance. In so doing, ocean science diplomacy was used
by the European Commission via the All Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance to achieve political reach in the Atlantic.
The results from the Alliance will both provide scientiﬁc evidence
in support of national decision making, as well as contribute to
international debates on the global ocean environment. The
upcoming UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030) is an opportunity for the Alliance to inspire the
development of global ocean affairs. Through this example, the
Alliance can both provide its experience coordinating a basin-wide
mechanism between countries for the generation and sharing of
ocean science, as well as by making more scientiﬁc evidence, tools,
and expertize available.
The All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance bridges countries
around common interests, facilitating research and evidencebased dialog that fuels and supports additional international
research collaboration. The All Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance
exempliﬁes the need to collectively develop research, human
capacity, technology employment and cost sharing mechanisms
to better address mutual responsibilities over an ocean basin of
utmost importance. A major remaining challenge for this Atlantic
Ocean science diplomacy is to ensure the co-creation of policyrelevant science that will support society in the most effective way
through an inclusive diversity of disciplines and stakeholders.
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Notes
1 https://www.atlanticresource.org/aora.
2 The Special Issue can be found at: https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/8873/
seaﬂoor-mapping-of-the-atlantic-ocean.
3 https://sway.ofﬁce.com/8hFw3qpVFwA2o8kD?ref=Link&loc=play.

ARTICLE

4 https://allatlanticocean.org/view/news/launch-of-the-selection-process-of-the-newcohort-of-all-atlantic-ocean-youth-ambassadors-.
5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/commissioner-gabriel-signs-administrativearrangement-marine-research-and-innovation-kingdom-morocco-2020-dec-08_en.
6 https://allatlanticocean.org/view/events/all-atlantic-ocean-research-forum.
7 http://land-ocean.ru/brics/.
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Ocean science is central in providing evidence for the implementation of the United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention’s provisions on transfer of marine
technology to developing countries aim at strengthening scientiﬁc capabilities to
promote equitable opportunities for these countries to exercise rights and obligations
in managing the marine environment. Decades after the adoption of the Convention,
these provisions are under implemented, despite the efforts of international
organizations, such as IOC-UNESCO. Latin America and the Caribbean struggle to
conduct marine scientiﬁc research and seize the opportunities of blue economy due to
the limited access to state-of-the-art technology. Ocean science communities in these
countries are subject to constraints not foreseeing in international treaties, such as
unstable exchange rates, taxation, fees for transportation, costs of maintenance and
calibration of technology, challenges to comply with technical standards, and intellectual
property rights. Action is needed to overcome these challenges by promoting a closer tie
between science and diplomacy. We discuss that this interplay between science and
international relations, as we frame science diplomacy, can inform on how to progress in
allowing countries in this region to develop relevant research and implement the
Convention. We provide concrete examples of this transfer of marine technology and
ways forward, in particular in the context of the UN Decade of Ocean Science for
Sustainable Development (2021–2030).
Keywords: science diplomacy, access to technology, Latin America, caribbean, UN decade of ocean science

INTRODUCTION
For the past decades, as the same time as scientiﬁc discoveries allowed us to acknowledge the critical
importance of the ocean to our livelihood, it was also signiﬁcant to demonstrate the serious consequences
of anthropogenic impacts on the marine environment threatening this life-supporting system (Rockström
et al., 2009). It is a humanitarian solicitude to preserve and sustainably use the ocean, conserving its
essential ecosystem services for generations to come (Griggs et al., 2013). However, science and technology
have not served all countries equally (Harden-Davies and Snelgrove, 2020; Ocampo and Vos, 2008, pp.
34–36). As the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development makes its debut, this paper seeks
to assist it by discussing current limitations hampering countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from
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accessing and using marine technologies to develop the science
needed to inform decisions and international negotiation processes
in an equitable basis.
Science has been responsible for both acknowledging the
critical importance of the ocean as well as identifying its
multiple stressors and delicate ecological limits (Nash et al.,
2017). With the increasing signiﬁcance of environmental and
ocean related discussions in international fora, scientists are
called to provide evidence on life-threatening issues, such as
natural and human induced hazards or food security and
pollution. More recently, science has been pushed in the ocean
international arena to assume a more relevant social role rather
than just unveiling the unknowns (Wisz et al., 2020). Scientists
are requested to provide empirical inputs to global decisionmaking processes, with the potential to build international
partnerships to overcome these collective humanitarian
challenges (Fedoroff, 2009). Ocean scientists are also being
urged to deliver social goods and foster capacity development
and transfer of marine technology (IOC-UNESCO, 2020b)1.
Nevertheless, ocean knowledge production depends upon the
access and application of available marine technologies. These
include not just research vessels, underwater vehicles and oceanic
instruments, but all sort of expertise and knowledge-based
materials, including databases and information, as formatted
by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)
of UNESCO (IOC-UNESCO, 2005). Therefore, accessing
marine technologies is critical to develop ocean research that
can ultimately provide evidence to decision-making.
Developing countries struggle to develop or access marine
technologies in spite of some attempts to address this issue
(Alexander et al., 2020). Vast ocean areas are still unmapped
and unknown to humanity, in particular the Southern parts of the
Atlantic and of the Paciﬁc, mostly due to the lack of access to
marine technologies and incipient human capacities of countries
in these regions (Inniss et al., 2017; IOC-UNESCO, 2017). The
asymmetrical distribution of scientiﬁc knowledge and
technologies not only impinge discoveries, but also reduce
possibilities of developing countries to table their needs in
international negotiations on ocean affairs based in sound
evidence. As one of the major historical battleﬁelds between
developing and developed countries, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) enshrines
provisions to promote international cooperation on marine
scientiﬁc research (MSR) and the transfer of marine
technology (TMT)2 (Anand, 1982; Soons, 1982; Nordquist
et al., 1990; Gorina-Ysern, 2004). However, these provisions
are among the less implemented in the LOSC (Long, 2007;
Long and Chaves, 2015; Salpin et al., 2018).

Enforcing the LOSC rules on MSR and TMT in an equitable
manner has been in the forefront of the international agenda for
developing countries, as for instance in the current negotiations
of a legally binding implementing agreement to regulate the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity
beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ agreement) (Long and
Chaves, 2015; Harden-Davies, 2018). The UN Decade of
Ocean Science also lies within this background, focused on
balancing countries’ capabilities to promote sound science for
social and environmental beneﬁt. Nonetheless, it is uncertain how
the geopolitical interactions between the actors negotiating these
processes will occur, as well as which roles will be played by
scientiﬁc evidence.
The Decade is a diplomatic movement to foster marine research
in search of fulﬁlling the targets established under the Sustainable
Development Goal 14, Life below Water (SDG14), in which ocean
science is pivotal (Visbeck, 2018). As a coordination effort to this
end, the Decade will need to deal with the transfer of marine
technology to the Global South, without which ocean science
cannot progress globally as requested. The Decade’s ambition to
involve other ways of knowing in science making, plus improving
this knowledge uptake in society’s decision making, will need to
involve social scientists further (Ryabinin et al., 2019). Social
sciences are called to the front to ask the correct questions and
bridge all ways of knowing (Claudet et al., 2019). In this context,
science diplomacy will be pivotal for the Decade’s success.
International Relations scholarship has overseen the role of
science and technology in theorizing the relations of power and
inﬂuence between countries (Mayer et al., 2014). Globalization,
for instance, has been mostly researched in economical contexts,
whereas science has been described as an inﬂuential soft form of
power, attracting partner countries to one’s interests and values,
rather than using force and coercion (Nye, 2017). Science
diplomacy is a recent ﬁeld of academic research that
investigates exactly the relationship between science and
international relations, opening a new horizon for scholarship
in International Relations (The Royal Society, 2010; Gluckman
et al., 2018; Rungius et al., 2018). Although its deﬁnition is still
disputed [a good debate can be found in Flink (2020) and in
Rufﬁni (2020b)], for the purpose of this piece, science diplomacy
is framed as a practice by which international relations support
and are supported by scientiﬁc research, evidencing sometimes
conﬂicting national, regional, and global interests. The current
debate around the topic has provided insightful perspectives to
think about fostering the access to marine technology for
developing countries (Griset, 2020).
This paper assesses how science diplomacy can be a signiﬁcant
tool for Latin America and Caribbean States to overcome
challenges in negotiations related to accessing marine
technologies and capacity building at the international level,
ultimately enhancing the regions scientiﬁc capacities. Proﬁting
from the opportunity presented by the implementation of the UN
Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development
(2021–2030), we propose recommendations that could leverage
the implementation of the legal rights and obligations on transfer
of marine technologies reducing global inequalities in the access
and use of marine technologies.

1
For the purpose of this paper, marine technology encompasses the “instruments,
equipment, vessels, processes and methodologies required to produce and use
knowledge to improve the study and understanding of the nature and resources of
the ocean and coastal areas” (IOC-UNESCO, 2005, p. 9)
2
In the absence of a clear-cut deﬁnition of marine scientiﬁc research in the United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), we understand this activity as “any
study or related experimental work designed to increase [hu]man’s knowledge of
the marine environment” (Soons, 1982)
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METHODS

proposals’ budget are challenged in predicting this currency
ﬂuctuation as well as adding the high costs related to taxation
and transportation. As a result, research inputs and equipment
can become prohibitive. Managing these discrepancies becomes a
fundamental part of doing ocean science in the Global South.
Second, once an equipment is imported, it needs to be calibrated
and maintained by certiﬁed services so results can be compared, and
data deﬁned as accurate. In general, these certiﬁed services are only
provided by the same companies that manufacture the devices. The
contracting party is usually hold accountable to cover the costs of
the technician’s travel and accommodation, plus the service itself.
Establishing local or regional ofﬁces in the region would provide not
only a solution, but also foster jobs and boost small enterprises and
start-ups. Ocean technology companies claim that the market share
in Latin America and the Caribbean is insufﬁcient for opening
branches in the region. Indeed, limited funding results in less
acquisition of equipment, making the market share low for those
companies. Countries could develop certiﬁed laboratories to
provide maintenance and calibration. Brazil, for example, has
this capacity established in universities. Those laboratories are
however unable to be certiﬁed due to the high international
standards for accreditation, costly to comply with. Without this
certiﬁcation, one can just loose the equipment’s warranty or have
the data being trashed out for the lack of quality assurance.
Lastly, the global ocean scientiﬁc community moves steadily in
determining essential ocean variables, i.e., a minimum requirement
of observations to monitor the state of the ocean environment and
predict trends which are useful to inform society and policy makers
(Lindstrom et al., 2012). It has been acknowledged that complying
with such standards will be challenging to the developing world, in
particular because of the fragmented ocean international
governance framework and the lack of coordination and security
in funding schemes (Bax et al., 2018). Capacity development and
transfer of marine technology are critical to instrumentalize a
coordinated set of data that will allow better forecast and
modeling of the marine environment (Miloslavich et al., 2018).
Despite some endeavors in the Paciﬁc and Southern Asia (Bax et al.,
2018), the overall scenario in ocean observations is still detrimental
(Tanhua et al., 2019).
All in all, ocean scientists in the South have limited research
budget in local currency with highly ﬂuctuating exchange rates.
Much of this budget is then spent in keeping up with
international standards, that determine data accuracy, thus
allowing replicability and comparison. To make things slightly
challenging, the competition for shiptime is intense since there
are not many research vessels available. Thus, international
cooperation is essential to access and deploy ocean
technologies. Governments need to support researchers in
negotiating equitable and fair platforms for sharing research
infrastructure and co-developing marine technologies.

We conducted a legal analysis of the provisions adopted in the
LOSC regarding the promotion of MSR and TMT, focusing on
the rules with especial provisions for developing countries.
Additionally, ofﬁcial documents aiming at implementing such
provisions were analyzed, in particular those from the
Intergovernmental
Oceanographic
Commission
from
UNESCO (Gonçalves, 1984; Harden-Davies and Snelgrove,
2020). Some of the perspectives and examples provided were
drawn from the authors’ experience in managing scientiﬁc
programs in the region and through the collection of views
from researchers in the ﬁeld over time. We acknowledge the
importance of analyzing how social, cultural and political
relations can add layers of complexity in the discussion of
implementing the transfer of marine technology obligations,
however, this has not been the focus of this paper.

Reasons Why Marine Technology Transfer
Is Critical in Latin America and the
Caribbean
Globalization is usually themed after economic relations but
became a facilitator movement of international scientiﬁc
cooperation, in particular in issues of global concern, such as
ocean health (Held et al., 1999; Carter, 2008). With a more
engaged global scientiﬁc community, the knowledge produced
could reﬂect a form of scientiﬁc consensus that could inform
diplomacy. However, the uneven participation of researchers
from Latin America and the Caribbean in global ocean
assessments show that this consensus might be reﬂecting views
from a narrow group of scientists, lacking inclusivity (IOCUNESCO, 2020a; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Vadrot, 2020).
Thus, globalization has provided good opportunities for the
evolution of Science but has still much to progress in terms of
accommodating knowledge from other communities, in
particular researchers from the Global South (Biermann and
Möller, 2019; Kraemer-Mbula et al., 2020).
Researchers from developed countries often access funding and
infrastructure to conduct research in Latin America and the
Caribbean waters. As principal investigators of such research
projects, these researchers usually apply only a small portion of
the funding in the foreign ﬁeld, leaving local contributors with
limited access to research equipment. This has been evident in the
current Covid-19 pandemic, with Northern scientists regretting
having lost their ﬁeld work access due to travel bans, thus
jeopardizing entire research projects (de Vos, 2020). What should
be regretted is that those research projects did not provide a wellequipped and trained personnel on the ground. If done so, research
would have been preserved, so as capacity development and access to
technology provided, a win-win situation.
Ocean scientists in Latin America and the Caribbean struggle
in many ways to develop world-class marine research. First,
research budget is limited and allocated in local currency,
subject to high ﬂuctuating exchange rates. This conversion is
necessary to import equipment and other research inputs from
foreign companies, usually from developed countries. Research
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The LOSC provides a comprehensive framework regulating the
jurisdiction of States Parties and activities taking place at sea,
interacting with other instruments, actors and regimes (Trevisanut
et al., 2020). Even though scientiﬁc evidence is interwoven in many
provisions of the Convention, the transfer of marine science and
technology is enshrined in part XIII (Marine scientiﬁc research),
part XIV (Development and transfer of marine technology), and
articles 143, and 144. Whereas the link between the framework on
marine scientiﬁc research, transfer of technology and capacity
development has been analyzed elsewhere (Harden-Davies and
Snelgrove, 2020), the literature lacks a closer look into the special
rules directed to developing countries.
The obligation of transferring marine technology generally
covers 1) access to data, information and knowledge; 2) training
human resources on science and technology; 3) promoting access
to equipment and infrastructure; and 4) promoting international,
regional and national scientiﬁc and technical cooperation (HardenDavies and Snelgrove, 2020). In more details, within the framework
of scientiﬁc cooperation, there is a special obligation for States,
alone or in collaboration, to promote the ﬂow of scientiﬁc data and
information, as well as the transfer of knowledge resulting from
MSR and transfer of marine science and technology to developing
countries. Additionally, international efforts must focus on
increasing the autonomous scientiﬁc capability and
infrastructure of these countries through capacity development
actions as well as the establishment of national and regional
research centers aiming at not only increasing skills in pure
science, but also to improve the social and economic
development of these countries (art. 244 (2), art. 266 (1)(2), art.
268 (d), art. 275, art, 276 LOSC). Aligned with States, International
Organizations must endeavor to conclude focused programmes of
technical cooperation for transferring all kinds of marine
technologies and technical assistance to States that have not
been able to establish or promote their own technological
capacities in pure or applied marine sciences (art. 269 (a)).
Even when not intermediated by international organizations,
the TMT between States must consider the needs and interests
of developing countries (art. 272, LOSC). Article 267 provides
means of interaction with other legal regimes by counterbalancing
the obligation to transfer marine technology with the obligation of
due regard the rights and duties of holders, suppliers and recipients
of marine technology. Table 1 summarizes the provisions in parts
XIII and XIV with rights and obligations for developing countries.
Understanding that technological and scientiﬁc developments
would require normative adaptation over time, article 271 calls for
collaboration though international organizations for enacting
criteria and guidelines to facilitate the TMT taking into account
the interests and needs of developing countries, including skills and
technology regarding activities in the Area, i.e., the seabed and ocean
ﬂoor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Even though no speciﬁc organization is mentioned in LOSC, IOCUNESCO has acted as the focal point for implementing parts XIII
and XIV. Other organizations with competences related to ocean
sciences are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), among others with a more
regional focus (Nordquist et al., 1985, pp. 558–560; United
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Nations, 2010). The conduct of MSR has increasingly been
undertaken by cooperative arrangements, what is fostered by
articles 424 and 244 of the Convention. Besides, IOC has been
leading initiatives of capacity building in marine scientiﬁc research
and has assumed a pivotal role in discussions in the BBNJ
negotiations, which has transfer of technology and capacity
building in the core of the negotiations (Harden-Davies, 2016).
In 1994, a new Implementing Agreement under LOSC was
negotiated to implement Part XI regarding activities in the Area
(United Nations, 1994). Developed countries were dissatisﬁed with
the regime negotiated in LOSC for the Area, including the
obligation of mandatory technology transfer. As part of the
compromise to acquire the necessary number of ratiﬁcations for
the LOSC to come into force, the 1994 Agreement modiﬁed article
144 introducing new principles in disfavor of developing countries
(Galindo, 2006). First, it has linked the conditions to facilitate the
access of technology to the terms of the open market or through
joint-ventures, reducing favorable prices to developing countries.
Second, it has submitted technology acquisition to the effective
protection of property rights, one important limitation for TMT in
current times, as we shall discuss below (United Nations, 1994).
Despite the setbacks introduced by the 1994 Agreement, the ISA
has established an Endowment Fund in 2006 to support the
participation of scientists from developing countries in research
projects (United Nations, 2010), which, in turn, has been subject to
some criticism (Jaeckel et al., 2016).
In spite of the comprehensive legal framework favoring scientiﬁc
cooperation and marine technology transfer with particular
provisions focusing on increasing capacities in developing
countries, part XIII and part XIV of the LOSC are underimplemented (Long, 2007) As a result, there is currently a lack of
balance between developed and developing countries in producing
ocean science (IOC-UNESCO, 2017). These concerns are vivid in
many international stages, such as in the BBNJ negotiations, where
countries of the Global South are requesting more legal opportunities
for accessing marine technologies. As the scope of the Decade is
broader than the BBNJ, we claim that it could act more ambitiously as
a springboard to foster the implementation of the special rules on
marine scientiﬁc research and transfer of technology for developing
countries, particularly considering the rules on international scientiﬁc
cooperation aforementioned and the positive outcomes to promote
transfer of technology of informal arrangements.

Challenges and Opportunities in
Implementing the Transfer of Marine
Technology

Implementing the LOSC Rules on Transfer of Marine
Technology
Technology transfer can mean a diversity of processes. For
example, it can be applied to a dual use of a certain
technology being transferred from one ﬁeld of application to
another. It can also represent the factual physical movement of an
asset (or even immaterial elements, such as know-how or
technical information) or people or a set of capacities between
places. Here, we will address technology transfer as the transfer of
systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the
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TABLE 1 | Law of the Sea Convention provisions in part XIII and part XIV (Development and transfer of marine technology) speciﬁcally dealing with developing countries.
Special rules for developing States in part
XIII

Art
244.2

Special rules for developing States in part XIV

Art 266
Art
Art
Art
Art

268
269
272
273

Art
275.1
Art 276

States and IO shall transfer scientiﬁc data, information and knowledge
States and IO shall strengthen the autonomous MSR capabilities of developing countries
States and IO shall strengthen human resources of developing countries through education and training
States shall promote the development of MS and technological capacity of States with regards to exploration,
conservation and management
States, IO, ISA shall promote the development of HR through training and education
States, IO, ISA shall endeavour: establish progammes of technical cooperation - own technological capacity
IO shall coordinate Global or regional programmes taking into account interests and needs
States, OI and ISA shall facilitate the transfer of Skills and marine technology with regards to activities in the
Area
States, IO, ISA shall establish national marine scientiﬁc and technologic research centres
States, IO and ISA shall promote the Establishment of regional marine scientiﬁc and technological research
centres to stimulate and advance the conduct of MSR and foster the TMT

HR, Human Resources; IO, Intergovernmental Organizations; ISA, International Seabed Authority; TMT, Transfer of Marine Technology; MSR, Marine Scientiﬁc Research; MS, Marine
Science.

application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does
not extend to the mere sale or lease of goods (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, 2014).

some of the region’s institutions, experts and research vessels,
but a match making feature for those seeking available marine
technologies from the North is inexistent. Therefore, after
15 years of the establishment of those criteria and guidelines,
the world has yet to see transformational technology transfers
that result in a balance between countries in the access and use of
marine technologies (IOC-UNESCO, 2017; Salpin et al., 2018).
Diplomacy cannot afford to postpone the debate on the
effective transfer of marine technologies. As the world’s
population grows, there will be a race to explore the ocean
natural resources further. Thus, ocean sustainable development
based on the best available scientiﬁc knowledge is of utmost
importance for future generations, in particular for developing
countries (Hassanali, 2020). Bearing this in mind, the United
Nations proclaimed the next decade as the UN Decade of Ocean
Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030).
The Decade of Ocean Science shall be a good opportunity to
foster the debate around effective manners to progress in granting
opportunities for developing countries to access marine technology
and capacity development (Claudet et al., 2019), by implementing
the regimes enshrined in part XIII and XIV of the LOSC. For this to
happen, the implementation of the Decade should be centered in
searching for equality in the access and use of marine technologies
for sustainable development and human and environmental
wellbeing. Terms such as co-development of technology instead
of transfer, with a more equitable and linear participation of
stakeholders, should also be promoted. In this sense, science
diplomacy can inform on practices applicable to fostering this
balance.

Marine technology transfer is generally referred to in the
context of the IOC Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of
Marine Technology, or GTMT, as illustrated in Box 1 (IOCUNESCO, 2005). GTMT details the need for a clearing-house
mechanism, by which interested stakeholders could identify
technology-holders and technology needs among the global
ocean community. This clearing-house mechanism is not yet
established, although IOC has created a Group of Experts on
Capacity Development that have produced recommendations on
ways to move forward, based in other organizations’ models
(IOC-UNESCO, 2019). IOC has, however, established a proof-ofconcept trial clearing house mechanism in its regional body for
the Latin America and the Caribbean through a dedicated
website.3 This trial version makes available information on

3

Scientists Leading the Transfer of Marine
Technology
In practice, marine technology transfer has relied less in formal
intergovernmental diplomatic routes and more in peer-to-peer
exchange. Peer-to-peer cooperation is a basic mechanism of the
scientiﬁc endeavor. It has produced advancements in our common
knowledge of the marine realm allowing society to make better
informed decisions (Fischhoff and Scheufele, 2013). Research centers,
universities and individual researchers have fostered technology
transfer for problem-solving, aiming at progressing in scientiﬁc

http://portete.invemar.org.co/chm, accessed on January 27, 2021.
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addressing community and common interests in a more
ﬂexible way than the ofﬁcial, Government-led track 1
diplomacy. At the end of the day, both forms of negotiations
should be interlinked and supportive of one another if we are to
see change in the transfer of marine technologies during the
Decade of Ocean Science, for example.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
The overarching difﬁculty for an intergovernmental body such as
the IOC to pragmatically propose the transfer of marine
technologies lays partially on issues of Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR) (Zhou, 2019). Unlike the provisions on TMT,
MSR and capacity development, under the scope of the LOSC
and the mandate of institutions connected with this regime, IPR
in under the mandate of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Indeed, as the LOSC is not a
stand-alone treaty, it interacts with other regimes of international
law, and has mechanisms to do so (Trevisanut et al., 2020), as for
instance the above-mentioned article 267. Nonetheless, the
conversation between these regimes has so far only favored
private companies detaining patents.
In light of global environmental conundrums, WIPO was
challenged to balance “the free transfer of technologies and
sustainable innovation”, but without much success (Zhou, 2019).
Similar process is undergoing in the WTO, and negotiations on
technology transfer under the scope of TRIPS have not been
evolving (Zhou, 2019). Therefore, traditional diplomacy has been
unable to reach consensus on how to balance IPRs and public
interests to advance sustainability (Latif et al., 2011).

discovery. Agreements signed between research institutions and
universities often include the exchange of human capacities and
technology transfer at some level (Dolan, 2012). Drivers of such
agreements are opportunities presented by the growing
internationalization mechanisms adopted by those institutions
(Qiang, 2003). Such mechanisms aim at projecting national
capacities and competencies abroad to attract human and
ﬁnancial capital for further institutional developments, as a form
of investment. In the context of Latin America and the Caribbean,
internationalization has also provided the means to access foreign
research funding and assets, placing an important opportunity to
foster partnerships, but also to overcome national budget constraints.
This practice is more common in the context of
technologies developed by publicly funded research, mainly
targeting scientiﬁc discovery. Privately funded research assets,
in particular those aimed at exploring the marine resources
such as oil, ﬁsheries and minerals, are less common on those
agreements because these technologies raise industry’s
competitiveness and proﬁt (Rufﬁni, 2020a). There are,
however, a few privately funded organizations that use
advanced technologies to promote open access information
to society [e.g., Global Fishing Watch (Nugent, 2019)].
It is therefore fundamental that scientiﬁc cooperation in
informal pathways is continued and promoted so science can
proﬁt from the free thinking and foster technology transfer. In
fact, diplomacy should acknowledge and promote these
informal channels where applicable, supporting actions that
have been successful over time, such as cooperation agreements
between research institutions. This informality is addressed as a
form of Track 2 diplomacy in International Relations
scholarship. The term can be understood as a parastatal
informal diplomacy in which stakeholders are not necessarily
bound to Governments (Jones, 2015). Track 2 diplomacy can
use the science international cooperation to progress on

Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics | www.frontiersin.org

Private Sector Involvement
Companies take risks and make investments to proﬁt from
technological assets. The private sector alone should not be
accountable to make change by opening patents and handling
technology blueprints. In addition, countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean will beneﬁt little from blueprints if they do not
possess the necessary human capacities and physical facilities to
develop marine technologies. Therefore, an intergovernmental
coordinated effort needs to be developed by ﬁnally
operationalizing the clearing-house mechanism of IOC to then
match technology holders and needs (Harden-Davies, 2016).
Second, public diplomacy needs to foster a discussion on the
possible trade-offs for the private sector to join in this effort.
Companies can proﬁt from opening new markets and investing in
capacitating new labor in the region. Third, local governments
need to invest in innovation policies and start-up programs to
absorb the technology being transferred. Local business might
then ﬂourish, and local realities will adapt technologies to their
needs, feedbacking the innovation process at a larger scale. At the
end of this complex process, countries can begin to negotiate the
co-development of technologies, beyond the scope of transferring
technology as a passive-active relationship (Chesbrough and
Schwartz, 2007). Although there are conﬂicting views
addressing market competition and sustainability, there are
also opportunities to leverage this relationship, such as private
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prominent focus on “center-periphery” relations in scientiﬁc
research and the globalization of the social sciences, or the
ownership of knowledge, particularly indigenous knowledge,
when compared to the United States and Europe (Echeverria
et al., 2020). Historically the theoretical ﬁeld of International
Relations (IR) has dealt with technology in both an optimistic and
a skeptical conﬂict, in particular scholarship around the role of
technology in the Cold War. Science and Technology was placed
exogenously in theoretical IR and the dynamics and global
impacts of Science needed further empirical evidence. Today,
IR is seeking ways to incorporate the global politics of science and
technology as a distinct subﬁeld, which is by default an
interdisciplinary approach that needs to include other ﬁelds of
social sciences therein (Koh and Jayakumar, 1977). Therefore,
science diplomacy can offer a new interdisciplinary approach to
study how science and technology, its multiple facets and
understandings, can inﬂuence international relations (Lidskog,
2014). We frame this discussion around the taxonomy provided
by (The Royal Society, 2010) so the organization reﬂects the
general science diplomacy literature.
First, “Diplomacy for science”, which stands for diplomacy
facilitating international scientiﬁc cooperation by leveraging
investment and prioritizing research to address uncertainties
in decision-making. Here, diplomacy can set ofﬁcial
frameworks by which countries can access marine
technologies, such as through the IOC. By doing so,
diplomatic negotiations can foster the establishment of
international cooperation on fair and equitable grounds, in
accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention. Moreover,
diplomacy needs to integrate debates going on in different
fora, in particular among WTO and WIPO, on how to deal
with intellectual property rights. In addition, diplomacy can
foster an arrangement between the public and private sector
regarding the access and application of relevant technology to
research global public goods, such as the ocean. Ocean science
can only progress in an equitable manner if access to marine
technologies is granted on an equitable basis through the
diplomatic decision making. Thus, diplomacy for science in
this scenario means intergovernmental negotiations to grant
access to marine technologies and capacity development.
Second, “science in diplomacy”, that deals with the provision
of scientiﬁc evidence to support international decision-making.
Research will be responsible to inform diplomacy on the above
mentioned negotiations. Knowledge gaps and trending themes of
concern need to be communicated in such a way that diplomacy
can discuss institutional and legal arrangements to overcome
current obstacles for an effective transfer of marine technologies.
Scientists have a pivotal role in clarifying what should be the
results in effective marine technology transfer, highlighting the
current pathways to acquire technologies and barriers, such as
Intellectual Property, maintenance and operating costs. Nongovernmental
organizations
and
intergovernmental
organizations shall play an important role in this regard
(Lidskog, 2014). For example, the organization of public
debates among scientists using the networks under NGOs are
theme-oriented and independent from States and formal
diplomacy, resulting in a ﬂexible approach to discussing the

research programs on marine ecosystem restoration or pollution
(Virdin et al., 2021).
Private companies’ interests are considered by diplomacy when
defending national positions in international negotiations. Same
applies to public interest, as the societal beneﬁt of a healthy and safe
ocean environment. Thus, diplomacy needs to balance community/
public interest with those interests coming from speciﬁc groups or
countries. This complex relationship between national interests and
global public goods involving science and technology is taken under
the scrutiny of science diplomacy research (Rufﬁni, 2020b).
Moreover, a better coordination between international regimes
such as LOSC, WIPO, and TRIPS is highly desired. The Decade
of Ocean Science should open this dialogue by confronting
diplomatic negotiations in both regimes and searching for
opportunities. A simple recommendation in this issue would be
to align country’s representations in both process with the aim of
ﬁnding common grounds for opening this frank debate on
Intellectual Property Rights.

DISCUSSION
The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and related
implementing instruments have set rights and obligations able
to reduce worldwide asymmetries in the access to scientiﬁc
knowledge and marine technology. Nevertheless, in spite of
some increase in the participation of Asian countries in
scientiﬁc publications, mentioned in the latest Global Ocean
Science Report, the scientiﬁc and technological capabilities
remain inequality distributed. Developed countries still
concentrate the majority of ocean science human capacity and
more incentives for researchers, like the access to international
forums and networking (IOC-UNESCO, 2020a). Equally, only
ﬁve countries in the world, all located in the global north, have full
wide range access of technological infrastructure, with only a few
others with capacity to conduct open waters and deep-sea
research (IOC-UNESCO, 2020a). For instance, none of the
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which includes the
Caribbean States, have deep-research vessels.
The origins of many of these difﬁculties in promoting the right of
access to scientiﬁc knowledge and technology to developing
countries lye in historical processes of colonization (Headrick,
1981). Additionally, from an epistemological perspective, science
is a western invention, as so, from the starting point developing
countries need to follow theories and methods founded in an alien
mindset, still being under dispute how to integrate traditional and
indigenous knowledge in the science-making (Weiss, 2005; Mulalap
et al., 2020). This topic assesses whether science diplomacy is an
appropriate tool to reduce scientiﬁc and technological asymmetries
without disregarding the compelling reasons for a deeper discussion.

Science Diplomacy Facilitating the Transfer
of Marine Technologies in Latin America
and the Caribbean
Latin America has experienced a raise in social sciences’ research
in understanding the role of Science in advising policy, with a
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state-of-the-art research and potential future actions. In ocean
affairs, NGOs have provided scientiﬁc expertize since the early
negotiations of the LOSC (Koh and Jayakumar, 1977). Therefore,
science in diplomacy will allow provision of knowledge gaps and
current technology needs to properly advance in ocean
sustainability to comply with global community interests.
Lastly, “science for diplomacy”, in which international
collaboration advances to bridge countries and build a
constructive dialogue through joint research projects. The
utmost example of such is the adoption of the UN Decade of
Ocean Science. The Decade is hoped to be the long-waited
opportunity for research to bridge countries and people
around a common goal. Different stakeholders with diverse
values and needs shall inform the Decade’s process on
achieving societal goals of ocean sustainability (Claudet et al.,
2019). The Decade’s raison d’être is to put ocean science in service
of society, including policy making, despite any possible tension
between countries in other international debates. Thus, science
for diplomacy will act to allow this dialogue between countries
and stakeholders to take place through joint regional/global
research efforts, that can be fostered initially by informal
pathways, attained to the Track 2 diplomacy practices.
Ultimately, the balance between national political interests
and global community interests in transferring marine
technologies to foster ocean sustainability is a matter of
balancing competition versus cooperation (Rufﬁni 2020b).
There must be an optimal point in which trade-offs are made
and commitments are adopted. This point must be achieved by
addressing both the issues of national priorities, such as industry
development and labor enhancement, with those of global
concern, such as marine environmental protection and
ecosystem service restoration. In this regard, scientists
become yet another social group with intrinsic values and
interests (Jasanoff, 1987; McCain, 2016, pp. 253-257).
Therefore, progressing in understanding the social dynamics
within the group of scientists and between scientists and
diplomatic relations becomes essential to better inform global
processes based on scientiﬁc evidence, such as the UN Decade of
Ocean Science (Rose, 2018). Science diplomacy research in this
regard, and in particular in the context of Latin America and the
Caribbean, the region’s gaps and priorities, will enhance the
global discussion to implement the Decade.

between the GEOMAR Helmholtz Center for Ocean Research and
Cape Verde’s Instituto do Mar—IMar. The Tropical portion of the
Atlantic has a determinant role in the heat exchange between the
ocean and the atmosphere, a feature that is central to understand
global climate and ocean dynamics (Seidel et al., 2008). German
scientists wish to access an island in the middle of the Atlantic to
further enlighten how the Tropical Atlantic inﬂuences the North.
Germany beneﬁts from relevant information and Cape Verde with
the access to technologies and capacities to deal with their own
waters. Moreover, the center is devoted on building capacities in
Cape Verde so their ocean science community can be empowered.
Ultimately, the German interest in Cape Verde contributed to the
European Commission signing a diplomatic bilateral science and
technology agreement on ocean research as a part of a broader
ocean science diplomacy arrangement for the whole Atlantic basin
(Polejack et al., 2021). This ocean science diplomacy practice has
balanced the capacity needs of Cape Verde with the German
interests in the region advancing knowledge production that will
be ﬁt for the global ocean assessment purpose, fully implementing
articles 244, 266 and 275, LOSC.
Another good example of science diplomacy aiding countries
to implement their international obligations in the transfer of
marine technologies is the global ocean observation network.
Ocean observations are highly dependent on technology and,
under the auspices of IOC’s Global Ocean Observing System
(GOOS) cooperation has been key to deploy equipment
worldwide, such as buoys, drifters and other ocean
monitoring instruments (Tanhua et al., 2019). In general, this
cooperation involves the exchange, maintenance and calibration
of equipment from one country to another. The handling of
equipment’s blueprints for local development and manufacture
is much rarer. Among the practical examples of our knowledge
is the development of the Atlas-B buoy in Brazil (Campos et al.,
2014). The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) freely handed the blueprints of their
Atlas buoy technology for development in Brazil. As a result,
Academia and industry partnered to develop an adaptation of
this equipment, which was deployed in face of Brazil for testing.
In spite of formal Government agreements in this matter, both
NOAA and the University of São Paulo together with two
Brazilian companies were able to successfully transfer a key
technology nonexistent in the country before. Capacities were
developed and today Brazil is able to progress in the
manufacture of this buoy.
From the above mentioned, science diplomacy as a
practice provides different perspectives of implementing
the international obligations of transferring marine
scientiﬁc knowledge and technology, reducing inequalities
and empowering developing countries. Practical examples
support this perspective, although the Decade will be a more
ambitious stage for the science diplomacy interplay.

Examples of Science Diplomacy Processes
Leading the Transfer of Marine Technology
Peer-to-peer cooperation agreements between research institutions
and universities generally include the exchange of human capacities
and technology transfer at some level (Dolan, 2012). Drivers of such
agreements are opportunities presented by the growing
internationalization mechanisms adopted by those institutions
(Qiang, 2003). Internationalization of universities and research
centers is one of the outcomes of the globalization of science.
A good example of such is the cooperation between research
institutions from Germany and Cape Verde to create and operate
an ocean research center in Cape Verde (Kaehlert et al., 2017). The
Ocean Science Center Mindelo results from a formal agreement
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permanent funding, appropriate scientiﬁc capacities and access to
marine technologies. Consequently, these countries are
challenged to contribute with scientiﬁc evidence in current
ocean affairs, such as the BBNJ negotiations (Harden-Davies
and Snelgrove, 2020). Although the global ocean governance
framework provides the legal and institutional support for the
transfer of marine technology from developed to developing
countries aiming at strengthening local and regional
capabilities, after decades of the entry into force of LOSC, part
XIII and part XIV are considered among the least implemented of
the LOSC (Long, 2007; Long and Chaves, 2015).
The globalized research community has provided informal venues
for the transfer of marine technology. However, these peer-to-peer
relationships will not be sufﬁcient to achieve the equity that several
States have called for to strength national capacity permanently to
meet national needs and international standards. Therefore, this
paper presents some concrete recommendations on how countries
in Latin America and the Caribbean can enhance their national
scientiﬁc capacities by using science diplomacy as a tool to foster
beneﬁcial international deals.
First, according to the requirements of the LOSC and the
Resolution on the development of national marine science,
technology and ocean service infrastructure (A/CONF.62/
120*), developing countries must produce science and
technology needs assessments, by which gaps and priorities
shall be apparent. Such an effort could be supported by
international organizations, the scientiﬁc community and
research organizations, including from the private sector,
together with governments.
Second, efforts must be taken to effectively implement the
clearing house mechanism as per the IOC guidelines (IOCUNESCO, 2005). Major technology holders from the developed
world and representatives from organizations with mandate related
to intellectual property, such as WTO and WIPO, should be
included in discussions on the of such a clearing house
mechanism, providing inputs and other perspectives. Issues
related to exchange rate, taxation, fees for transportation, and
limits to comply with standards for ocean observation should be
considered in the clearing house mechanism. Additionally, it is
relevant to discuss about incentives to create regional certiﬁed
laboratories in developing countries to provide maintenance and
calibration for equipment, as well as reviewing the standards for
accreditation. Latin America and the Caribbean can proﬁt from the
trial version of this mechanisms that IOC has initialized in the
region.

Third, a shift in vocabulary may represent a positive change on
how developed countries understand their role in promoting
scientiﬁc and technological equity. Using terminologies such as
co-development of technology instead of transfer are able to build
more linear relations between stakeholders and reduce
perspectives of subservience (center-periphery).
The Decade of Ocean Science shall be a good opportunity to
foster the debate around effective manners to progress in granting
opportunities for developing countries to access marine
technology and capacity development, by implementing the
regimes enshrined in part XIII and XIV of the LOSC.
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have the
opportunity during this Decade to push for improvements in
the access of marine technologies. The provisions in the LOSC
and related instruments give the legal basis for this discussion.
Moreover, ocean science diplomacy can provide the necessary
insights on possible negotiations based on evidence and favoring
fair and just transition pathways.
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Climate Change hazards to social-ecological systems are well-documented and the time
to act is now. The IPCC-SROCC used the best available scientific knowledge to identify
paths for effective adaptation and mitigation of climate change impacts on the ocean
and cryosphere. Despite all the evidence highlighted by SROCC and the key role of
the ocean and cryosphere for climate change at all levels, Latin America (LA) faces
challenges to take effective action mostly due to socio-economic vulnerability, political
instability and overall technical capacities. Countries have adopted diverse actions as
the information needed by policy makers has been made available, not necessarily
in accessible and inclusive ways. Regional imbalance in economic development,
technological level, capacity development, societal involvement, and governmental
oversight have contributed to skewed geographical and technological gaps of knowledge
on key ecosystems and specific areas preventing effective climate actions/solutions. We
analyze the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) from the region as proxies to the
incorporation of IPCC recommendations. The gaps and opportunities for the uptake of
ocean and climate science to political decision making is discussed as five key aspects:
(i) climate assessment information and regional policies, (ii) knowledge production, (iii)
knowledge accessibility, (iv) knowledge impact to policy, and (v) long term monitoring
for decision making. We advocate that the uptake of SROCC findings in LA policies
can be enhanced by: (a) embracing local realities and incorporating local, traditional
and indigenous knowledge; (b) empowering locals to convey local knowledge to global
assessments and adapt findings to local realities; (c) enhancing regional research
capabilities; and (d) securing long-term sustainable ocean observations. Local and
regional participation in knowledge production and provision enhances communication
pathways, climate literacy and engagement which are key for effective action to be
reflected in governance. Currently, the lack of accessible and inclusive information at
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the local level hampers the overall understanding, integration and engagement of the
society to mitigate climate effects, perpetuates regional heterogeneity and threatens
the efforts to reverse the course of climate change in LA. Local researchers should
be empowered, encouraged, rewarded and better included in global climate-ocean
scientific assessments.
Keywords: climate change, SROCC, local knowledge, policy makers, Latin America

INTRODUCTION
The critical importance of the ocean and the cryosphere to the
climate system (Reid et al., 2009), hydrological cycles (Schanze
et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2020) and the consequences to society
(Nicholls, 2010) stimulated the IPCC to commission a Special
Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate
(hereafter SROCC) (IPCC, 2019a), which assessed climate change
impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems. The combined
effects of ocean warming, ocean acidification, and deoxygenation
are reducing primary production and marine biodiversity, and
impacting associated ecosystem services such as nutrient cycling,
carbon sequestration and fisheries (Bindoff et al., 2019). Sea level
rise and ocean extreme events are causing coastal damage, with
natural and capital losses, and many associated socio-economic
impacts (Nicholls, 1995; Leatherman, 2001). People dependent
on or living in close connection with coastal, polar and mountain
environments are especially vulnerable to the hazards of ocean
and cryosphere change (Oppenheimer et al., 2019).
Climate change is a global phenomenon, but the scale
to act is local, primarily influenced by a country’s policies,
geography, socio economic development, and vulnerability to
climate-risks. Consequently, climate coastal adaptation policies
have been developed, with substantial variations between
countries, and across developmental status (Klein et al., 1999,
2001). Investigating how scientific knowledge and international
recommendations based on science are being taken at national
level is not simple, due to the time-lag between implementation,
monitoring, evaluation and reporting. In addition, climate
change adaptation actions generally lack scientific uptake and
on-the-ground change, with most focus being on assessing
vulnerability, compared to developing plans and actions (Gibbs,
2015).
Latin America and the Caribbean1 (hereafter LAC) represents
a high contrast region where wealth and prosperity coexist with
vulnerability and extreme poverty, explained by low growth
(Fernández-Arias and Fernández-Arias, 2021). The region hosts
1/3 of the world’s most biodiverse countries and highly urbanized
regions (UNEP, 2011). It comprises 46 countries, dependent
territories and overseas departments on the edge of the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans and the Caribbean Sea and is limited
to the south by the Southern Ocean. Altogether, LAC has
more than 30,000 km of coastline, ranging from the tropical
region—dominated by mangroves, seagrass meadows and coral

reefs—to subtropical and temperate areas, dominated by salt
marshes, rocky shores and macroalgal beds all the way to the
Drake passage, where the influence of the Southern Ocean and
Antarctica is well-documented (Sijp and England, 2004; Scher
and Martin, 2006; Livermore et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2014;
Viebahn et al., 2016; England et al., 2017). This continent-wide
latitudinal range reflects diverse oceanic domains and climate
influences, responsible for the high diversity of marine habitats
and ecosystems (Miloslavich et al., 2011; Turra et al., 2013;
Spalding et al., 2017) where hotspots of “exceptional marine
biodiversity” and fisheries coincide with areas most severely
affected by global warming (Ramírez et al., 2017). Coastal areas
surrounding the Mesoamerican reef and nearby islands are
low-lying and extremely vulnerable to sea level rise. Extreme
hydrometeorological events are frequent and coastal erosion
is a widespread threat (particularly severe in Northern and
Northeast Brazil—Silva et al., 2014), associated with human
interventions, poor coastal planning and management but also
influenced by the morphodynamic nature of the coast (Silva
et al., 2014), as most coastal areas in the region. The diversity
of this region is also reflected by a wealth of peoples, languages,
social-political systems, cultures, traditions and origins that
constitute a unique mosaic of diversities with 780 indigenous
peoples and 560 different languages (Freire et al., 2015) that
heightens regional imbalance and skewed geographical and
technological gaps.
Despite the alarming magnitude and extent of climate
change effects shown by SROCC, Latin America (hereafter LA)
is challenged to take effective action due to socio-economic
vulnerability. Extreme poverty in LA reached unprecedented
levels in 2020 (ECLAC, 2021), and social inequality indices,
like unemployment and labor participation rates, have worsened
particularly among women, despite the recent emergency social
protection measures adopted in the COVID-19 pandemic. The
recently published Regional Human Development Report2 for
LAC (UNDP, 2021) highlights that concentration of power,
violence in all its forms and failed social protection of policies
and frameworks cause the contrasts found in the region.
These promote high inequality and low growth, challenging
the intake of the recommendations from SROCC even though
the region plays a key part in the global green recovery
(UNDP, 2021).
This paper analyzes the adopted Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) in LAC as a reflection of the incorporation

1 The

2 Regional

acronyms LAC and LA are not used interchangeably: LAC refers solely for
evidence from Latin America and Caribbean while LA is used when evidence refers
to Latin America.
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rationale goes for “Ocean and Coasts” in the NDCs from Brazil,
Guyana, Nicaragua, and Peru which seems invisible to national
commitments despite the proportion of coastal and marine
areas in these countries. NDCs in the region have not yet been
impacted by SROCC findings as reflected by the first (and now
the second more recent) round of NDC submissions. Unless the
climate and ocean communities recognize LAC’s socio-economic
contexts and associated environmental and social vulnerabilities
to consider uniting to act, this scenario might not change
significantly over time.

of IPCC recommendations. We briefly discuss gaps and
opportunities in the region for the uptake of ocean and climate
science to political decision making, organized in five key
categories: (i) climate assessment information and regional
policies, (ii) knowledge production, (iii) knowledge accessibility,
(iv) knowledge impact to policy, and (v) long term monitoring
for decision-making. We finally present some conclusions and
propose future actions.

NATIONALLY DETERMINED
CONTRIBUTIONS (NDCS) AS SCIENCE
UPTAKE INDICATORS

GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN
AMERICA

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are official
Government commitments to comply with UNFCCC’s targets.
NDCs may also reflect how IPCC findings are perceived and
incorporated into policy documents that go beyond current
national climate plans and bring us closer to the Paris Agreement
goals of decarbonizing economies and improving resilience. We
reviewed the NDC reports submitted by 31 Latin American
and Caribbean countries to the NDC registry3 and searched
for expressions such as “oceans and coasts,” “fisheries,” “risk
management,” “gender,” “UN 2030 Agenda,” “interculturality,”
“community-based solutions,” “ecosystem-based adaptations,”
and “cryosphere.” In addition, we incorporated Socio Economic
indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita,
Human Development Index (HDI), and specific GDPs for 2017
and 2019, relative to the overall values of GDP estimates for the
whole world, extracted from the World Bank Database4 Results
are shown in Table 1.
Risk management was the most common feature, addressed
by 29 countries, followed by Ocean and coastal activities (n
= 27). Fisheries actions were reported for 19 countries, while
ecosystem-based adaptation appeared in 18, such as Mexico’s
Blue Carbon action. Gender equity/balance issues were a concern
for 17 countries and frequently mentioned by most countries,
although not included by Guatemala and Uruguay. Community
based adaptation is of particular interest in 16 countries, while
Agenda 2030 has been considered by 15 countries in their
NDCs. Interculturality, the existence and equitable interaction
of diverse cultures and the possibility of generating shared
cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual respect5 was
important for 13 countries. The least frequent concern was with
the Cryosphere, only included in the NDCs of Argentina, Chile
and Peru (Figure S1).
NDCs in the LAC region have been developed according to
local context and capacities. Commitments to climate change
mitigation and adaptation are frequent, but specific targets
to “oceans and cryosphere” have not been prioritized. For
example, SROCC reports coral reefs as amongst the most
susceptible ecosystems and yet the Mesoamerican Arrecifal
Barrier has not been included among local NDCs. The same

Climate Assessment Information and
Regional Policies
National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are policy driven
commitments that translate the NDCs into local and sectoral
actions. Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) are rights of
States to claim the necessary technology to comply with IPCC
recommendations. NDCs, NAPs and TNAs are three different,
but complementary, instruments that countries in LAC seek to
implement. While NDCs are designed to fulfill international
commitments, NAPs and TNAs reflect national capacities and
local vulnerabilities, yet to be targeted in IPCC assessments.
IPCC assessments are geographically and disciplinarily
skewed, strongly based on the most influential science
produced by developed countries (Vasileiadou et al., 2011),
with a disproportionate influence of formally educated and
economically advantaged groups (Castree et al., 2014). Thus,
as LAC contributions to SROCC have been limited (nine
authors from seven countries), the resulting recommendations
also lead to limited local application. Moreover, political
leadership in the region favors socio-economic policies over
environmental protection (e.g., Custer et al., 2018, in relation
to the UN 2030 Agenda). Yet NAPs generally show two main
pathways: while developed countries focus on economic risks
and opportunities, developing countries prioritize natural
resources and conservation (Alves et al., 2020). A clearer
connection between environmental threats and socio-economic
concerns must be established so regional leaders feel safer
and supported to make decisions. Local researchers should be
encouraged to work closely with communities and aid in bridging
knowledge gaps.
The IPCC epistemic community defines knowledge as
information published in peer-reviewed papers, generally
neglecting publications in other languages and other sources of
knowledge (traditional, indigenous, and local knowledge—ILK).
SROCC has made an effort to include ILK (Abram et al.,
2019) and yet LA-ILK’s representation was slim. One can argue
that SROCC has favored traditional, formally educated, and
economically advantaged groups as most scientific assessments
do (Castree et al., 2014) perpetuating cultural and geographical
imbalance. Representation matters and the participation of
Lead Authors from LAC in SROCC was also low. Ten out of
103 SROCC authors were self-identified as belonging to 8 LAC

3 https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx
4 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator
5 As expressed by the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity

of Cultural Expressions (Art. 4.8).
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TABLE 1 | Specific categories listed as targets to meet either UNFCCC’s climate targets or specific SDGs from 31 countries from Latin American and the Caribbean
region (LAC) according to the NDC Registry*. Countries are alphabetically listed. Economic indicators, i.e., Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Human
Development Index (HDI), and specific GDPs for 2017 and 2019 relative to overall world GDP estimates for these specific years were world extracted from World
Development Indicators**, at the World Bank website.
Categories
Countries

Risk
Gender Ocean Agenda Ecosystem Fisheries Interculturality Community Cryosphere
based
2030
based
management
and
adaptation
adaptation
coasts

Antigua &
Barbuda

1

1

1

1

Argentina

1

1

1

1

Bahamas

1

1

1

1

Barbados

1

1

1

Belize

1

1

1

Brazil

1

Chile

1

1

Colombia

1

1

Costa Rica

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1

Dominican
Republic

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

Grenada

1

1

Guatemala

1

1

Guyana

1

Haiti

1

1

Honduras

1

1

Jamaica

1

Mexico

1

Nicaragua

1

Panamá

1

Perú

1

Saint Kitts
and Nevis

1

1
1

0.78

1.02

3.00

1.76

0.83

0.82

−2.44

2.08

0.81

0.98

0.17

0.32

0.80

0.15

−0.18

−0.06

−1.27

1

0.51

0.76

0.24

0.30

−0.24

0.84

−0.11

−0.11

−0.16

0.75

−0.08

1.49

2.80

0.79

1.31

0.89

0.78

0.83

0.00

0.72

−3.28

2.62

3.52

0.74

1.65

3.16

0.57

0.75

0.27

−1.29

1.74

0.67

0.82

1.48

1

3.87

0.77

1.81

1.13

1

1.36

0.65

0.64

1.78

3.22

0.65

1.51

3.86

0.96

0.50

0.45

−2.31

3.08

0.62

1.45

0.78

0.50

0.73

0.23

0.19

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.93

0.77

0.44

−0.91

1

1

1

1

1

3.31

0.66

1.55

−4.03

1

1

1

1

1

1

3.81

0.79

1.79

1.05

0.83

0.75

0.39

0.41

−2.74

0.78

−1.29

1.65

2.96

0.75

1.39

0.98

0.66

0.72

0.31

0.12

0.76

0.72

0.36

−0.53

−2.77

0.78

−1.30

−0.29

0.76

0.00

0.00

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Suriname

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

2.17

1.77

1

St Vincent
and the
Grenadines

Venezuela

1

R_GDP R_GDP
2017
2019

−7.00

1

1

Saint Lucia

Trinidad &
Tobago

1

1

1

HDI
2017

−0.13
1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

Dominica

Ecuador

1

1

Cuba

El Salvador

1

GDP
2017

1

1

1

Note that negative scores are shown in red.
*https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx.
**https://ourworldindata.org/human-development-index and http://wdi.worldbank.org/.

countries6 (97% of the total authoring contribution). The USA
alone had 15 authors, in contrast with other LAC countries such
as Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago—the only SIDS regionally
represented—as well as Mexico and Brazil—two of the largest
and most populated countries in LA—which accounted for
one participant each. Apart from language and representation,

technical and scientific capacity deficiencies refrained researchers
in the region from contributing more (Polejack and Coelho,
2021).

Knowledge Production
Knowledge production of the ocean-climate nexus in LA insofar
as the uptake of such knowledge to national advisory exercises
is still incipient, possibly due to limited technical capacities
in the region combined with a deficient access to marine

6 These

countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru,
and Trinidad and Tobago.
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the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Small Island Developing
States, where development pressure and high social vulnerability
hamper ocean and climate sustained observations. These areas
should represent high monitoring priorities and efforts.

technologies and research platforms. International cooperation
aids local researchers to overcome such bottlenecks (Soler,
2021). Argentina, for example, has developed a national strategy
to strengthen marine research capabilities, allowing for better
coordination and optimization of resources, the “Pampa Azul”
initiative. However, seven years after its launching, economic
instability jeopardized investments, despite international
commitments. One current opportunity is the All-Atlantic
Ocean Research Alliance, a South to North multilateral
scientific cooperation open to countries in the region (Polejack
et al., 2021). It aligns research priorities, infrastructure, and
budget, to overcome the knowledge gaps in the Atlantic,
informing decisions for improved societal benefit. As a result,
the Alliance fosters marine technology transfer and balanced
knowledge co-production.
Use of regional knowledge is hindered in world assessments
for several reasons. Despite budget constraints, political and
economic instability, LAC researchers produce a wealth of
knowledge that often faces intra-academic barriers, such as
language (Angulo et al., 2021). Knowledge relevant to local
systems are often published in languages other than English
or outside of mainstream Journals receiving less attention by
peers and thus becoming invisible to global assessments like
SROCC. Therefore, local researchers are again critical to make
such knowledge visible to global reporting processes. Regional
ILK needs to permeate more effectively into global assessments
like IPCC and IPBES reports to complement classic scientific
information. At the same time, the results/findings from such
reports must return to local communities in a language that
both society and policymakers understand and relate to, so
that the uptake of such knowledge is enhanced. Science cannot
be detached from local realities, even if the final message
pertains to global effects. Translation of scientific knowledge
to local languages is certainly essential to allow for a more
equitable extraction of the information from these assessments
making calibrated language and the whole process more palatable
to the general public since its information is designed to
provide evidence, agreement and communicate uncertainties
(Mastrandrea et al., 2010) based on peer-reviewed research. By
adjusting the language, it allows the information and its flow
to be more inclusive and receptive to diversity, particularly
when interculturality is taken into account. Although many
perceive the region as sharing similar languages, geographies
and cultures, reality shows a huge diversity of languages and
cultures but also values and beliefs. Latin America and the
Caribbean are as diverse and wide as the geographic breadth and
ecosystems/biomes described in-between. Thus, climate change
perception of threats needs to account for local realities and
require larger representation of specific groups, knowledge and
traditions at different assessment processes.
Climate knowledge production is also dependent on
multiscale observing systems to produce accurate scenarios and
long-term predictions. Nevertheless, despite existing initiatives,
there are still considerable capacity and data gaps (Malone et al.,
2010; Foltz et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2019; Speich et al., 2019;
IOC-UNESCO, 2020) due to insufficient observations. These
gaps are particularly critical in coastal Africa, South America,

Frontiers in Climate | www.frontiersin.org

Knowledge Accessibility
Societal engagement is influential in science uptake to inform
decisions by pressing governments to act, as well as by
using scientific information to transform behavioral patterns
and foster climate and ocean literacy, and social innovation.
Consequently, inclusion and equity require accessible language
and capacity development. In socio-ecological systems, where
scientific uncertainty and societal stakes are high, values tend
to be in dispute and decisions are urgent. The Post-Normal
Science framework (PNS, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) proposes
a multi-stakeholder engagement in the decision making, jointly
considering the risks and opportunities to act. We need to
address social vulnerabilities at the local level to enhance and
sustain the engagement of LA in the green/blue economy. Thus,
PNS could be an adequate framework for developing SROCC’s
recommendations further.
Scientific knowledge used to be restricted to academic groups
and publications and discussed within invisible schools (Sieber,
1991). Recently, the Open Science Movement has attempted to
make this knowledge available to all (Aspesi and Brand, 2020).
Open Science is about making scientific research and data freely
accessible, but should also mean dialoguing with society, while
embracing ILK in support of better-informed decision making
(Oliver and Cairney, 2019; Safford and Brown, 2019).
Broad stakeholder engagement (affected communities,
indigenous peoples, local and regional representatives,
policy makers, managers, interest groups and organizations)
has the potential to combine and use relevant knowledge
(Obermeister, 2017) and balance the disproportionate influence
that economically advantaged groups have in most scientific
assessments (Castree et al., 2014). The formal process of IPCC
assessments follows predetermined formats and standards7,8
, uses specific calibrated language and approaches unfamiliar
to many scientists and policy makers in LA. Locally, there is
little interaction and support by IPCC focal points to promote
learning-oriented methodologies, familiarity with the language
and experience to address the IPCC process, hampering
regional/local participation. Although the recognition and use
of ILK is expanding in peer-reviewed research (Savo et al., 2016;
Abram et al., 2019) thus providing information and responses to
guide and inform policy with different perspectives (Huntington,
2011; Nakashima et al., 2012; Lavrillier and Gabyshev, 2018),
most global assessments have not yet incorporated ILK
information (Obermeister, 2017) thus limiting the potential of
local adaptation response (Ford et al., 2016).
Science diplomacy, the interrelation between research and
international relations, can reduce inequalities and bridge
communities by aiding in the implementation of international
7 https://www.ipcc.ch/documentation/procedures/
8 https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/09/ipcc-principles-appendix-afinal.pdf
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highly affecting society (IPCC, 2019b). Detection of climate
change in coastal regions is difficult because of their natural
variability, requesting long-term ocean observing systems
(Duarte et al., 2013; Turk et al., 2019). Globally coordinated
ocean observing systems provide the information needed to
support climate prediction on different timescales (e.g., Sloyan
et al., 2019). However, many existing records are still short
to detect anthropogenic change, and some regions remain
undersampled (e.g., deep-sea, shelves). Southern Hemisphere
temperate, subpolar and polar latitudes are among the least
studied areas of the planet, which represents a serious gap
to decrease the uncertainty of global models predicting future
climate scenarios (Meredith et al., 2019). Long-term data is
essential to measure changes to ecological and environmental
conditions, but also the outcome of policies and human
behavioral changes (Pecl et al., 2017). Thus, long-term ocean
observatories in LAC, combining environmental data (such
as Essential Ocean Variables-EOVs) with social sciences and
traditional knowledge need to be developed and implemented
(Abram et al., 2019; Fennel et al., 2019).
At the heart of climate change research is the requirement
of sustained observations with time series frequent and long
enough to develop baselines and climatologies. Baselines are
compared with anomalies, changes in phenology, trends or
changes in populations, and spatial distribution. Time series
enables us to characterize variability, reduce uncertainty, and
increase forecast and prediction which can guide the outcome
of policies and human behavioral and environmental change.
Bio-Environmental baselines and time series represent global
trends and local pressures that can be evaluated against
natural variation for policy and decision-making at many
levels (Muelbert et al., 2019). Integrative scenarios, combining
environmental, socioeconomic and health sciences, such as the
Nexus method (Howells et al., 2013), has been successfully
applied to climate and fisheries in the Humboldt Current
System (Garteizgogeascoa et al., 2020), in the assessment of
climate vulnerability in Brazil (Araujo et al., 2019), and in the
International Long-Term Ecological Research (LTER) programs
described in Muelbert et al. (2019) and detailed for LAC
in Table S2.
Consequently, better government climate-related decisions
are likely to occur when decision-makers are exposed to climate
scenarios and environmental indicators with dynamic outputs,
even in face of models’ limitations and potential risks of being
misused to support biased political statements (Saltelli et al.,
2020). According to Haasnoot et al. (2015), scenarios lead to
increased awareness of when and which adaptation policies
should be applied.

provisions aimed at leveraging scientific capabilities in LAC
(Ruffini, 2018; Salpin et al., 2018; Polejack and Coelho, 2021).
By incorporating scientific literature in other languages, other
sources of knowledge, and regional input, global assessments
like SROCC reduce most of its imbalance. The opportunity
presented by the UN Decade of Ocean Science (Ryabinin et al.,
2019; Polejack, 2021), particularly through the Ocean Literacy
movement seek creative ways to bridge science, policy, diplomacy
and society (Santoro et al., 2017; Borja et al., 2020).

Knowledge Impact to Policy Change
Climate change adaptation and mitigation requires coherence
of global, national, and local levels of governance, a challenge
to the integration of political and administrative systems. There
is a void between international treaties, national regulations,
and local implementation due to the lack of broad stakeholder
participation in the formulation of these policies, undermining
their adequacy (Keskitalo et al., 2016). The development of
effective responses involves societal adjustment and modification
of current behavior provoking such changes.
Scientific advice is playing an increasing role in policy
and decision-making (Gluckman, 2016a). Governments require
scientific evidence in a wide range of situations (e.g., Gluckman,
2016b), but there is still the need to respect the different
imperatives in science and in policy, so better-informed decisions
are made, and research is promoted and sustained in the longterm (Parkhurst, 2016).
Interculturality matters to LAC (UNDP, 2021) and has
been recognized as an important regional aspect that defines
local identity as reflected in a few NDCs. Thus, as scientists,
we must incorporate the local social, cultural, and political
forces to seek mutual understanding and cooperation to also
find solutions to climate change adaptation. Local institutional
and policymaking landscapes are determinant of how scientific
evidence is perceived and used in the decision-making process,
mostly because these decisions consider a wide range of factors
that are grounded on local realities, including social values and
beliefs (Cairney, 2016) and traditional and local knowledge,
reflected in the interculturality aspects brought by a few NDCs.
Latin America has a diversity of political systems that produce
and apply scientific evidence in a variety of ways, deriving
from national and subnational realities that often challenge
the Western-democratic perspective of the use of evidence, so
dominant in global reporting exercises (Parkhurst, 2016). Thus,
standard global solutions can become locally irrelevant and there
is a need to consider these realities when co-designing fit-forpurpose local solutions. In this sense, local actors (scientists, the
public and stakeholders) are better equipped to act as knowledge
brokers within their local social-political contexts.

Importance of Long-Term Monitoring for
Decision-Making

CONCLUSIONS

Long-term observations inform society about change rates in
ocean warming, sea-level rise, acidification, and deoxygenation
(Breitburg et al., 2018; Bourlès et al., 2019; Turk et al., 2019),
including coastal areas where the effects on ecosystems and
ecosystem services are often associated with social vulnerability,

Despite the efforts to disseminate, warn and engage as many
nations as possible in a global effort to reverse the course
of climate change, high inequality and low economic growth
in several regions are hampering the overall understanding,
integration, and engagement to mitigate climate effects, thus
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with a more diverse and multi knowledgeable approach
embracing local cultures, language, and broader participation of
local communities (Figure 1). Despite political and economic
limitations, the region must be integrated not only from a
commercial perspective of goods and services (i.e., Mercosur)
but also from an environmental standpoint to implement its
strategies against irreversible climate change. A few organizations
in the region could facilitate this coordination and strengthen
the participation of LAC representatives in global reporting
assessments such as SROCC. The InterAmerican Institute
for Global Change (IAI—Instituto InterAmericano para la
Investigación del Cambio Global) is a regional intergovernmental
organization that promotes interdisciplinary scientific research
and capacity building, informing local and regional decisionmakers about important issues of global change. Although the
IAI has mechanisms in place to provide scientific evidence for
the improvement of its Parties’ public policies, it is essentially
intergovernmental, i.e., triggered by diplomatic negotiations
that depend upon national mechanisms of integration with
other stakeholders. The Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) is also another important
intergovernmental organization in the region that could enhance
the coordination in climate change responses, significantly

perpetuating regional heterogeneity (UNDP, 2021). The goals
and specific objectives of climate change strategies around the
world tend to reflect a global agenda that, at least for LA,
are often detached from national/regional vulnerabilities and
contexts which in part respond to delayed actions. It needs
to change.
In order to reduce knowledge gaps in LA, there is a need
to secure investment in long-term observations and to promote
capacities, which will also raise the accuracy of models and
predictions. Sustainable research funding shall provide local and
regionally oriented information and advice. Moreover, successful
initiatives like Pampa Azul, AtlantOS, the All-Atlantic Ocean
Research Alliance, Rede Clima, Acceso Libre a la Información
Científica—ALICIA, the National Repository in Mexico and the
Cartagena Convention (Table S1) reflect State policies trying
to overcome bottlenecks in LA. The interruption of such
policies jeopardizes future investments and continuity of climate
action mitigation.
How would Latin America engage in climate action globally
while maintaining its identity and structure of interconnected
social, economic, and ecological systems? It is imperative to
develop specific national-institutional capacities and public
awareness to support and advance a long-term process

FIGURE 1 | Examples of current initiatives that can narrow the gaps and explore opportunities for the uptake of ocean and climate science to political decision making
in LA across five key categories: (i). climate assessment information and regional policies, (ii). knowledge production, (iii). knowledge accessibility, (iv). knowledge
impact to policy, and (v). long-term monitoring for decision-making. (Note see Table S1 for additional information and references).
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to the document, its revision, reading and approving the
submitted version.

contributing to regional knowledge production and public
policies, while promoting the transition to environmentally
sustainable and low carbon economies (UNDP, 2021). However,
both IAI and ECLAC apply similar diplomatic processes as
the IPCC and the UNFCCC, with little synergy with local
stakeholders. Moreover, neither have a climate (not to mention
ocean) focus and not all countries in the region are Parties to
those organizations. Therefore, while we recognize that regional
organizations can aid in bridging global, regional and national
perspectives based in science, we advocate that local researchers
can act as knowledge brokers and should be empowered,
encouraged, rewarded and better included in global climateocean scientific assessments.
Addressing climate change entails modifying the status
quo facing resistance from influential groups in society that
interfere with the development of local climate change policies
(Meadowcroft, 2009). In this perspective, we advocate that the
uptake of SROCC findings in LA policies can be enhanced
by: (a) embracing local realities and knowledge purveyors; (b)
empowering locals to both inform local knowledge to global
assessments and adapt those findings to local realities; (c)
enhancing regional research capabilities; and (d) securing ocean
observations for the long run. The adoption and incorporation
of SROCC’s recommendations into NDCs depend strongly
on the local reality which is dictated by the relationship
between adaptation-related processes (social vulnerability, low
growth, as well as high contrasts and inequalities) and
political pressures.
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ABSTRACT
Integrated Ecosystem Assessment (IEA) is designed to be an inclusive, evidencebased process to engage stakeholders, in the support of ecosystem-based
management. IEA is resource intensive, requiring the engagement of personnel,
experts from many disciplines, public and private institutions, and including issues
of technology, infrastructure, capacity building, etc. Stakeholders such as policy
decision makers and scientists in influential decision making roles often determine
the level of investment when committing to an IEA. It is thus critical to understand
how these specific stakeholders understand and perceive IEA, as well as their
motivations for engagement. We interviewed government officials, science
managers and researchers whose decisions are critical for mobilizing resources
(time, expertise and funding) in support of ecosystem based management (and
potentially IEA) in the Atlantic Ocean. The interviews aimed at documenting their
perceptions of IEA, and their motivations to engage in the process. Our results show
that most of these research and policy stakeholders are generally unaware of, or have
misconceptions about IEA concepts. Moreover, many seem to perceive IEAs as still
unfit to address most policy and managerial goals. We discuss our results in light of
Postcolonial theory, and suggest ways to improve transboundary collaboration on
1

marine IEAs that meet the needs of a broader range of stakeholders. We suggest
how improving inclusivity and applying ocean science diplomacy can help to
support IEA through negotiating, strengthening and diversifying the involvement of
international stakeholders, and can likewise bolster the salience, legitimacy and
credibility of IEA among stakeholders. This article is part of the Mission Atlantic
Project (Horizon 2020) which is designed to conduct IEAs in the Atlantic Ocean.

KEYWORDS
Ecosystem-based management, All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance, decision
making, science-policy interface, science diplomacy

INTRODUCTION
Ecosystem based management and the governance of human activities requires
inclusive approaches that engage stakeholders from across disciplines, geographies,
sectors, cultures, genders, and generations (Wisz et al., 2020). Integrated Ecosystem
Assessment (hereafter IEA) is an interdisciplinary and participatory process that
engages stakeholders to support ecosystem-based management. IEA has been
adopted by the UN Environment Program (UNEP, 2022), the International Council
for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) (Walther & Möllmann, 2014) and the US
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Harvey, Kelble, &
Schwing, 2017). IEA has been promoted as an effective evidence and ecosystembased approach to develop policy-relevant recommendations about the state of the
environment and its interaction with human activities (Harvey et al., 2017; Walther
& Möllmann, 2014). Participants of an IEA process seek to combine, interpret, and
communicate knowledge in order to define courses of action in a given
environmental management challenge (Levin et al., 2009; ICES, 2012a; DickeyCollas, 2014; Levin et al., 2014; Samhouri et al., 2014; Harvey et al., 2017).
Moreover, those engaged in an IEA process seek to evaluate management strategies
together with the possible outcomes (via trade-offs) derived from the agreed
managerial measures (Levin et al., 2009; ICES, 2012a; Dickey-Collas, 2014; Levin
et al., 2014; Samhouri et al., 2014; Harvey et al., 2017).

Engagement in the IEA process
IEA is a stepwise process that includes: 1. a scoping phase to identify the goals of
ecosystem-based management and threats to achieving these goals, 2. the
development of ecosystem indicators and targets, 3. a risk analysis, 4. an assessment
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of scenarios relative to ecosystem-based management goals, and 5. the monitoring
of indicators (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The Integrated Ecosystem Assessment cycle adapted from Levin et al. (2014).

The first phase of the IEA process is the scoping phase, and is the part of the IEA
process where relevant stakeholders are identified and engaged to negotiate and
formulate the IEA objectives, along with the necessary knowledge to be provided
(Levin et al., 2014). During the IEA process, stakeholders are requested to identify
the appropriate scale to define management objectives (Samhouri et al., 2014), and
the strategies to exchange the IEA information with decision-making processes
(Harvey et al., 2017).
Failure to engage in the IEA process potentially weakens the inclusivity and the
effectiveness of the scoping phase, which is the foundation of the entire IEA process
(Levin et al., 2014). Stakeholders who do not engage in the IEA will lack the
evidence base needed to inform decisions that could support their own interests.
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Moreover, failure of some stakeholders to engage in IEA could undermine the
potential for IEA to help achieve shared ecosystem based management objectives
in a region (and beyond) (deReynier, Levin, & Shoji, 2010). A lack of clarity on the
purpose and need of IEA can be detrimental to the process (Harvey et al., 2017), in
particular, due to its relevance for operationalizing ecosystem-based management
principles (Dickey-Collas, 2014; Levin et al., 2009). Unveiling individuals’
perception of and the need for IEAs is critical to understanding the values they place
in engaging in the process. Thus, it is useful to assess how policy decision-makers
and scientists empowered to deploy resources for cross-border science collaboration
understand and value the IEA process. It is likewise useful to understand what
factors motivate them to commit resources to IEA activities.

IEA and science diplomacy
Ocean natural processes do not adhere to national jurisdictions (Ranganathan,
2020), and for this reason, international science is needed to support the objectives
of many marine IEA initiatives (Polejack, 2021). IEA objectives are rooted in
societal challenges that require an ecosystem-based management solution, advised
by scientific evidence and traditional knowledge (Rudd et al., 2018). In the cases
where an IEA occurs across jurisdictions or in international spaces, such objectives
require international engagement and action.
Because of the transboundary and international nature of many marine IEAs, ocean
science diplomacy, can potentially play an important role in facilitating such
initiatives. Ocean science diplomacy refers to the interaction between marine
research and international relations. Ocean science diplomacy can involve issues of
evidence provision, the balance of national versus international interests, and/or
power dynamics involving scientific matters between countries (Polejack, 2021).
First, evidence provision to international decision-making is perhaps the most
commonly known feature of ocean science diplomacy, e.g. data on fish populations
to determine fishing quotas. Second (and less visible), less commonly considered is
the research regarding the balancing of national interests (e.g. exploitation of marine
resources for economic profit), with more global interests (e.g. ocean conservation).
In cases where these interests clash, power conflicts may emerge. For example, the
fishing industry of a given country will most probably show interest to engage in
the diplomatic negotiation concerning the establishment of no-take zones or marine
protected areas, seeking to avoid an overlap with lucrative fishing sites. This specific
industry’s interest may then become a national interest to be supported and defended
by diplomacy. Alternatively, that specific ocean site may become the subject of
global interest due to its strategic provision of other ecosystem services, such as
biodiversity conservation or climate change mitigation. Finally, power dynamics
involving scientific matters between countries can come into play whereby ocean
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science diplomacy can become a soft form of power (Nye, 2017). For example,
better scientifically equipped countries can use their national science assets to
seduce other countries and attract investment and talents to empower domestic
science systems and raise competitiveness (Fedoroff, 2009; Nye & Welch, 2017).
IEA is a relatively new concept, and there are so far no clear examples where
political tensions have hampered specific IEA efforts. However, power disputes can
critically influence area-based management exercises, such as Marine Spatial
Planning (Ramírez-Monsalve & van Tatenhove, 2020).
The Atlantic Ocean presents a useful opportunity to examine how research and
policy stakeholders perceive international IEAs. The Atlantic is the second largest
ocean basin and has the world’s longest running history of international IEA, mostly
done in the North (Levin et al., 2014). For example, NOAA has been a strong
advocate for applying IEAs to fisheries management (Harvey et al., 2017; Muffley
et al., 2021; NOAA, 2022), while ICES is seeking to expand IEAs to sectors beyond
fisheries (Dickey-Collas, 2014; ICES, 2019; Walther & Möllmann, 2014). The
alignment of Canada, the European Union, and the United States of America
through the Galway Statement has reinforced the importance of IEAs in support of
better ocean management and cross-disciplinary research (Link et al., 2019; Rudd
et al., 2018; Wisz et al., 2020). In the South, the work jointly done by Angola,
Namibia and South Africa in managing marine resources through the Benguela
Current Convention has shown how delicate an ecosystem assessment can become
when dealing with economical assets in face of the consequences of climate change
(de Barros Neto et al., 2016).
The Belem statement is an agreement that aims to support scientific collaboration
in the South and North Atlantic by establishing the All-Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance, a cooperative international arrangement with the aim of enhancing
citizens' wellbeing, grounded in joint marine research efforts (Polejack, Gruber, &
Wisz, 2021). The European Commission, in support of the Alliance, has also
contributed major funding to support the development of Atlantic-scale IEA, as by
the Mission Atlantic project1. It is however poorly understood how policy decision
makers and leading scientists in the Atlantic understand and prioritize the IEA
process.
This paper investigates the diversity of perceptions of IEA among a sample of
research and policy stakeholders across the Atlantic, and the inherent implications
that these perceptions might pose to the development of IEAs. This paper analyses
the perceptions of a particular set of research and policy stakeholders, which include
research leaders and high-level decision-makers. These stakeholders’ values can
potentially influence the level of commitment directed toward the IEA process, and
1

https://missionatlantic.eu/ accessed on June 15, 2022
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its success. This study is part of the Mission Atlantic project, which aims to
operationalize IEAs through case studies from the North and South Atlantic, in
support of ecosystem-based management in the Atlantic and the All-Atlantic Ocean
Research Alliance.

METHODS
Our goal was to understand how individuals with positions of power and influence
in the Atlantic Ocean perceive IEAs. We selected individuals engaged in negotiating
and implementing the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance among government
officials and researchers. We conducted twenty semi-structured interviews with
government officials (13 interviewees) and researchers (07 interviewees) from
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United
States of America, and the European Commission. We focused on government
officials who hold decision-making roles important to the allocation of resources for
IEAs (human and financial). We also focused on research leaders, as those leading
research projects, groups or institutions working on the science-policy interface in
the Atlantic Ocean. We expect that their perceptions of IEA matter in terms of
committing time, resources and personnel to the process.
The general profile of the interviewed government officials were decision makers
who occupy high-level positions in national ocean-related science systems,
including Science and Technology State Secretaries and Ministers, directors,
science managers and diplomats. These government officials are budget owners,
agenda setters, and report to the high levels of governments (e.g., Head of State or
Ministers). Unlike “mid-level technocrats” (Jasanoff, 1998) who would be
personally participating in an IEA process, our interviewees are not expected to take
a seat at the IEA table, but rather be fed by the results of IEAs and capable of
determining further engagement. The general profile of the interviewed researcher
is that of a person who has gained extensive, and high profile experience in
international scientific cooperation by coordinating cross-boundary research
projects and scientific programs, and engages across large international marine
research institutes in the Atlantic.
The first author of this publication was personally involved in negotiating the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance. His positionality has facilitated the identification
and engagement with interviewees. The first author also conducted the interviews,
and it is believed that this pre-existing level of trust and acquaintance facilitated
access to the interviewees, and their openness and sincerity when answering the
interview questions. The first author also analyzed the results. The first author
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positionality can thus place him as an insider researcher (as per Merriam et al.,
2001).
The first author carried out twelve face-to-face interviews during the All-Atlantic
Forum2 (Brussels, February 2020), before COVID-19 travel restrictions were in
force. After that, from April to October 2020, the remaining eight interviews could
only be carried out online (via the Zoom platform). Interviews consisted of a set of
nine questions, from which six were common to all subjects and the remaining three
were specific to each category of interviewee (government officials and
researchers). These questions were aimed at investigating the overall perception of
science diplomacy and the specific issue of IEA was explored by two questions: 1)
In your opinion, what is international IEA? and 2) how should the success of IEA
be measured? These interviews were performed in the context of collecting
perceptions about ocean science diplomacy. IEAs were dealt with within this
context. Results pertaining broader perceptions on ocean science diplomacy are the
focus of a different paper.
The interviews were conducted both in English and in Portuguese and were fully
transcribed in their original language. Translation from Portuguese to English was
only done to present extracts in this paper. To preserve the anonymity of the
interviewees, the names of the interviewees were replaced with numbers, shown in
brackets after each quote, along with their functional role (researcher or government
official).
The data were approached by grounded theory (Bryman, 2012, pp. 567–570) and
MAXQDA Plus 2020 (Release 20.4.1) software was used to support our analysis.
Codes identified in the data were revised multiple times and clustered in themes,
which were again revised and used to guide our analysis, as per thematic analysis
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). We present the resulting themes as subsections of the
Results section below and in Table 1.

RESULTS
In general, interviewees expressed being unfamiliar with the IEA concepts and how
the process is conducted. Neither government officials, nor the researchers
interviewed claimed to have actively participated in an IEA process. Some
interviewees stated being entirely unaware of IEAs. Thus, the perceptions we
collected come from the moment of the interviews, where many government
officials and researchers were introduced to IEA for the first time. However, this
lack of clarity and experience on the IEA framework did not impede these
2

https://allatlanticocean.org/view/atlanticforums/2020-brussels, accessed in Nov.18, 2021
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individuals to share their beliefs of what an IEA should or not entail. The data
presented here do not represent the view of experienced research and policy
stakeholders who were personally involved in an IEA. Moreover, the results do not
attempt to suggest a generalization of our findings. Rather, results should be viewed
as a point in time and reporting from non-experienced individuals’ perceptions of
IEAs. These specific individuals are, however, influential in the context of the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance and their perceptions can facilitate the
engagement and investment in IEAs in the region.
The codes derived from the interviews were clustered around seven themes,
summarized and presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Summarized results showing the main themes identified, key results emerging from those themes, an
exemplary quote and whether the result was more frequent amongst government officials, researchers or both.
Theme

Key result

Exemplary quote

Uncertainty about the
IEA concept

The lack of clear
understanding of the IEA
process, its limitations, and
benefits

“I'm certain there's a good definition of it and a
good description, but I suppose that's about
as far as my conceptualization of it goes”

IEA as a resource
management tool

IEA seen more as a tool to
manage marine resources
rather than unveiling
ecosystems' complexities

“So for me, it's looking at this resource multidimensionally, not just looking at it through
one lens”

IEA as a way to
understand and manage
nature’s complexity

Recognition of the human
limitations to assess the
complexity of ecosystems

“Ecosystems don't know no boundaries. The
boundaries are put up in there by our
knowledge paradigms. (...) the world itself in
the nature in which it's working, it's already
integrated. So we need to find a rubric, a
methodology that helps us to understand this
holistic part of it”

Managing human as
part of the ecosystem

IEA is about managing human
activities rather than
managing nature

“Fisheries management is mostly about
managing fishermen, harvesters, not about
managing the fish at all. Fish are just the kind
of the outcome. They're part of the story”

Managing resources that
have economic value

Results arising from IEAs
should be tailored to address
resource management and
governance decisions

“Eventually, there will be a value placed on
(...) looking at the economic and monetary
aspects of systemic views of ecological
ecosystem”

Integrating knowledge

A call for breaking boundaries
and working across disciplines
and sectors while assessing
marine ecosystems

“It requires really different sectors, different
disciplines to work together, which then
translates as well into... when you
operationalize it, that you need different
policymakers, you need different funding
agencies”

IEA does not offer a one-sizefits-all solution

“there's sometimes too much enthusiasm for
the idea that there's an optimal solution to
what is ultimately not a tractable problem that
can go back to having the solution. That there
isn't an activity that you could set a target
level that will guarantee some particular
outcome”

The challenges of an
ecosystem-based
approach
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1. Uncertainty about the IEA concept
Most interviewees premised their answers to IEA questions with the caveat that they
lacked a clear understanding of IEA concepts and methods. This was the case for
both government officials and researchers we interviewed. Often, interviewees
explained that IEA was not their expertise, nor part of their routine work. One
official stated:
“I'm certain there's a good definition of it and a good description, but I suppose that's
about as far as my conceptualization of it goes” (Respondent 18, government
official).
“It's a term that often confuses me when people use it. And there's a whole lot of other
information in that, that is not my expertise. And I can't even begin to comprehend
what you would need to actually measure the success of something like that.”
(Respondent 19, researcher)

2. IEA as a resource management tool
In spite of a lack of clarity on the IEA concepts and process, interviewees showed
preconceived beliefs on what IEA would entail and what it was meant to achieve.
To these individuals, IEA is mainly perceived as a marine resource management
tool. For example:
“So for me, it's looking at this resource multi-dimensionally, not just looking at it
through one lens” (Respondent 12, government official)
“it's fundamentally just about recognizing the complexity of the environment that we
are managing. Fisheries management is more than just about managing fish. But our
point would be that fisheries management is mostly about managing fishermen,
harvesters, not about managing the fish at all. Fish are just the kind of the outcome.
They're part of the story” (Respondent 9, researcher)

Another perception brought by interviewees was about IEA being an area-based
managerial tool. In this sense, one of the roles of the IEA is to assess specific
geographical areas to be applied in area-based management processes, such as
Marine Spatial Planning and coastal zoning.
“So we have to be more flexible on what we call this animal but I think at the end of
the day it is about zoning, thinking about the entrusted real estate that you have in the
ocean and how you really want to manage or interact with it in a sustainable way”
(Respondent 10, researcher).
“You sit down and look at an area, see what the activities are, and you try to decide
for that country, for that community, without purely lobbying and economic
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influences, which makes sense, right? So, where is each area, what each area is going
to be intended for. What is best to do, what is best not to do, right, so that the fauna
and flora can recover, and everything else.” (Respondent 13, government official).

3. IEA as a way to understand and manage nature’s complexity
Interviewees communicated a belief that IEAs are designed to assess and report on
the complex connectivity found in nature. Researchers were more inclined to
express the complex linkages between ecosystem components, and the role that IEA
can play in understanding and managing these complexities. For example, a
researcher stated:
“IEA is complex because it tries to see all the possible impacts of an action, not just
one or two aspects, but really all the aspects that can affect an ecosystem, a landscape,
etc...” (Respondent 7, researcher).

Government officials expressed a certain degree of confusion and skepticism when
addressing the complexity of nature. For example:
“(…) ecosystems are integrated anyway, so I'm not sure that makes immediate sense
to me” (Respondent 18, government official).
“I've never heard or read about integrated ecosystem, but all ecosystems need to be
integrated.” (Respondent 15, government official)

According to one government official, IEA is:
“a flexible way of beginning to vision (sic) how the wild itself operates. Ecosystems
don't know no (sic) boundaries. The boundaries are put up in there by our knowledge
paradigms. We like classifying these kinds of things and so to that extent we create
the need for an integrated but the world itself in the nature in which it's working, it's
already integrated” (Respondent 16, government official).

The belief that IEAs are designed to assess and report on the natural
interconnectedness of nature seems to be related to the adoption of concepts that are
artificially created by humans. As suggested by respondent 16 above, this can be a
paradigm created by humans in an attempt to frame the complexity of nature so we
are capable of understanding it. Another official challenged the dominant
conceptualization of ecosystem:
“[ecosystem] is one dimension of a much bigger set of integrated systems where what
we understand an ecosystem to mean is going to change (...) as having a value in
itself or having a function on production supplies (...) in terms of the basic processing
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that ecosystems achieve as part of the services that it provides to us” (Respondent 4,
government official).

4. Managing humans as part of the ecosystem
While the interviewed government officials tended to understand the IEA as a tool
to report on the state of the marine environment, in particular from the perspective
of providing services to humans, researchers brought forward the notion that
humans are an intrinsic part of those ecosystems. Therefore, assessing ecosystems
would mean also assessing human dimensions found within them as part.
Consequently, to the interviewed researchers, IEA would be a tool to understand the
impacts of human activities on the environment, and to manage them. For example:
“it's a struggle because the word ecosystem means a lot of different things to people
(...) and what was (…) most useful in what we brought to the Minister, was to
recognize that humans are included in the ecosystem and that most environmental
management is about managing human behavior” (Respondent 9, researcher).

5. Managing resources that have economic value
Interviewed officials seemed more likely than researchers to attach the goals of an
IEA to the economic value of marine resources. This concern was also translated
when linking IEAs to political objectives. To those officials, results arising from
IEAs should be fit-for-purpose in aiding decision making mainly about resource
management.
“Eventually, there will be a value placed on that and (...) [we] need to be looking at
the economic and monetary aspects of systemic views of ecological ecosystem”
(Respondent 4, government official).
“We have to understand the value of what the condition at that ecosystem is.”
(Respondent 6, government official)

Researchers rarely brought political and economic issues upfront when explaining
their views of IEAs, but one in particular stressed the need for governments to take
more responsibility in managing marine resources, stating:
“The government has to establish some kind of rules. And of course, the government
has to control what is happening there. So you have to have a complete monitoring
of the area in order to control what is happening there. They have to have much more
responsibility” (Respondent 11, researcher).
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6. Integrating other knowledge
Both Government officials and researchers have expressed the need to brake
boundaries and work across different disciplines and sectors when assessing marine
ecosystems:
“It requires really different sectors, different disciplines to work together, which then
translates as well into... when you operationalize it, that you need different
policymakers, you need different funding agencies, and that is the complexity”
(Respondent 2, government official).
“so, I come in from the physics. I think it's really important to start connecting. So
we are doing a lot of that, like, doing more multidisciplinary analysis and to try to
understand how the environment... In the end, the variability of the physical
components are providing for the environment, for the ecosystems.” (Respondent 20,
researcher)

According to some government officials, transdisciplinarity in the IEAs should go
beyond knowledge disciplines, but also incorporate other frameworks. In their
perspective, these other frameworks would include the United Nations (UN) 2030
Agenda (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)), the World Ocean Assessment
(United Nations, 2021), and also the IPCC reports (e.g., IPCC, 2019):
“I think the national level is quite important, but in the international level you would
also have maybe the use of the sustainable development goals and reports to the UN
that possibly could be used with the various indicators. Each of the goals would have
a set of indicators and reporting against those indicators could provide some sense of
how that integrated ecosystem approach implementation is going on, whether it's
been achieved or not” (Respondent 12, government official).
“First of all, if you take the general assessment, the UN assessment of the ocean
status, you have an established methodology. The other one is the IPCC. You take
the SDGs and the different indicators. Then, you might have different key
performance indicators related to performance required at national level, so you have
again a whole series of descriptors there. So, we have enough, we have all these
existing frameworks. What is always missing is: how is this actually implemented?”
(Respondent 2, government official).

7. The challenges of an ecosystem-based approach
To most of the interviewees, IEA should be a beneficial tool for decision-making.
However, on several occasions, interviewees made reference to the challenges
associated with using IEA for managerial decisions. For example, a government
official stated:
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“When I see in my own country our fisheries folks who are leading integrated
ecosystem assessments and I see how slow it is to get people to migrate from a
fisheries-based ecosystem to a totality of the ecosystem, it's frustrating. It takes a long
time for that level of focus to change its direction” (Respondent 3, government
official).

Another official illustrated the inefficiencies of the current management system:
“as an RFMO (Regional Fisheries Management Organization manager) said: we
closed the fisheries for this species, it's been 10 years. And the species doesn't
recover. Why doesn't it recover? Because it's not fishing, it's climate change, it's oil,
it's shipping... so this stock will never recover, because it's not impacted by how much
we're fishing. So, it's no use” (Respondent 13, government official).

One researcher shares this frustration:
“I think there's sometimes too much enthusiasm for the idea that there's an optimal
solution to what is ultimately not a tractable problem. That there isn't an activity that
you could set a target level that will guarantee some particular outcome. That's just
not possible because there are too many movable pieces in the system, but I think it's
much better to talk about ecosystems approaches than it is to talk about single species
or even multi-species approaches” (Respondent 9, researcher).

DISCUSSION
The researchers and government officials we interviewed have a lack of familiarity
with the IEA framework. They also stated not having participated in an IEA before.
In spite of their lack of familiarity with IEA, interviewees expressed preconceived
concepts on what an IEA should entail. These individual’s perceptions expose their
understanding and values placed to IEAs as a non-experienced public. Their
perceptions matter because of their influence in the Atlantic Ocean community.
These stakeholders are agenda-setters, budget holders, science managers and
influential researchers with the capacity to influence the allocation of resources for
IEA. Therefore, our results do not represent a generalization of any population, but
rather individual insights that compose their truths and understandings of IEAs. This
is the framework by which we discuss the results.

The importance of understanding the IEA
Although IEA is considered among the scientific community as a well understood
concept, and features prominently in the discourse of organizations such as ICES,
UN Environment, and NOAA (Levin et al., 2014), interviewees declared being
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unfamiliar with the IEA concept. This highlights the need to discuss and harmonize
all participants of the IEA process in defining central concepts before all else.
Although these individuals state being unfamiliar with IEA techniques, their
perception aligns with current descriptions of a process by which fit-for-purpose
research is delivered to decision making, mainly regarding marine resource
management (Long, Charles, & Stephenson, 2015). This view produces an
expectation that science will deliver the necessary answers to a more sustainable
ocean management in the Atlantic. Researchers we interviewed expressed concern
over the inherent complexity of nature, which challenges science when presenting
possible managerial paths. Government officials who we assessed seek solutions
from science to enhance sustainable economic development, despite the
uncertainties that science seeks to unveil. Our results provide evidence of this clash
in the expectations that these government officials and scientists have of the
outcomes of IEAs.

Expectations of an IEA
In general, interviewees were skeptical about the capacity of IEA to deliver a silver
bullet solution to design relevant actions towards marine sustainability. Government
officials expressed concerns over IEAs being isolated from political ends, including
economic development. Researchers seemed to be concerned about possible
misinterpretations about the limits of IEAs by decision makers and wider society.
Although both government officials and researchers advocated for the adherence of
IEA to broader societal benefit, they seem to conceptualize this societal benefit
differently. To interviewed researchers, this benefit would accrue from safeguarding
the ecological environment. To officials, social benefit would come from the
economic, yet sustainable, exploitation of marine resources. Both perceptions are
complementary in an IEA process, but our results reinforce the importance of
harmonizing concepts, goals and expectations from all actors involved.

The meaning given to IEA
To our interviewees, which all participate in the All-Atlantic Ocean Research
Alliance, IEAs tend to be seen more as Integrated Assessments of Human Threats.
Consequently, interviewees reflected a utilitarian view of the ocean, whereby
humans act as engineers of nature, with the power to both disturb and manage it.
This finding aligns with the ideas of human dominance and ownership over nature,
with a resulting responsibility over our actions (Ludwig et al., 2021). The improved
understanding of the natural events of the marine environment come as a second
goal, as a means to identify a feasible level of human exploitation of the marine
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environment. According to this perspective, the IEA process would prioritize the
assessment of ecosystem components linked to service provision to humans.
Throughout the interviews, these individuals have challenged presupposed
concepts, such as “ecosystem”, stating that these mean different things to different
stakeholders. To the interviewed government officials, IEA seeks to find
sustainable, but also profitable ways of leveraging ecosystem services for societal
benefit. In this case, ecosystems are manageable. To researchers, what is
manageable in fact is human activity, not ecosystems and their services. Thus, these
conflicting perceptions will probably impact communication throughout the IEA
process when bridging communities that have different understandings of
ecosystems and IEA. There is a need to make sure that all participants engaged in
an IEA have a common understanding of the adopted IEA concepts and what is
reasonable to achieve from the IEA.

The importance of the scoping phase
As our interviews have indicated, combining government officials and scientists is
not a usual, easy task. Both communities value IEAs differently and communication
needs to be secured in order to properly address each groups’ concerns. For this
dialogue to occur, all relevant stakeholders need to be engaged and participating in
the IEA process, otherwise the whole IEA process runs the risk of resulting in an
exclusively academic activity. In the IEA process (Figure 1), the scoping phase is a
determinant step to properly identify and engage the most relevant actors. In this
phase, participants engage in negotiations about the scope, the target, the scale and
all necessary steps to be done in an IEA. Similar to most negotiations, stakeholders’
interests and expectations can clash and create conflicts that can put in risk the whole
IEA process (Furnham & Boo, 2011). It is therefore essential to identify these
conflicts and make sure that relevant evidence is generated by the IEA and
expectations are equally shared amongst those involved.
Best practices for cross disciplinary stakeholder inclusion (e.g., Land et al., 2017;
Oates & Dodds, 2017; Ostrom, 2014) should be applied during the scoping phase
of the IEA process. Although these best practices for stakeholder inclusion are well
established (e.g. Ostrom et al 2014) many stakeholders expressed frustration
concerning the lack of inclusivity in the scoping phase of IEA.
The scoping phase of the IEA needs thus to be a safe, open and committed space by
which the inherent limits of the proposed assessment are disclaimed and dealt with,
transparently. We advocate that neutral, professional mediators should be involved
in the scoping phase of any IEA, using exercises for enhanced trust-building and
dialogue, so participants would feel safe in sharing perspectives.
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Transdisciplinarity as a principle for IEA
Many interviewees highlighted the importance of transdisciplinary science (as
described in Jahn, Bergmann, & Keil, 2012) to the success of IEAs. Many
transdisciplinary research efforts fail to secure the sufficiently balanced
participation from the various disciplines and stakeholders (Kelly et al., 2019). This
weakens the potential for research to address the social, environmental and
economic aspects of sustainability challenges that must be addressed by IEAs. In
addition, navigating transdisciplinarity across scientific disciplines is not enough to
a few interviewees. In their view, integration in IEA should embed all available
knowledge sources, including the outcomes of international reports such as the
Sustainable Development Goals and the World Ocean Assessment (United Nations,
2021). Transdisciplinarity in IEA should not be constructed as an exclusive
endeavor of scientists and government officials, but rather welcome other ways of
knowing. Such inclusivity is supported by scholarship (e.g., Fischer et al., 2022;
Wisz et al., 2020).

What “Integrated” means in the IEA
This feature was highlighted several times, in particular among the interviewed
government officials. In these official’s perspectives, IEA should go beyond
integrating knowledge of the marine environment. To them, IEAs would be one
component of a much broader system that includes production, distribution and
other economic value chains of marine resources. Such a “system of systems” would
enhance economic profit at the lowest environmental cost. According to this
perspective, IEAs should provide sufficient information about the environmental
components affecting resource exploitation, so this information could be integrated
to other assessments, such as those that are more economic-oriented. Following this
line of thought, IEAs would serve the market, that is, contradictory to the view that
IEA findings are intended to lead the market to adapt to ocean thresholds
(Rockström et al., 2009). Therefore, among the Atlantic stakeholders we
interviewed, IEA may be perceived as tool for finding solutions that maximize
profit, while minimizing loss to environmental health. The question remains on how
to define which level of loss of environmental health would be acceptable, or how
to refrain economic activities to allow ecosystem recovery in the IEA process
(Martin, Maris, & Simberloff, 2016; UNEP, 2021).

Decolonizing IEAs
Post-colonial theory is an interesting perspective to discuss these results. Postcolonialism assumes a western dominance in shaping a value system by which we
make sense of reality (Césaire, 1955; Harding, 2011; Said, 1978). Post-colonialism
16

explains, for example, how we came to perceive natural resources as inexhaustible.
This perception of nature as a cornucopia partially derives from the notion that
colonies were abundant in resources and were to be explored in exhaustion without
much consequences since the environment would be resilient enough to serve the
crown (Fanon, 1965). Thus, Post-colonial theory provides an interesting approach
to unveil the basis of the western value system when it comes to face the challenges
of developing a sustainable future and to redesign our very own relationship with
nature, core to IEA.
When we position nature as a separate entity to humans, we adopt a binary logic
that triggers issues of superiority and dominance. Humans, in this view, are superior
to nature since we are capable of managing it, as our interviewees, particularly
government officials, seemed to perceive. According to our interviews, IEA is
perceived as a tool to assess how humans can leverage the provision of services and
goods from the ocean while keeping it in a sufficiently good environmental status.
Decolonizing IEAs would require that stakeholders see themselves as just another
part of the natural world, and not a steward separate from it.
IEA depends on successful participatory approaches, and must be decolonized to
have legitimacy. Principles of environment justice and equity should be front and
center in international IEAs (Bennett, 2022). This should include the identification,
engagement and empowerment of minorities and disadvantaged groups among the
stakeholders to be voiced and equitably represented when designing IEAs.

International IEAs and Ocean Science Diplomacy
Interviewees did not explicitly refer to international IEAs in their responses.
However, the broader interview was conducted in such a context and international
elements seem to be important in the case of IEAs in the Atlantic. Interviewees
expressed the ambition of promoting dialogue among communities and engaging
these voices in the IEA process. In addition, the interests of the private sector, of
social actors and other stakeholders not focused by this study can trigger conflicts
with negative impacts to the IEA process. Therefore, we find the framework
provided by science diplomacy to be relevant to discuss international IEAs.
Transboundary marine IEAs, as those conducted under the Mission Atlantic project,
are complex due to the potential for conflict between different national interests at
play, generally dealt with by diplomacy. Diplomatic environmental negotiations are
highly supported by scientific findings as science provides information on the state
of the marine environment, on the human threats and on options to manage such
threats (Holford & Nichols, 2017).
As suggested by interviewees, IEAs should be integrated with other marine
management frameworks, such as area-based management initiatives like Marine
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Spatial Planning and coastal zoning. The IEA process holds similarities with these
area-based management tools, particularly regarding participation and collective
decision-making. Power struggles have been reported to be critical to marine spatial
planning (Ramírez-Monsalve & van Tatenhove, 2020). Therefore, one could expect
a similar context in an IEA where acknowledging and managing power conflicts
become paramount.
Ocean science diplomacy (Polejack, 2021) can provide a framework to study the
multi-actor dynamics of those engaged in international IEAs. It provides a new
perspective on the power play underlying the negotiations of international IEAs.
Through ocean science diplomacy, regulatory frameworks, such as international
legal regimes or States’ practices, can be better addressed in an IEA. Apart from
producing the relevant scientific evidence in an IEA, there is also the issue of
communicating this evidence so it impacts the policy formulation. Once again,
ocean science diplomacy adheres to the objectives of transboundary IEAs by
combining elements of international relations scholarship with political sciences and
science and technology studies. Lastly, international IEAs could be enhanced by
including the training and expertise of diplomats, in particular negotiation and
mediation techniques, which also falls into the scope of ocean science diplomacy.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the perceptions of government officials and scientists on the
meaning of Integrated Ecosystem Assessments (IEA) in the context of the AllAtlantic Ocean Research Alliance. Most of the interviewees stated not having had
previous experience with IEAs, and being generally unaware of IEAs concepts and
process. However, this lack of understanding of IEA was no obstacle them to
elaborate on what IEA is and how it should proceed. According to their perceptions,
the main goal of IEA is to co-produce knowledge about the management of human
threats to the marine environment. According to this view, humans are separate from
the marine environment, with the power to both disturb and manage it. The scientists
and government officials we interviewed had distinct views of IEAs. Scientists
reflected on the complexities of assessing integrated ecosystems and rarely placed
economic benefit as a priority. Officials perceived IEA as the environmental
component of a broader system that aimed to maximize economic profit while
minimizing environmental risk. We question who can determine what an acceptable
level of environmental risk would be in the Atlantic. From our research, we can
make the following recommendations, in particular for transboundary marine IEAs.
We advocate that the scoping phase of an IEA is of critical importance. It is during
the scoping phase that stakeholders are identified and engaged. With their
involvement, there is a need to make their interests visible and respected. During
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the scoping phase, a safe and open space needs to be secured, so these interests can
be negotiated and mutual understanding on concepts, roles in the process and the
possible outcomes are achieved. We acknowledge the limitations of this study,
particularly regarding the profile of our interviewees, most of which are not IEA
experts. Nonetheless, the government officials and researchers we interviewed
showed preconceived assumptions of the IEA process that highlight the importance
of communicating and agreeing upon IEA concepts between all participants as a top
priority.
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ABSTRACT
Ocean science diplomacy stands for the social phenomena resulting from the
interaction of science and diplomacy in ocean affairs. It includes, inter alia, the
provision of scientific evidence in support of international decision-making, the
building of alliances through scientific cooperation and the enhancement of
international collaborative research about the ocean. Despite this general
conceptualization, there is a need to understand what sense practitioners in the field
make of ocean science diplomacy. This paper reports on perceptions of ocean
science diplomacy collected through twenty in-depth interviews with government
officials and researchers active in the setup and implementation of the All-Atlantic
Ocean Research Alliance, both from the South and North Atlantic. Interviewees
overall perception is that ocean science diplomacy is a positive and critically
important phenomenon that combines the best of science and diplomacy. However,
results show that these practitioners perceive ocean science diplomacy differently,
resulting in a polarization of power in two ways: between science and policy, and
between South and North Atlantic realities. Scientists have reported feeling
suspicious of the policy making processes, while officials portray science as
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unaccountable and segregated from policy. South Atlantic interviewees have
expressed concern over their limited access to research, but at the same time seem
more welcoming to the scientific evidence presented by scientists. Northern
interviewees, with reported enhanced research capabilities, seem more inclined to
search for the scientific evidence that supports national political goals. The SouthNorth Atlantic relationships seems to be based on preconceived perceptions of the
other. Northern subjects make sense of their Southern peers as those in need of
assistance, while Southern interviewees claimed being unheard and victim of
tokenism. I discuss these findings in light of postcolonial and decolonial theories,
advocating for the need to decolonize ocean science diplomacy in the Atlantic
Ocean if we are to achieve its alluded benefits.

KEYWORDS
Coloniality of power, decolonialism, postcolonialism, international relations,
political sciences

INTRODUCTION
Science diplomacy analyses the interplay between knowledge development and
political contexts in which research and international affairs interrelate, from
international evidence-based negotiations to building uncontentious partnerships
(Davis & Patman 2015). Science diplomacy has been recognized as a long-lasting
practice in bridging countries even in face of conflicts elsewhere (Turekian et al.,
2015), although overlooked by orthodox International Relations scholarship
(Kaltofen & Acuto 2018). Finding its grounds on the universality of science and its
progressive influence over diplomatic negotiations (Skolnikoff 1993), science
diplomacy is particularly mainstreamed by the policy world as a practice to our
collective benefit (Ruffini, 2020b; Rungius & Flink, 2020). In turn, academia is
interested in understanding what are the drivers of science diplomacy practices,
including foreign policy interests, industrial competition, and the use of science as
a form of power between countries (e.g, Flink, 2020, 2021; Ruffini, 2020a; Rungius
& Flink, 2020). Despite these attempts to unveil the policy push over science, some
academics still ascertain science diplomacy to be grounded in the neutrality of
science as a benefit to diplomacy (Domingues & Ribeiro Neto, 2018; Turekian,
2018). Empirical evidence on the drivers and interests that fuel science diplomacy
is needed (Flink 2021), and even more so on South-North science diplomacy
phenomena (Soler 2021), where the colonial historical bounds cannot be neglected.
The Atlantic Ocean plays a key role in this regard, centrally connecting countries
from South and North while being the main stage for historical colonization (Games
2

2006). In face of the call for further empirical evidence on science diplomacy, this
inductive research assessed the meanings and values that Northern and Southern
practitioners use to engage in ocean science diplomacy. As this research analyzed
agent’s perceptions as they were presented, postcolonial and decolonial theories
were considered appropriate to discuss findings.
This article makes reference to South and North Atlantic as given geographies which
are separated by the Equator, with each reaching both polar seas: the Southern
Ocean in the South and the Arctic Ocean in the North (Talley et al. 2011). At times,
this paper also makes reference to the dichotomy Global North - Global South. In
the context of the Atlantic Ocean, Global North refers to the wealthier countries of
North America and Europe and Global South the less privileged countries in Latin
America, in Africa and in the Caribbean. It is acknowledged that Global North and
South are contested terms that suggest an oversimplification of a group of very
distinct countries (Tripathi 2021). However, I opt to use them in detriment to other
grouping terms that denote a sense of subalternity, such as developing and Third
World countries (Haug et al. 2021; Khan et al. 2022). What the terms Global North
and Global South capture is the core-periphery relations that sustain most of the
inequalities in terms of science and diplomacy capabilities of countries in the
Atlantic. It is also acknowledged that this binary logic invites a sense of opposition
and conflict (Chimakonam 2019), but my goal in using such terms is to highlight
the structural differences that do exist between these groups of countries, which can
result from the historical colonization and subsequent Western dominance over
Southern epistemes (Kloß 2017; Santos 2019), that still today benefits the privileged
countries in Europe and North America (Carchedi & Roberts 2021).

Ocean Science Diplomacy
The ocean, as a life-supporting system under serious environmental threats, is
subject to international law and governance, where conflict is the rule and not the
exception (Ranganathan 2020; Robinson 2020a). The ocean, more specifically the
high seas and the seabed, is considered a global commons. Global commons are
spaces and resources that lie beyond the sovereignty of countries, whose
management becomes a matter of global public interest, greatly informed by science
(Vogler 2012). Large ocean areas (particularly in the South Atlantic and South
Pacific) are still deficient of scientific knowledge that would allow better informed
international decision making (IOC-UNESCO 2020). Consequently, international
scientific cooperation, facilitated by diplomacy, is deemed necessary to overcome
the existing bottlenecks in our knowledge about the ocean. As science and
technology become important drivers in ocean diplomatic negotiations (Robinson
2020b), science diplomacy stands out as a structural phenomenon in global ocean
affairs (Polejack 2021). Distinct to a land-based science diplomacy, ocean science
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diplomacy is fluid and complex. It is constantly challenged by the very fragmented
and yet unresolved international ocean regime where science has ever been critical
(Ranganathan 2020; Robinson 2020b). Moreover, the discrepancies between
countries, particularly regarding technological capabilities, imposes questions of
which countries are able to explore and manage the ocean as a global commons,
possibly reflecting colonial dimensions in ocean diplomacy (Ranganathan 2016).

Colonialism and the Atlantic Ocean
The Atlantic Ocean stands out as an interesting case to study ocean science
diplomacy. Historically, the Atlantic has been the main stage for colonization and
imperial expansion (Games 2006). Colonialism was responsible for the wealth that
European empires enjoyed from exploring Atlantic colonies (Mignolo 1995). In this
work, ‘colonialism’ stands for the historical European political project to invade,
settle, explore and control non-European geographies for the benefit of the empires
(Kohn & Reddy 2022). Colonialism was possible due to the technological
advancements in navigation, intensified in the sixteenth century with the Atlantic
Ocean at the heart of the matter (Kohn & Reddy 2022). Apart from exploring natural
resources, colonialism systematically selected what was considered beneficial to the
wealth of the crown, expropriating local knowledge, specially about the local natural
environment, and repressing those that were considered unfit (Quijano 2007).
Consequently, colonialism established a relationship between the settlers and the
colony based on dominance. Scholars argue that the colonialization of what today
is termed as Latin America facilitated the creation of Europe as a socially and
politically constructed identity, where the European would be the civilized and
superior to the colonized, who were perceived as the savage deprived of civility and
enlightenment (Quijano 2007). The differences in the physical traits of the colonized
and the settler have possibly nurtured the notion of race as a social classification,
placing non-Europeans as the inferior other (Harding 2008; Said 1978). As a result,
these relations of superiority and inferiority legitimized dominance and permitted
the Eurocentric perspective to be the standard of civility and scientific epistemology
(Quijano 2000). The historical and political colonialism (and its subsequent
Eurocentrism) is relevant to understand the modern international relations between
former colonies and empires in the Atlantic (Alejandro 2018), and hence composes
the backstage of this research.

Coloniality
It could be said that colonialism saw its epilogue with the political independency of
colonies. However, this Eurocentrism has continued to rank and segregate humanity
in terms of class, gender and race (Mignolo 2009). Postcolonial theory postulates
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that the modern social fabric cannot be understood without acknowledging this
‘colonial wound’ (Losurdo 2020; de Sousa Santos 2009; Spivak 2010). Decolonial
scholars attribute this persistent legacy of colonialism to be a redesign of power
relations and dominance in modern international relations, termed as coloniality of
power (Mignolo 2007; Quijano 2000). Coloniality then represents the new colonial
project, referring to the social, economical and political consequences of historical
colonialism that gives the backbone for the core-periphery relationships today
(Mignolo 2009). Coloniality can also provide an explanation to how resources still
flow from peripheric (and semi-peripheric) countries to enrichen core countries, as
addressed by dependency theorists (Furtado 2020). In this sense, colonialism would
be a social formation, while coloniality a “political and symbolic condition”
(Lissovoy & Bailón 2019).

Coloniality and science
Science and technology are intrinsic parts of historical colonialism and current
coloniality. During colonization, the access to biodiversity, minerals and also
cultural heritage was of interest to European empires. This exploitation and
expropriation accounted for the enhancement of science, with Europe as the detainer
of scientific knowledge and wisdom (Collyer et al. 2019 p. 8). Far from being only
a historical fact, still today the consequences of colonialism impacts science. For
example, historical colonialism allied to current coloniality produce and maintain
an imbalanced paleontology, due to the concentration of fossil data in Northern
countries (Raja et al. 2021). Humanity’s ignorance about the marine biodiversity
that occurs in areas beyond jurisdictions is impacted by coloniality, with diplomacy
maneuvering legal principles (such as the common heritage of (hu)mankind) to
defend economic interests that profit from inequalities (Vadrot et al. 2021).
Coloniality also prevents Southern researchers to access science infrastructure
(Polejack & Coelho 2021), which makes them invisible to their Northern peers
(Gomez et al. 2022) and subject to what has been referred to as “parachute science”
(Vos & Schwartz 2022). Coloniality can also explain certain trends in science
cooperation between core and periphery, where historical colonial bounds and
subsequent language similarities could promote biased research networks, with
South-South cooperation being still incipient (Leydesdorff et al. 2013). Therefore,
in order to understand how ocean science diplomacy takes form in the Atlantic
region, it is necessary to comprehend the historical colonial ties together with the
modern international relations that exist between Northern and Southern countries.
North-South relationships have persisted over time, with science playing an
important role in advancing geopolitical claims in the Atlantic (Blair 2019).
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Case study: the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance
This study focuses on a specific science diplomacy arrangement in the Atlantic
Ocean: the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance, a North-South ocean science
diplomacy framework (Polejack et al. 2021).
The All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance (hereafter the Alliance) was created
through a set of successive international ocean science cooperative arrangements
bridging countries from the North (Canada, United States and the European Union)
and the South Atlantic (Argentina, Brazil, Cape Verde, Morocco and South Africa).
The countries involved in the creation of the Alliance agreed upon research priorities
and the alignment of resources, much of which attained national interests, becoming
a petri dish case study for exploring the realpolitik of ocean science diplomacy in
action (Polejack et al. 2021). This research drew from this Alliance to engage with
practitioners of science diplomacy in the Atlantic, as to collect their perceptions of
ocean science diplomacy. By establishing what ocean science diplomacy means,
these science diplomats (as the practitioners of science diplomacy, according to
Melchor 2020) define the values of engaging in such practices, influencing the
agenda-setting, the allocation of funds and the overall meaning of science
diplomacy in the Atlantic Ocean region, driving foreign policies and research efforts
in one direction or another.
Results suggest the existence of a polarization of power in the Atlantic Ocean
science diplomacy framework in two ways: 1. a clash between science and policy,
and 2. Differentiated meanings and engagement between North and South Atlantic.
Since calm waters do not make a good sailor, it is time to acknowledge this power
play among stakeholders and countries in the region if we are to achieve, in tenyears time, the “Science We Need for the Ocean We Want”, as predicted by the UN
Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (Ryabinin et al. 2019).

METHODS
This research assessed individual perceptions of ocean science diplomacy
from South and North Atlantic government officials and researchers, active in the
setup and implementation of the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. Perception
is a sensorial information process which, determined by past experiences, enables
an individual to create a lens in which to view and signify the world through a filter
of sociocultural influences (McDonald 2011). In assessing these individuals’
perceptions, the meaning each of them make of ocean science diplomacy is being
revealed, and at the same time their positionality is being exposed. Positionality
“describes how an individual’s perspective is shaped by their social position,
including class, gender and sexuality, racial identity, and other determinants of
6

social privilege” (Polk & Diver 2020). The sample was composed of high-level
decision-makers (13 individuals) and research leaders (07 individuals) coming from
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the
USA, and the European Commission. High-level decision-makers are government
officials who occupy high hierarchical positions in national ocean-related science
systems, including Science and Technology State Secretaries and Minister,
directors, head of departments, science managers, and diplomats. Research leaders
are those who have extensive experience in international scientific cooperation by
coordinating large-scale research projects and scientific programs but are also
involved in the provision of scientific information to political decision-making.
The identification and selection of these interviewees was done on the basis of their
professional positions, but also leveraging from the author’s prior engagement with
them as a former negotiator of the Alliance on behalf of Brazil. All interviews were
done by the author. On one hand, the previous interaction between the author and
the interviewees might have improved trust-building and consequently facilitated
openness and sincerity when answering the questions. On the other, it also exposes
the author’s positionality. The author is self-identified as a Southern male with a
background in natural science and proactively engaged with the All-Atlantic Ocean
Research Alliance and other international fora (generally related to ocean sciences).
With over 20 years of activity in the field, mainly as a government official in Brazil
and a practitioner of ocean science diplomacy, the author can be considered as an
insider researcher (Merriam et al. 2001). Consequently, the author’s positionality
matters for it exposes the background through which this analysis was done.
Semi-structured interviews (Bryman 2012) were done in presence (12 interviews),
during the All-Atlantic Forum2 (Brussels, February 2020), as well as online (08
interviews), due to the COVID-19 travel restrictions, from April to October 2020.
Interviews were composed of a set of six questions, from which three were common
to all interviewees, while the reaming were specific to researchers or to government
officials (Table 1).

2

https://allatlanticocean.org/view/atlanticforums/2020-brussels, accessed in Nov.18, 2021
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Table 1: Interview questions.
GENERAL SET OF QUESTIONS
1. Can you tell me a bit about yourself? Background, age, experience…?
2. Tell me about Science Diplomacy, what is it to you?
3. In this context, please let me know how useful Science Diplomacy could be?
QUESTIONS TO SCIENTISTS ONLY

QUESTIONS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ONLY

4. Let’s say you hold an important result that
could help authorities to deal with a problem,
what would you do?

4. Please share how you use scientific information in your
work. How to access, apply?

5. Tell me how you feel about your participation
in negotiations (national or international).

5. Tell me your perception of how negotiations take
scientific information (first nationally, then internationally).

6. Would you have any insights on how this
picture could look better?

6. Any final recommendations on how to improve this?

Interviews were conducted both in English and in Portuguese and were fully
transcribed in their original language. Translation from Portuguese to English was
only done when presenting extracts in this paper, which are shown between brackets
and in italic. Interviewees are anonymized and their names replaced by
corresponding gendered names inspired by the Orixas (Rosario 2014), a
mythological pantheon of African gods which illustrates one of the many African
cultural heritage introduced by cross-Atlantic colonial slavery in South America.
Transcripts were analyzed with the software MAXQDA Plus 2020 (Release 20.4.1)
and codes were assigned to text extracts. Codes were generated by the author in
accordance with grounded theory (Bryman 2012), meaning that no pre-established
codes were used. Coding was revised multiple times. These revisions included
reassessing transcripts and the audio of the interviews in full, assigning codes
relevant to capture the main ideas expressed by interviewees. The same text (or parts
of it) could have been assigned to multiple codes. Revisions were considered
fulfilled when coded segments did not require further reassignments. The full list of
generated codes can be found as supplementary material3. Codes were clustered in
themes, as per a thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006). Themes were also revised
multiple times. Revision of themes was carried out by clustering all the coded
segments under each thematic category (irrespective of the interviewee or the order
in which the element was transmitted) until no further rearrangement was necessary
and the placement of codes under each theme was considered exhausted.
Thematic analysis was chosen (Braun & Clarke 2006) because it allows the
identification and organization of patterns of meaning, suitable to identify these
individual’s perceptions and values in engaging in ocean science diplomacy
3

For reviewing purposes, the list of codes is included in this file as an appendix, as requested by one
reviewer.
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practices, irrespective of the sample size. Thematic analysis, however, is limited to
collect what was said, rather than how interviewees say it, which also limits the
scope of the discussed results. Moreover, positionality is very influential in thematic
analysis for it is the researcher who assigns codes and organize themes, which
naturally denote her/his standpoint, grounded on issues of gender, class, race, and
social realities (Braun & Clarke 2013 pp. 174–83). In spite of such limitations, this
method was suited to collect the necessary understanding of what agents in the
Atlantic context mean by engaging in science diplomacy practices. Therefore, the
themes generated by this research are presented as subheadings of the Results
section below and include: 1. Ocean science diplomacy perceived as beneficial, 2.
Perceptions about the role of science and diplomacy, 3. How scientists feel about
diplomacy and policy, 4. How policy-makers feel about science, 5. Different science
diplomacies in North and South Atlantic, and 6. Perceptions of coloniality.

RESULTS
Figure 1 illustrates a dive into the ocean, showing exemplary quotes from the
interviews that reflect the themes addressed in this section. This dive starts at the
surface, where the best of science meets the best of diplomacy, for our collective
benefit. In shallow waters, conflicting issues between the principles of science and
policy start to become evident. Diving deeper, individual positionalities in terms of
those from the Global South and those from the Global North diverge, particularly
on the motivations to engage in practices of science diplomacy. At this stage, issues
related to differences in scientific capabilities and advisory schemes are frequent.
At the bottom, the different meanings and values attributed to ocean science
diplomacy by this particular set of individuals seem to point to matters of
coloniality.
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Figure 1: Visual graphic on the results shown in this paper ranging from a beneficial ocean science diplomacy in the
surface to matters of coloniality in the bottom. Quotes represent exact extracts of interviews conducted in this
research.

1. Ocean science diplomacy perceived as positive
In general, individuals expressed unfamiliarity with the current academic
conceptualization of science diplomacy (e.g. Gluckman et al., 2018; The Royal
Society & AAAS, 2010). In spite of this alleged unawareness, interviewees have
expressed perceptions of science diplomacy that goes in line with the general
common sense frequently found in the academic literature (e.g. Fedoroff 2009;
Turekian et al. 2015). This common sense of science diplomacy includes the
benefits accruing from using science to peacefully bridge countries and
communities around shared goals, achieved by exercises of trust-building and
generally based on the goodwill of those engaged to overcome global challenges
(Skolnikoff 1993).
“Science diplomacy is about building the relationships. It's building the trust but it's
also building the sense that we are all working towards a common good” (Omin,
South, Government official).

To interviewees, ocean science diplomacy is an unavoidable reality.
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“It's not because it's beautiful, it's because we actually achieve a greater impact
through international cooperation than individually” (Xango, South, Government
official).
“Science diplomacy is moving from being a very welcome and easy optional extra to
becoming a critical part of how we are collectively going to solve problems” (Oxossi,
North, Government official).
“Science diplomacy is really central to a lot of politics around the world” (Exu, South,
Government official)

Science diplomacy would have the power to overcome existing political constraints
between countries.
“Commitments were made to say, okay fine, we have to be able to utilize the ocean
for common needs. So that create issues... Currently science is pushing towards [the
motto of] forget our differences” (Exu, South, Government official).
“Science diplomacy seems to be that continuous steady point of engagement that
surrounds so many different subjects, but it's a core of goodwill between countries
that may be choosing to disagree about matters elsewhere” (Ere, North, Government
official).

2. Perceptions about the role of science and diplomacy
Frequently, the general perception of science diplomacy as a powerful tool to build
alliances and overcome political sensibilities was based on assumed characteristics
of the practice of science. For example, one Southern government official believes
that the internationalization of science gives the foundations of this dialogue
between science and diplomacy.
“You cannot practice science without doing it in an international context and
therefore diplomacy automatically becomes part of it. It's an unavoidable
consequence” (Ibeji, South, Government official).

In addition, science has been attributed as a source of truth, a safe port to be called.
“When you enter the policy debate, it's really easy to go down a slippery slope of
being seen as an advocate for a particular position because of some reason other than
the science. Whereas if you stay solid as a science voice, I think then the science
community can routinely be that repository of truths that people can go to” (Ere,
North, Government official).

Science has also been portrayed as a driver of political decision-making.
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“Politics don't matter if the science is important. Sometimes you can get a lot done if
the scientists go first, and the politics will follow. Not always, but…” (Odoya, North,
researcher).

These views seem to translate a feeling of trustworthiness in science, of a science
that is naturally open, uncontested, apolitical, and internationally cooperative.
Ocean science diplomacy would then profit from these perceived characteristics of
science to influence diplomatic decisions. As pointed out by one government
official, science can be an inescapable force in diplomatic negotiations that are
informed by scientific evidence:
“in international negotiations, I would presume it's very difficult to avoid the
scientific evidence without having to walk away from that negotiation process, in the
way that we know has happened in the climate change negotiations, for example”
(Ibeji, South, Government official).

One Northern government official portrayed science as also determinant for
economic development and social wellbeing.
“Our assumptions in terms of how we build our economy, how we ensure the people
have the security and prosperity that they need and the values that they can pursue....
We are now bound to what science has produced for the first time” (Oxossi, North,
Government official).

Traditional diplomacy has been portrayed as limited and in need of the help of
science.
“Diplomacy can effectively solve problems. There are other issues where diplomacy
is not enough, the intervention of knowledge is necessary. And especially when
diplomatic relations, for many social, economic, political reasons, are complicated
and serious, it must be scientists who help” (Kao, North, Government official).

3. How scientists feel about diplomacy and policy
Although interviewees attributed to science a power of influence in diplomacy,
scientists have expressed multiple feelings when engaging with diplomacy and
general decision-making processes. Such feelings included:
Pride:
“How did I feel about my participation? I feel great. And I think that we helped move
the needle but, as you know, it's a pretty slow process. It takes a lot of perseverance”
(Yemanja, North, researcher).
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Frustration:
“[I feel] sometimes a little frustrated, especially in the CBD, I was really frustrated
because it was an ordinance that had no justification and it fell. This is sometimes
very demotivating.” (Oya, North, researcher).

Limited agency:
“I feel the ball is on the other side, on the people that take the decisions at a
different level, completely different to what I do. I'm a scientist, just a scientist”
(Eparrei, South, researcher).

Suspicion:
“You just happen to be a good case to get something through that you wouldn't even
subscribe if you knew what it was, right? So I feel we shouldn't be seen as being part
of that particular process, but we should be ready to inform those who are in that
game” (Iorimar, North, researcher).

Misuse:
“Often it's not that obvious that something is scientific. Sometimes it's really about
urgency, about politics. But you always have to justify it in a scientific way...” (Oya,
North, researcher).

Precaution:
“I always personally felt a real sense of responsibility. I felt like I had to be really
careful about what I was saying and doing. I tried to make it clear there was a whole
bunch we didn't know, so that they weren't somehow confused and think that I knew,
that we knew, as scientists, everything” (Oxala, North, researcher).

Estrangement:
“I always wondered why the hell are scientists there because you sort of get in the
way of the diplomats trying to do the job that they're supposed to be doing” (Iorimar,
North, researcher).

“for me, that was very impressive because I was never really close to that world and
then you can see how it is so dynamic and you have to get adjusted and accustomed
to that truth, to be able to do the best of your help” (Eparrei, South, researcher).
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4. How policy-makers feel about science
The relationship of science with society was frequently raised by officials. Officials
tended to perceive science to be apart from socio-political realities and closed in
itself.
“We’re not doing science for science's sake. We are trying to bring scientists, who
only think about science excellence, to go beyond that. (…) How do we bring in the
users of the science who are affected by these challenges right at the beginning of
defining what needs to be done? And in so doing we are beginning to create a new
paradigm that it's not just scientists influencing science diplomacy” (Alafim, South,
Government official).

Another interesting perception of science was highlighted by one official who
seemed to call for a more socially engaging science, but recognizing boundaries to
the agency of scientists in the “big political games”:
“Even though scientists very often stay in their labs, they give an example in the
universities, they give an example to their students, to the PHD candidates, they give
an example to society. (…) Of course, we cannot enter into the big political games,
which are of a totally different nature.” (Saluba, North, Government official).

According to another official, science is not accountable in the policy sphere and
scientists need to build a consciousness of their expanded role in delivering answers
to society, as potential leaders of future transitions:
“Science is not a very accountable area. It's accountable to the scientific community,
but not to the rest in the same way. But in this context is quite different because now
science actually has to lead and science has to be very conscious of the fact that the
community of practice involved in science diplomacy is no longer the scientists. Is
the people who need science to deliver answers, solutions, directions, transitions”
(Oxossi, North, Government official).

One issue of importance in the relationship of science and other sectors was
communication.
“This is also a scientist's duty, a diplomat's duty, to always explain what scientific
findings are, what are the impacts of it, to make it into an easy language for the
population to understand” (Xango, South, Government official).
“Public opinion-making, storytelling is very often also linked to how can we manage
to couple that with the scientific evidence, so that it catches really the attention of the
opinion-makers, slash, of the politicians” (Saluba, North, Government official).

Hitherto, perceptions have positioned science as a powerful influence over
diplomacy, but with limited participation in decision-making processes. Both
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officials and scientists recognize a need for better coordination. On one hand,
interviewed scientists not always feel comfortable when engaging with policymaking. On the other, government interviewees tend to perceive science as a source
of truth, but apart from socio-political realities. As yet, perceptions seem to position
science as a key element to lead social transformation and aid diplomacy, but
concurrently challenge it on becoming more accessible and accountable.

5. Different science diplomacies in North and South Atlantic
Southern and Northern interviewees have expressed different departing points when
engaging in ocean science diplomacy frameworks. To Southern interviewees, issues
of research funding and scientific capabilities were central.
“We have different challenges, where quite a number of countries do not even have
research vessels. So, how can they contribute? How can they participate in such a
venture? Some of them are lined on European vessels and come along but then they
are unable to design their own agenda” (Exu, South, Government official).
“I think it goes back to the point that we don't have the resources to do things alone,
to address these various issues. So collaboration, whether it's in the area of oceans,
or a very good example right now is the issue of COVID, where we're seeing science
diplomacy being used to leverage various countries' expertise, experiences” (Omin,
South, Government official).

Not only the capacity to develop research was brought upfront. The fashion by
which government officials access science to inform decision making also differed.
For example, while one Northern official states:
“I have technically limitless access to the available science information in that we are
an organization that has very sophisticated technocratic processes to extract
knowledge from projects, convene scientific experts to pre-digest results and give us
some pre-digested analysis” (Oxossi, North, Government official)

A similar official in the South recognizes the challenges they face in providing
scientific evidence to decision making:
“[country A] is probably in a fortunate position where we do have science advisors
at different levels. That may not be the case for many other countries” (Omin, South,
Government official).

With the expressed differences in the capacity to foster research and to access
research findings to inform diplomacy, differences on the use of the available
scientific evidence were also noted. Northern officials seem to search for the
scientific evidence that can support political claims:
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“We just recently, for example, reframed our [document] and that means that we will
not simply pursue that and all the policies around us including science within [country
B], but we will support and pursue and imbue all of our diplomacy around the world
with a view to working with other countries also to attain that goal because it is a
global goal, but it's also now.... it is a geopolitical interest of the [country B] to do
that. So the diplomacy will use Science to attain that end.” (Oxossi, North,
Government official).
“As we prepare a policy statement or a position, does the science back this up? What's
the science behind it that would lead us to be able to comfortably say that's our
position and this is why” (Ogum, North, Government official).

Southern officials tend to listen to scientists before formulating a political statement:
“The [National] Academy [of Science] actually has a series of experts that are
members in different areas and also work closely with the government. Well, not as
in we'll provide you with what you want to hear but using the science that's out there
in terms of reports, in terms of what is happening globally, where the science is
going” (Omin, South, Government official).

One Southern government official voiced concerns on the political use of the
scientific evidence in diplomatic negotiations:
“This thing of science being neutral is bullshit. Of course, it's less political, but it is
political. If you have more people, who go to meetings, who finance studies, how is
this financing done... We are not silly. When you don't have your own people on a
scientific committee, you don’t trust in it. But you start to get lost too” (Oxum, South,
Government official).

This same official provided an example on how impactful this influence of science
can be to Global South foreign policies:
“It's like the tuna quotas, right? If you divide the high seas today and say: so for now,
whoever has the technology to do this will start, then you can never play again. And
turns into this awful quota, that if you didn't fish 70 years ago, you don't get a quota
for anything today” (Oxum, South, Government official).

And ends with this strong quote:
“I, from a developing country, am very afraid of what this might mean for our
ambitions for the future” (Oxum, South, Government official).
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6. Perceptions of coloniality
Although the term “coloniality” was not used by interviewees, issues related to the
differences between North and South were frequent, denoting how instrumental
coloniality seems to be to the North-South science diplomacy. According to one
Northern researcher, North-South differences can be explained on the basis of how
the world operates:
“I think we have too much structure, old structure and too much naivety and
particularly when you consider how we need to pull this outside of the Northern
Hemisphere kind of top down approach, which still is quite present in the way in
which science operates, the way in which the world operates. I'm giving a talk next
week, and I'm showing different maps of the world to try to illustrate the idea that
even just mapping the world influences how we think about it. And you have the
different projections, and then a globe itself. If you just take whatever projection you
like and flip it upside down and put the North Pole in the bottom of the map, it looks
completely different. It doesn't look like our planet at all to me when I look at that
and the oceans look very different, the way in which they connect. And so, we're all
of us trapped in these old ways of seeing the planet itself and our various wools and,
you know, I always look at the globe and I think yeah [Country C] is on top” (Oxala,
North, researcher).

Away from the generic initial statement of producing a “common global purpose”
(Jetrue, North, researcher), the structural inequalities in the Atlantic produce distinct
realities to those doing and managing ocean science. For example, a Northern
researcher expressed:
“we are all about -we need to understand the ocean, so we get better decisionsbecause we are coming from a perspective of excellent capacity” (Iorimar, North,
researcher).

In the South, another researcher recognizes:
“Setting up international agreements to do ocean research is perhaps not as high on
the agenda as reducing poverty, most of which is not dependent on the ocean
environment” (Nana, South, researcher).

In consequence, achieving the expressed desire of applying ocean science
diplomacy to build a new world ambition based on the power of influence of science
becomes virtually impossible without addressing the impacts of such structural
differences in the Atlantic. And, of course, the meaning they create.
This same researcher testified on tokenistic scientific practices:
“I've noticed a tendency for the involvement of third world countries and their
scientists to be sort of... from a token perspective. So with some projects and
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programs the international consortia around those and involved in those is already all
worked out. The proposals are essentially written and then there's a realization oh, by
the way, we need to include a Brazilian or we need to include a South African. And
it almost comes as an afterthought. So, you know, you're not really... and I've seen
the same thing with programs that focus on the tropical systems where there's really
token involvement of the Angolans in the whole thing, but they're not really leading
anything and they're not allowed to change anything within the proposal itself. So,
that for me is a bit of an issue and I've seen it in the past and it's kind of continuing
to happen today. So I think that's a huge limitation.” (Nana, South, researcher)

Similar thoughts were shared by one Southern government official:
“Of course you do have the problems of this being an unequal share, of being a share
that often gives unequal possibilities to countries, and we suffer this from countries
in the North” (Oxum, South, Government official)

These perceptions of unequal opportunities were also recognized by individuals
from the Global North:
“The traditional methods of doing ocean research are very expensive and it is
necessary to evolve towards lower cost systems. You have to have information on
top and this is the best way to combat the inequalities that persist between the South
and the North” (Kao, North, Government official).

These perceptions of structural differences in capacities seem to also produce a
meaning of the South as those in need of assistance, a feature risen by both
government officials and researchers in the North:
“The leveling, the increasing arrival of countries to get to a point where they actually
can take some action rather than be so poor that they can just crush under the whoa
with what their circumstances might be. As a small kid, I dreamed about being in a
certain place in a science community on a marine environment and I think those
countries had similar aspirations, individuals there, but they get to realize it now (…)
they're part of our community” (Ere, North, Government official).
“When I talk to countries which are in the middle of the road, for them the Ocean
Decade is all about capabilities and capacities. It's about being able to join the
dialogue, being able to assess, also in a quantitative way what the ocean means in
their development agenda” (Iorimar, North, researcher).

One Northern official voiced the value of knowing Southern realities and the
significance that this has in science diplomacy.
“I'm interested to know what does the world look like to them [the South], what they
consider to be important. And in diplomacy, science diplomacy in particular, your
selection of what is important or not important, what should you know, knowing what
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you should know is the single biggest problem in all of this” (Oxossi, North,
Government official).

However, a Northern researcher pointed out to the strategic importance of knowing,
of profiting from this knowledge about your peers:
“At the end, we are always going to have some kind of asymmetry because
companies, persons, institutions and countries or allies or whatever, they use the
asymmetry in the information, they know something... If I know something that you
don't know I have an advantage” (Jetrue, North, researcher).

The role of the Global North as holders of capabilities was expressed by this
government official, who also seemed to align such position to a power in making
decisions about viable scientific cooperation:
“So [Institution] being a major distributor of the ocean observations in the world,
needs to see value in changing the way in which they do business. Doesn't mean we're
trying to be bullies here, but if we're contributing we'd better be part of the
conversation” (Ogum, North, Government official).

Meanwhile, this Southern official expressed concern over the sustainable future of
the Atlantic:
“My perception is that either we do something with a broad regime in the South
Atlantic or the South Atlantic is going to die, because the Chinese, the Spanish and
so many others are fishing like there is no tomorrow. They do what they want, right?”
(Oxum, South, Government official).

One Southern official articulated on the existing differences between North and
South and how they seem to produce distinct meanings of engagement to each
community. He alludes to science diplomacy the power of change and provides a
few recommendations:
“Between the South, we must increase our visibility in the discussions. I think that
bit is lacking. We must also build more cooperation between ourselves. In science
diplomacy, we are not carrying to the negotiations an empty bowl, and then the others
must donate into that bowl. We are taking our geographical advantage areas because
of our geopolitical positioning, our science systems and infrastructure. We are
playing as equal partners to negotiate on a future of the Atlantic because we all are
stakeholders. So to me, it is important that even when we bring in other partners, they
must not be looking as if the [North] will provide everything. We have contributions
to bring along. And we must articulate that, so that the others can see that without us
they cannot achieve the purposes of that [Alliance]. Just as much as we must also
acknowledge that without the partnership with the North, we will not have an AllAtlantic. So, we need to find those kind of spaces where we move away from the
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development assistance philosophy. Science diplomacy must lead to that kind of
work, of creating this kind of interaction”. (Alafim, South, Government official)

DISCUSSION
Interviewees seem to perceive the influence of ocean science in international
relations as inevitable, even critical. In their perception of ocean science diplomacy,
the scientific component, rather than the diplomatic, is identified as the main factor
of science diplomacy. This perception goes in line with what The Royal Society &
AAAS (2010) term as Science for Diplomacy, where science is assumed to serve
diplomacy in fostering dialogue, building alliances and alleviating political tensions.
According to the interviewees’ perceptions, science is portrayed as value-free,
apolitical and a source of truth. Science diplomacy would be a strong influence in
international relationships and a driver of change, primarily supported by the
perceived values of universality and neutrality of science. This initial perception of
a benevolent and inevitable ocean science diplomacy is further challenged as the
interviews went in more details. Issues such as the search of scientific evidence to
support political claims, the influence of science funding and research infrastructure
in North-South relationships, and competition amongst peers became more evident.
Science is commonly promoted as paradigmatic (Khun 1962), universal (Merton
1973), and the source of objective truths (Popper 1963). Hence, public perception
of science tends to reinforce such a view (Jasanoff 2012 p. 247). However, science,
as any other social phenomena, is embedded in the political, economic and social
drivers that signify its meaning and conduct (Latour 1993). Such a turnover is
apparent in the interviews. When interviewees were given a chance to elaborate
further on their perceptions of science diplomacy, they usually expressed many of
the political and social drivers that seem to influence the practice of science in the
region. Questions about the accountability of science, the segregation of science
from policy, accessibility to scientific evidence and unbalanced research capabilities
seem to point to at least two layers of power disputes composing the meaning of
ocean science diplomacy in the Atlantic. These power disputes are: a) a dispositional
power between researchers and government officials in international negotiations,
and b) a relational power fueling a South-North divide and producing different
meanings for ocean science diplomacy practices in the region.

A. Dispositional power
One would assume the term science diplomacy to reflect a cross-boundary
phenomenon where (at least) scientists and diplomats would coordinate and work
together. However, the collected results point to the existence of limitations to such
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joint work. One of the limitations refers to the positionality in which the interviewed
researchers place themselves in international negotiations and how that positionality
place government officials in an advance position of power in relation to the
researchers. The interviewed scientists reported to be confused about the political
decision-making process and not wishing to fully engage with it, suspicious of the
processes and values of the policy world. Apparently, scientists seem to feel more
comfortable acting as providers of scientific evidence and leaving the room for the
diplomats to take over negotiations in what was called “big political games”, where
scientists seem not to belong to. The position of actors in relation to each other will
determine what they might be able to achieve in terms of outcomes from a decisionmaking process, constituting what is termed as ‘dispositional power’ (RamírezMonsalve & van Tatenhove 2020). In this case, the influence of science (and the
agency of scientists) is limited in the process of international decision-making, and
government officials are placed in a position of superiority in relation to the
researchers. The predominance of policy actors mainstreaming and conceptualizing
science diplomacy has been reported by previous publications which raise the
concern on the driving interests in using science as a source of power to fuel
diplomatic relations (see Ruffini 2020a). The establishment of trust between science
and policy was presented by the interviewees as one element that would facilitate
the cooperation between researchers and government officials, an element which
could also address the power imbalance. However, trust-building is a complex
process that takes time and is context-dependent, sometimes limiting the legitimacy
of the decision-making process by promoting specific stakeholders’ views
(perceived as trusted sources) to be more influential than others (Cvitanovic et al.,
2021; Lacey et al., 2018).
It would be interesting to investigate this feature further. If such agreement proves
to be a common practice, it would challenge scholarship that alludes much power to
the diplomacy that happens away from the State-led setting, generally termed as
public or track two diplomacy (Jones 2015; Nye 2008), where non-State actors
progress with international negotiations in spite of traditional diplomacy.

B. Relational power
The availability and use of resources will influence the ability of actors to interrelate
and achieve certain outcomes from a decision making process, constituting what is
termed as ‘relational power’ (Arts & Tatenhove 2004). In this case, the privileged
position of countries in the North Atlantic, with reported better technical capacities
and more structured advisory schemes, seem to facilitate the uptake of scientific
evidence to diplomacy. Some of the interviewed Northern government officials
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expressed alleged unlimited access to scientific evidence4, evidence which they are
capable of selecting to support political positions5. Meanwhile, interviewed
Southern individuals reported on their limited agency in setting ocean research
priorities6, with limited advisory systems7, falling victim to tokenism8 and afraid to
what these limitations might mean to their countries’ future9. These results indicate
that the technical divide between the North and South Atlantic motivate distinct
engagements in ocean science diplomacy. It would seem that Northern officials seek
to use science to support foreign policy goals and raise influence over other
countries, whereas the South seems to desire an improvement of their capabilities,
enhancing opportunities for research and enjoying similar levels of evidenceinformed decision-making. Thus, the inequalities between North and South is
pivotal in ocean science diplomacy frameworks in the Atlantic, requiring those
studying the region to consider structural unbalances both in science and in
diplomacy to play a considerable part in the dynamics between science and
diplomacy. One way of analyzing such discrepancies is through the lenses of
postcolonial and decolonial theories, explained in broader terms in the introduction
and explored further in the next sub-section.

Coloniality of power in ocean science diplomacy
Briefly, postcolonialism argues that today’s social fabric cannot be understood
without acknowledging the historic political project of European colonization,
resulting in a classification of colonies and people therein as inferiors (Fanon 1965;
Harding 2008). Decolonial theoreticians defend that modernity is a concept built
from colonialism (Mignolo 2007) and coloniality of power a term to designate the
current project to maintain colonial values of dominance and classification of the
‘other’ (Quijano 2000). It has been observed that interviewees from the North
Atlantic often refer to their Southern partners of the All-Atlantic Alliance as those
4

“I have technically limitless access to the available science” (Oxossi, North, Government official)

5

“As we prepare a policy statement or a position, does the science back this up?” (Ogum, North,
Government official)

6

“quite a number of countries do not even have research vessels. Some of them are lined on
European vessels but then they are unable to design their own agenda” (Exu, South, Government
official).

7

“[country A] is probably in a fortunate position where we do have science advisors at different
levels. That may not be the case for many other countries” (Omin, South, Government official).

8

“I've noticed a tendency for the involvement of third world countries and their scientists to be sort
of... from a token perspective.” (Nana, South, researcher)

9

“I, from a developing country, am very afraid of what this might mean for our ambitions for the
future” (Oxum, South, Government official).
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seeking assistance, which naturally results in the North as the assistance provider,
somehow superior. Southern subjects, in turn, voiced the deleterious consequences
of this assistance philosophy and tokenism, both in research as in diplomacy. This
feature is not exclusive to this Alliance, but rather a common practice in
international aid, particularly on issues of health, as recently discussed by Khan et
al. (2022). Thus, coloniality of power would advise on South-North relationships in
ocean science diplomacy. From the manner by which Northern individuals make
sense of their Southern peers to issues of equity in the access to funding, research
infrastructure and human capital, all could be rooted in a project of coloniality. This
project would seek to maintain countries in the Global North as the holders of
scientific capabilities, culminating in more influential roles in the international
agenda setting on ocean affairs, which seems to happen with regard to the
negotiations on the conservation and sustainable use of the biodiversity that occurs
out of national jurisdictions, for instance (Tolochko & Vadrot 2021; Vadrot et al.
2021). Examples of this coloniality in science diplomacy could include the incipient
participation of Southern scientists in developing critical scientific reports to
influence diplomatic negotiations (Muelbert et al. 2021).
As part of the colonial wound, Southern scientists are bound to Western criteria of
excellence, even if these criteria are largely unfit to the reality in which they exist
(Kraemer-Mbula et al. 2020). This criteria of excellence not only affect scientists,
but also traditional and indigenous knowledge, the millennium survival kit for
individual decision making in every Southern colony. Western science determines
which epistemes are fit and valuable to the eyes of the modern, widely accepted and,
of course, Western scientific method (Hesselmann 2019; Sharma 2021; Smith
2012). This epistemicide, or the murder of knowledge (De Sousa Santos 2016),
translates how ineffective coloniality has been on de facto producing knowledge
that is fit-for-purpose, questioning if science has ever been either universal or
apolitical (Latour 1993). In addition, this epistemic injustice has shown how
detrimental epistemicide is to build any possibility of a better planet (Koskinen &
Rolin 2021).
Unless there is an effort to decolonize science diplomacy, ocean science diplomacy
will reproduce outdated habits by reinforcing coloniality and failing in achieving its
perceived main goal of building alliances around science to tackle global challenges.
At this point in time, it seems inevitable to also question whether the very concept
of science diplomacy makes sense to Southern communities as it seems to do for
those in the North. As a concept developed in the USA with further debates in
Europe, science diplomacy may be yet another manifestation of coloniality of
power. According to these interviews, diplomacy is distinctively influenced by
science in the North and South, turning the definition of what would be a Southerncentered science diplomacy a matter of interest, if indeed this definition is desired
by the South. Noteworthy, the search of what a Southern science diplomacy would
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look like can greatly differ between epistemic communities and countries,
reinforcing the artificiality of the term South as including many different realities.
However, science diplomacy has been reported as a tool for the globalized
advancement of humanity as a single entity (Berkman 2019; Gluckman et al. 2018),
but caution is necessary with the Northern approach to using science as a source of
power to chase political interests abroad, what could reinforce relationships of
dominance and coloniality of power with the South, all considered (Flink 2020;
Ruffini 2020b; Rungius & Flink 2020). It is time for the many countries and
communities in the Global South to signify science diplomacy to local realities and
build meaningful international engagements for these communities benefits
(Mencía-Ripley et al. 2021).
On this regard, globalization has produced a worldview centered on people rather
than nations, as if humanity was one single entity (Chilcote 2002). As discussed
before, coloniality ranks humanity from those fully humans, in general the
normative white Northern men, to those less humans. It is virtually impossible to
correctly address any global challenges, wicked problems and so on without
breaking this paradigm and recognizing privileges (Ludwig et al. 2021). Therefore,
ocean science diplomacy will probably fail extensively in the ambition to tackle
global common interests. Nonetheless, understanding these forces in action on the
interrelation of ocean science and diplomacy will boost our collective knowledge
towards seeking shared interests that can be explored conjointly.
On a final discussion note, this research being inductive means that the identification
of postcolonial and decolonial theories as the adequate lenses through which to
analyze these results occurred after these individuals’ perceptions were exposed.
However, my own positionality might have influenced this criteria, as much as it
have impacted the selection of coding categories and themes. As highlighted by one
of the reviewers of this article, a reflexive discourse analysis was done in order to
ascertain that this text was not reproducing coloniality itself (Alejandro 2021). To
this end, I used my interpretation of coloniality as a compass discourse. Thus, after
reflexively reanalyzing this text, I attempted inasmuch as possible to undress myself
of Eurocentrism and oppressive lines of argumentation. This has proven to be harder
than expected and I do apologize to the reader in case colonial praxis are still
present. Decolonization starts with self and reflexive analysis is an endless process,
thus this paper’s evidence should be looked at with these limitations in mind.
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CONCLUSIONS
Science has extensively informed on the ocean thresholds (Rockström et al. 2009),
supporting diplomatic negotiations with enough empirical evidence, which are
largely failing in producing the required changes (Ruffini, 2018; Tessnow-von
Wysocki & Vadrot, 2020). It seems very naïve to believe that science alone holds
such a power in moving the current directions of humanity. Unless we acknowledge
the need for a bridging of communities of practice and move towards greater ocean
equity between regions, leaving behind outdated habits, we will probably fail again
in envisioning a new order, as expected for the UN Decade of Ocean Science
(Claudet et al. 2019).
Although we are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, with the data
presented and discussed in this paper showing signs of how coloniality refrains us
from building this imagined ocean science diplomacy, I want to conclude with a
beam of hope, expressed by the interviewees themselves. When asked how we could
do better, these knowledgeable individuals presented a few possibilities to progress
with change. First, enhancing South-South cooperation may improve greatly the
decolonization of ocean science diplomacy by creating alliances based on similar
challenges and socio-economic realities. Second, recognizant of matters of
coloniality in ocean science diplomacy, many of these individuals showed signs of
goodwill in pursuing a new worldview, one in which epistemic justice and more
balanced capacities are nurtured as an incremental part of doing ocean science
diplomacy. Lastly, dialogue. Listening to the other inasmuch as taking their views
into consideration was highlighted as the oil to grease the engine of ocean science
diplomacy in the Atlantic. I end with a quote that envisions the future of science
diplomacy:
“So science is moving from being an observer to an actor, and diplomacy has to move
from being a polite way of bringing scientists together to talk about interesting things
to a mandate to deliver for people they may never see or meet. We need a new area
of international relations, which will likely describe the specificities of science
diplomacy in an age where diplomacy will depend on science in a way it never has
done before” (Oxossi, North, Government official).
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Supplementary Material – coding system
The Table below shows the code categories identified from all interviews. Codes
are presented in alphabetical order along with their frequency (in terms of absolute
number of coded segments).
Code System

Frequency

Accessibility to data

14

Broader participation

33

Capacities

18

Collaboration

35

Communicating Science Diplomacy

27

Competition

6

Cross-border interests

23

Diplomacy for Science

17

Equity

18

Funding for research

22

Global interests

34

Intergenerational aspects

10

Limitations to advice

35

Linking national to international

8

National Interests

47

National Science Advice schemes

30

Northern perspectives

22

Operability of Science Diplomacy

23

Other advice/values beyond science

11

Researchers pushed to societal issues

15

Risk in decision making

5

Role of institutions

23

science as a soft power

11

Science closed in itself

33

Science denial

6

Science Diplomacy examples

24

Science for Diplomacy

49

Science in Diplomacy

24

Science-policy conflict

94

Science-society clashes

40

Skepticism

35

Southern perspectives

53

Trans/interdisciplinarity

27

Unawareness of doing science diplomacy

18

Unseen ocean

23

Values of science diplomacy

78

What science diplomacy should be

42
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